

**THE STRUGGLE'S NOT  
YET OVER: NUCLEAR  
FREE ISSUES IN  
PACIFIC ISLANDS  
TODAY**

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FORWARD

This paper is a revision of a presentation given in June, 1994, to the first conference of the International Small Islands Studies Association. Today, as I gaze out my window at the remnants of my neighborhood, it is hard to remember the sense of security I had when this paper was originally written. Under ordinary circumstances, I would postpone this revision for a time when life is more normal, but 'normality' has everything to do with feeling secure, and so I suggest it is imperative that we reconsider security now, while we are still able to do so.

At 5:46 a.m. on 17 January 1995, Kobe was hit by an earthquake of tremendous force. I spent the next 45 minutes or so pulling myself out of the ruins of what had been my furniture and lighting and frantically trying to ensure that, having survived the initial shock, I would remain alive regardless of what else happened.

After about an hour, I finally found my radio beneath the contents of what had once been a bookcase, and was overcome with relief as I switched it on and the sound of static filled the room. With no electricity or telephone, that radio provided my only link with the

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outside world. Keeping an eye on each of the four fires burning unchecked outside my window, I eagerly tuned to the national news station just in time to hear the words, "The great earthquake in Fukui Prefecture..." The next thing I knew I found myself collapsed in tears on a pile of books and broken glass. Fukui Prefecture is the home of 15 of Japan's 48 nuclear power plants, including the new fast breeder reactor *Monju*, and clearly they would not have been able to withstand an earthquake centered in Fukui which had shaken Kobe with such force. My tears, the first of many since the earthquake, came from the realization that if the power plants had been destroyed, I no longer had any control over whether I lived or died; it was just a matter of time before the radiation came. For a horrible moment, I thought that perhaps it would have been better if I had died in the quake or fires.

Fortunately for us all, the quake referred to on the radio occurred a long time ago, and the center of the present earthquake was far enough away to have caused no obvious damage to the nuclear plants (one would hope they would tell us about any other damage, but one wonders). Moreover, they tell us that even if it had been closer, the plants would have

come through unscathed! Then again, they also said it was impossible for Japanese highways to be destroyed by an earthquake, but look what happened to them. In Kobe, the 'impossible' happened, and no one was ready for it.

It is impossible to always be ready for everything, and yet some things are so inherently dangerous that they require particular care. Nuclearism, in all its physical, psychological and political forms, is just one example of something which, through its very existence, makes our lives less secure. This paper is dedicated to all those whose lives have been touched by the recent earthquake, in the hope that they will join the search to redefine the meaning of 'nuclear security,' in a very insecure world. (15 March 1995).

## INTRODUCTION

The Cold War is over, the so-called 'Soviet threat' in the Pacific a fading memory. The countries of the region have signed a treaty establishing a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific, a moratorium on nuclear testing has been in effect for several years, the Japanese now support a ban on nuclear waste dumping at sea, and US military bases and forces in

the region are being reduced. The issues which were the focus of the nuclear-free activism of the seventies and eighties no longer seem to be of such pressing importance, yet it is hard to believe that the time has come to hang our Nuclear-Free Pacific posters in local museums as evidence of battles fought... and won. Has the end of the Cold War made the Nuclear-Free Pacific an anachronism, or is it giving us a chance for reflection and the establishment of new goals?

Since the early seventies, the focus of the call for denuclearization of the Pacific region has been on two main issue areas: nuclear testing and the nuclearization of the region, particularly by the US, in the course of the Cold War. In addition, especially in recent years, a third area of concern has become particularly apparent - that of the so-called 'peaceful' nuclear industry especially with reference to the whole question of plutonium, spent fuel reprocessing and nuclear waste.

In thinking about the first two areas it is clear that while the former was primarily a Pacific Basin problem which also had deleterious effects on the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, the latter was a Pacific manifestation of an Asia-Pacific Rim problem. It is necessary to

emphasize this seemingly simple assertion because more often than not, what is meant by 'Asia-Pacific' in strategic terms is really the countries of Asia, those of the Pacific Rim and the sea lines of communication which link them. It is not the island Pacific, nor is it the nuclear testing Pacific - which is no doubt why it was possible to get away with doing nuclear testing there in the first place.

The present paper is an examination of the process of denuclearization within the framework of national and international security. It is asserted that in the Pacific, that process cannot and must not be separated from the question of decolonization and independence. Nuclear testing and nuclear waste will be addressed as examples of nuclear issues still relevant in the region, and the analysis will be placed within the overall context of post-Cold War nuclear strategy and the question of nuclear proliferation in Asia.

This paper takes a positive approach to denuclearization in the Pacific region, seeing it as being both an important and desirable goal. Unfortunately, however, in usual conceptualizations of national security theory, denuclearization and nuclear-free policy are generally not

considered to be legitimate alternatives for security policy. It is, therefore, useful to begin this discussion of denuclearization efforts with a theoretical explanation for the legitimacy of those endeavors. Accordingly, the point of departure for this analysis will be endogenous security,<sup>1</sup> an approach to national security which begins from within rather than without. This will provide the context for a brief consideration of the political legitimacy of action for a nuclear-free Pacific, and the nuclear free/independence connection will be made.

## I THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

### (1) ENDOGENOUS SECURITY AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY

During the Cold War, the concept of national security was defined as being of a virtually exclusively military nature, and measured in terms of indices such as military capability and preparedness. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that this military conceptualization of security is insufficient to meet the needs of modern states, and many at-

tempts are being made to broaden the concept. Most of these attempt to take a 'human' (as opposed to inhuman/mass destruction) perspective, and try to incorporate concepts of human and environmental rights into the security paradigm. The concept of 'endogenous security' presented here expands on this 'human' idea by addressing the question of security from the position of those desiring security rather than those doing the securing; nuclear issues are a particularly good subject for an endogenous security analysis because of the size and dimensions of the threat involved.

Using the above expression, when "those desiring security" are defined as the beneficiaries of security policy, e.g. the residents of a given country, then it follows that the starting point for a discussion of that security must be the health and well-being of those people. In post-earthquake Kobe, it is clear to the 300,000 people left homeless (not to mention those who lost their lives due to the complete inability of government to respond to the disaster) as well as to the rest of us living here that our security has definitely not been ensured, and it would have been much less so if the center of the earthquake had been below the nuclear plants in neighboring Fukui

1 For a discussion of endogenous security see Ronni Alexander. *Putting the Earth First: Alternatives to Nuclear Security in Pacific Island States*. Honolulu: Spark Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii, 1994.

Prefecture. From this perspective, it is easy to understand that in the Pacific, the call for the complete denuclearization of the region is a response to what are perceived to be direct threats to the health and well-being of the people of the region on two levels, the nuclear threat of 'today', e.g. nuclear contamination and that of 'tomorrow', e.g. nuclear war.<sup>2</sup>

In a construction of security in which nuclear deterrence and nuclear defense are seen as rational and logical, this call for denuclearization can have no political legitimacy. In reality, however, the use of the Pacific Basin to enhance the so-called security of the Pacific Rim countries, particularly the United States and by proxy Japan, does nothing to increase the security of those people living in the Basin itself. Given that the result of the actual use of nuclear defense in the Pacific islands would be ridiculous,

2 It is interesting to note that in Japan, where nuclear weapons and nuclear power have traditionally been completely separate issues, there is beginning to be appreciation of the nuclear threat in terms of destruction of the ambiance of a place. A recent interview with two anti-nuclear power activists centered on the imbalance of Rota Island (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) and the plutonium-laden Japanese ship Akatsuki Maru or that of Japanese traditional landscapes and nuclear power plants. (Interview with TAKAKI Jinzaburo and TOYAMA Yoko in *Oikos*, No.12, Spring, 1994, pp.9-19).

and that even a small nuclear accident could have disastrous effects for a small island country, the call for denuclearization of the Pacific Basin makes perfect sense.

In order to be secure, one must be reasonably healthy. If, therefore, we take healthy populations as a basic building block of endogenous security, and we recognize that in order to have healthy populations, it is important to have healthy women as mothers, and access to sufficient quantities of healthy food,<sup>3</sup> then we can see that nuclear weapons and infrastructure present a threat to security in that even in a time of relative peace (e.g. a time in which they are unlikely to be used), they threaten the very sustenance of all living things, including but not limited to the human populations. In this sense, it can be asserted that at the center of the question of 'illegitimacy' lies not the struggle against nuclearism but rather the promotion of

3 In this context, 'healthy food' refers to unprocessed foods which retain their natural nutrients and are prepared in ways which maximize their nutritional value. There is of course a cultural component to this type of 'health' and cultural integrity is seen as being one of the fundamental elements of security. In the current Kobe example, this would refer to the unhealthy quality of the food being distributed (ex: cold rice, instant food, sweet bread) and to the lack of concern for the cultural preferences of those eating it, e.g. Koreans).

it.

A second aspect of endogenous security entails freedom of choice. The idea of endogenous security assumes that there is a range of security choices, some of which are more endogenous while others are less so. There ought, therefore, to be, on the one hand, freedom to choose endogeneity over exogeneity, or vice versa, in security policy. In other words, this means that along with the right to self-determination, peoples and states should have the right to determine whether they want their security guaranteed from within or without. At the same time, the question of security from within cannot be considered until self-determination has taken place. The subjugation of the right to self-determination of Pacific peoples to the nuclear security of the colonial powers has led not only to an infringement of their basic human rights, but also to a fundamental linking of nuclear free and independence issues in the region. Even today, when most of the Pacific islands have exercised their right to self-determination, the vestiges of nuclear colonialism continue to impede and/or deny independence to peoples in Tahiti, New Caledonia and, until recently, Belau.<sup>4</sup> It must thus be noted at the outset that

one of the most important reasons for the continuing relevance of the nuclear-free Pacific idea is that independence has not yet been achieved in these territories.

It is difficult, in this era of post-Cold War instability, to talk about the right to national self-determination without thinking about the horrible situation in the former Yugoslavia. While on a very different scale, the Pacific has not been immune to the fragmentation and violence occurring throughout the world in recent years. The war for the secession of Bougainville from Papua New Guinea, two military coups in Fiji, internal conflicts in Vanuatu, continuing struggle in East Timor and West Papua, independence struggles in New Caledonia and Tahiti and even the new South Pacific Peace Keeping Force are all examples of the expansion of military solutions and culture, sometimes referred to as the militarization of the region.<sup>5</sup> Military solutions are neither desirable, nor do they tend to be very effective, and it is be-

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4 Law suits challenging the Compact were unsuccessful, and Belau achieved independence on 1 October 1994. In December, 1994, it became the 185th member of the United Nations, the tenth South Pacific Forum country to join that organization. ("Lawsuits Challenge Palau Compact", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, February 1994, p.11. Also, "Plans Progress Despite Court Challenge on Vote", *Pacific*, March/April, 1994, p.13).

lieved that they have no place in the Pacific community of states. At the same time, the increasing militarization of the region and the link between nuclearism and independence coupled with global trends toward fragmentation give cause for concern. In this sense, the movement for the denuclearization of the Pacific should see as one of its roles work for the demilitarization of the region as well.

## (2) DENUCLEARIZATION: METHODS AND STRUCTURES

The process of denuclearization takes place basically at three levels: the individual/Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) level, institutional (local as well as national/state level) and institutional (international/global level). In the Pacific, a great deal of work has been done at each of these levels, and a certain amount of progress has been

made. As this paper will deal with possible directions for future work for denuclearization in the region, it is useful to first review what kinds of initiatives have already been taken.

### (A) INDIVIDUAL/NGO INITIATIVES

Work at the individual/NGO level has been very widespread in the region, and has focused primarily on nuclear testing, nuclear ship visits, nuclear waste dumping and uranium mining. The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement (NFIP) was begun in the mid-seventies, and since that time has served as an international network not only for independence issues, but also for the denuclearization of the region. The linking of nuclear and independence issues within the movement has enabled it to link the anti-nuclear/anti-war/peace movement with the independence movement, thereby increasing the breadth of its constituency.

Moreover, the global nature of both nuclear and independence/indigenous issues has made it relatively easy for the NFIP movement to obtain extra-regional support. This support takes a variety of forms, such as directly affiliated solidarity groups, church groups and issue-oriented networks, and has not only

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5 For a discussion of militarization in the Pacific, see Suliana Siwatibau. "Disarmament, Security and Co-operation in the Region: An Overview of the Main Security Concerns of the South Pacific." Keynote address presented to ASPAC 1990, Melbourne, Australia, July, 1990, p.3. Also see Anthony Payne, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Pacific", *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics: Special Issue on Size and Survival - The Politics of Security and Survival in the Caribbean and the Pacific*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, July 1993.

helped to raise money and to bring the struggles of Pacific peoples into the living rooms of people in developed countries, but has brought the organizing expertise and experience of overseas supporters to the benefit of the Pacific movements.

(B) INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES  
(Local and National)

National initiatives for denuclearization are those which have been put forth through some institution of the national government. These initiatives can take a number of forms. In the Pacific, such initiatives have included legislation such as nuclear-free constitutions, establishment of national or local nuclear-free zones or national or local nuclear ship bans, as well as individual statements by national leaders and/or heads of state.

The first proposals for a Pacific nuclear-free zone came in the mid-1960's, in response to French nuclear testing and concern over the future of Antarctica. This was a time when most of the Pacific Island States had just begun the process of decolonization, and the timing and politics of the situation made for a strong linking of independence and denuclearization. Perhaps the best known example of this type of 'nuclear-free na-

tionalism' is the nuclear free constitution adopted by the Republic of Belau, in spite of great resistance from the United States. For many countries, however, while statements by heads of state were possible, the enactment of nuclear-free policy was an issue which would have to wait until after independence. In fact, much of the policy was later linked with the establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty regime, and thus the focus was on international cooperation rather than national policy.<sup>6</sup>

(C) INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES  
(Regional/International/Global)

Institutional initiatives at the international/global level take a variety of forms, such as the creation of nuclear free zone treaties or other treaties dealing with specific aspects of nuclearism. One recent example of the extension of national efforts to the international arena would be the World Court Project which has posed the question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons to the International Court of Justice.

Most international/global efforts

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6 For a discussion of nuclear-free policy and the SPNFZ Treaty see Yoko Ogashiwa, *Microstates and Nuclear Issues: Regional Cooperation in the Pacific*, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1991.



begin on a regional scale. Accordingly, the following brief description focuses on regional efforts in the Pacific. One of the most important issues confronting the Pacific Island States was the problem of French testing; another was economic development. The South Pacific Commission was a regional organization established in 1947, and membership consisted of the colonial powers in the region plus Australia and New Zealand. The newly independent countries gradually gained admission, but while they were able to discuss economic issues in the South Pacific Commission and in other regional fora, they had no regional organization of their own. The political problem of French nuclear testing provided an important catalyst for the formation of a new regional organization with an emphasis on the discussion of political issues such as decolonization and nuclear testing.

The South Pacific Forum was established in 1971, with membership open to the independent South Pacific Island Countries plus Australia and New Zealand. The South Pacific Forum became an important voice for denuclearization and independence in the region, and it was through this organization that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was established in 1985.

It is perhaps useful at this juncture to say a few words about the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). The second of its kind (the first being the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America), the treaty of Rarotonga established a nuclear free zone in the Pacific south of the equator. As only independent countries can be parties to the treaty, the islands of the former American Trust Territory in Micronesia which had not yet achieved independence when the treaty was established and the French territories in Polynesia are not included. Moreover, while one of the main objectives of the Treaty was to stop French nuclear testing, the French (as well as the United States and Britain) have refused to sign the protocols which make the provisions of the treaty applicable to non-independent territories in the region. This lack of compliance, coupled with the limited territorial boundaries of the Treaty, have made it a less effective instrument than that which was originally envisioned by the founding countries.

In addition to the work of the South Pacific Forum, Pacific Island countries have been active in the international community in a variety of ways. For

example, the first international action of Papua New Guinea (PNG) upon achieving independence in 1975 was to co-sponsor with Fiji and New Zealand a proposal to the United Nations for the establishment of a Pacific nuclear-free zone. Similarly, Nauru and Kiribati joined the London Dumping Convention in order to oppose Japanese proposals for dumping low-level nuclear waste in the Pacific, helping to establish the first moratorium on ocean dumping of nuclear waste.

Opposition to nuclear testing provided a unifying issue for the Pacific Island countries, and put their leaders in the international political limelight to an extent not possible with most other issues. From the point of view of some of the powerful Western countries, the independence of extremely small island states was in and of itself an affront to conventional ideas of statehood; the rejection of nuclearism compounded the problem. On the other hand, a major reason for independence in many Pacific Island countries was the desire of the colonial powers to rid themselves of the economic and political burden of maintaining colonies in a distant and unprofitable region.<sup>7</sup> In these countries, the call

for a nuclear-free Pacific became in part a call for the formation of both national and regional identity, asserting the unique situation of the Pacific Islands in a positive way. Moreover, the call for a Pacific-wide denuclearized region involving heads of state as well as local people, was essentially creating a form of 'nuclear-free nationalism' which provided a strong uniting force in a culturally diverse region. In other words, the idea of 'nuclear-free' became synonymous with a vision of society which was non-Western, non-colonial, non-industrially exploited. It was able to offer an alternative to ethnic nationalism, a concept which can be as divisive as it is unifying in a culturally diverse setting. This nuclear-free nationalism helped to establish and enhance the legitimacy of the Pacific Island States, as discussed further below.

#### (D) INTER-LEVEL COOPERATION

As is clear from the above, a prerequisite for successful creation of policy for denuclearization is that groups at the various different levels work together. Nuclear-free nationalism and the creation of nuclear-free constitutions, for example, provides a good illustration of this process, showing both the role of NGOs in creating structures for the

7 Yash Ghai. "Reflections on Self-Determination in the South Pacific" Unpublished manuscript.

implementation of national and international policy and their potential for influencing the ways in which those structures are actually used. Similarly, the logic behind the creation of regional nuclear-free zones is that eventually these could be linked together until they encompassed the entire globe.

In recent years, the role of NGOs in international development and environmental issues has been attributed greater and greater importance, while security issues still remain primarily within the control of states (and men). In fact, the work of the NFIP and the individual movements throughout the region have provided the impetus for initiatives at the national and international levels, demonstrating that there is very definitely a role for NGOs in security issues. Without the leadership and direction set by the individual movements, legislators and governments do not move toward denuclearization, and it has been the efforts of the committed individuals and groups which have been the driving force behind denuclearization in the region. It is hoped that the success of this experience will help to enhance recognition of the need for 'democratization' with regard to security issues on a global scale.

The legitimization, from a state

and/or international perspective, of the involvement of NGOs in security issues is important but not sufficient for the democratization of security. The bottom-up linear relationships which flow from NGO to local authority to state authority to international organization (or conversely, those which flow from top to bottom) are essential but their effectiveness is limited by their linear construction. It is suggested that the cross-linking among various levels of organizations and authorities are those which will enable the greatest level of participation and recognition of the broadest range of needs.

## II THE SETTING: NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE

### (1) THE REGIONAL SETTING

While the purpose of this paper is to look at nuclear issues in the Pacific Basin, it is impossible to discuss these matters without paying some regard to the regional strategic environment as a whole. With regard to nuclear issues, recent developments is disarmament such as START 1 and 2 have greatly reduced the number of US and Russian nuclear weapons in the region. There are, for example, no longer any tactical nuclear warheads deployed on US submarines. At

the same time, SLBMs such as the Trident still remain in use, so it goes without saying that the denuclearization of the sea is a priority for any nuclear free movement. However, in addition to the two nuclear superpowers, the presence of China as a regional power and of threshold states such as India, Pakistan, and DPRK contribute to the tension and instability of the region, and thus bear attention.

The question of instability, both internal and external, while beyond the scope of this paper, is of course of great concern to all of the countries of the region. The end of the Cold War has created a perception of strategic uncertainty on the part of the Asian states, described by Malaysian Defense Minister Najib Razak as making the strategic environment "fluid and unpredictable" and requiring countries to "prepare for the worst scenario."<sup>8</sup> This has meant, on the one hand, increasing armaments, something in which even some of the Pacific Island countries are getting involved.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, it has led to increased ef-

forts for regional dialogue and the implementation of a variety of confidence building measures, such as the recent Asean Regional Forum.<sup>10</sup>

In the context of the Pacific Islands, navies become a central issue, and there has been a noticeable increase in the size and abilities of Asian navies in recent years. According to Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, there are six reasons for this: (1) Perception of probable American withdrawal and relative decline, (2) Fear of Japanese military resurgence, (3) Unresolved territorial disputes, (4) EEZ protection, (5) Non-military causes such as economic development and prestige and (6) Supply-side pressures. All of these concerns are real; the overall US presence in the region has declined, the Japanese have a large and increasingly sophisticated military force and what appears to be growing political will to use it abroad, territorial disputes, particularly mari-

8 *The Age*, 13 July 1993, p.9.

9 For example, Australian arms exports in 1992 included such countries as Fiji, Guam, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. (*Pacific Research*, August, 1992, p.29).

10 For a discussion of regional security dialogues in Asia Pacific see Paul Evans. "Existing Regional Security Dialogues in Asia Pacific". Unpublished paper presented to the Second UN Disarmament Conference, Hiroshima, Japan, 24-27 May 1994. The ASEAN Regional Forum is a formal governmental process for ministerial-level discussion on regional security issues. Membership includes the six ASEAN members, the dialogue partners, Russia, China, Laos and Vietnam. It builds on the ASEAN PMC process.

time disputes such as that concerning the Spratley Islands remain unsolved, and pollution, depleted fish stocks and growing commercial pressures make EEZ patrol and protection increasingly important. Unfortunately, these issues are only part of the problem. Mack and Ball assert that it is "the deterrence mindset," e.g. the culture of militarism mentioned earlier, which presents the greatest threat to security because it emphasizes and reinforces military solutions to problems which might otherwise have been solved differently.<sup>11</sup>

## (2) US POST-COLD WAR PACIFIC

No discussion of security in the Asia-Pacific region can ignore the presence of the United States. Beginning with the US 'defense' of the Pacific in World War II and continuing until the mid-1980's, the Pacific was for all practical purposes an American lake. After the mid-eighties, and particularly after 28 July 1986, when Mikhail Gorbachev announced his perception of the Soviet Union as a Pacific power, Soviet activities in the region increased. By the end of

the decade, the US and USSR both had nuclear navies capable of long-range power projection and were of course the undisputed military superpowers in the region.

While the Soviet presence or so-called 'Soviet threat' in the Pacific gave the United States a good excuse for being there, there were also other motivations for the strong US presence in the Asia-Pacific region. One was the "containment" of communism, be it Soviet, Vietnamese, Chinese, North Korean or otherwise, and the accompanying threat of instability in Asia. While the Soviet threat was easily identifiable in terms of location and focus, that of instability in Asia was known to be amorphous, especially after the mistake which was the Vietnam War. As a result, the US maintained a dual strategic focus which allowed both concentration on the Soviet Union and the ability to respond to other threats and situations wherever they might arise.

The second reason for US military involvement in the Asia-Pacific region is essentially economic in nature, and relates to sea lines of communication. Asia has always been important for US trade, and certainly by the early eighties, US trade with the Asia-Pacific exceeded that with Europe, with many of those goods

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<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Charles A. Meconis. "Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region after the Cold War", paper presented to the ISA/West Regional Conference, Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 29, 1993, p.10).

being transported by sea. The Pacific, covering one-third of the earth's surface, lies between the US and Asia, and the islands of the western Pacific, including the former US possessions in Micronesia, lie in between. If the US/NAFTA-Australia/New Zealand-Japan/Asia triangle is considered, all the Pacific islands are included. Today, as during the Cold War, "the United States, Australia and New Zealand - as well as Japan and other East Asian allies and friends - attach high strategic importance to the region. The island states and territories straddle or are proximate to the air and sea lanes of communication that link the rim nations; these lanes carry nearly one-half of all American foreign trade, and connect the United States to five of its seven alliance relationships. Preservation of freedom of navigation and the security of these trans-Pacific routes thus is a vital national interest for nearly all the Pacific rim nations - but also for the island states dependent on export-import trade."<sup>12</sup>

At the height of the Cold War/Soviet threat era, President Reagan envisioned a global American naval force

consisting of 600 ships, comprised of "15 carrier battle groups, four battleship surface action groups, 100 attack submarines and transportation for the assault echelons of a marine amphibious brigade."<sup>13</sup> Leaving aside strategic value, given the economic situation in the US, this idea was preposterous. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the "Soviet threat" (although not the Russian navy), the rhetoric of "containment" no longer provided justification for the US presence abroad, and nailed the lid on the coffin of the 600-ship navy idea. At the same time, from an American perspective, given the unchanged and/or increasing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific, uninterrupted American access to that region still has to be ensured.

For the US Navy, the end of the Cold War thus created a problem; a replacement had to be found for the obsolete "containment" which would justify the deployment of American naval forces abroad, particularly in the Pacific region. While forces were being cut back throughout the world, those deployed in

12 Vasey in John Dorrance, et al. *The South Pacific: Emerging Security Issues and U.S. Policy*. Brassey's (US) Incorporated, 1990, p.99.

13 Lehman cited in Joseph R. Morgan. *Porpoises Among the Whales: Small Navies in Asia and the Pacific*. East-West Center Special Reports, No.2, March 1994, p.40.

the Asia-Pacific remained much the same. Moreover, in spite of the loss of the US bases in the Philippines, the US managed to mitigate that loss through an arrangement signed in 1992 giving US forces access to ports and airfields in that country. The US has also negotiated for use of facilities in all of the other ASEAN countries, so in fact US forward deployment remains possible, at a much reduced cost.

The justification for the presence of US forces is in keeping with global needs in the post-Cold War world; American strategy has "shifted from a focus on a global threat to a focus on regional challenges and opportunities." The dual focus of the Cold War changed to a single one; the 'enemy' now lurks in the jungles and deserts of the so-called Third World, hidden from sight but ready to pounce at any moment. The threat of global war and the rivalry between the two superpowers has been replaced by the need to respond to a variety of problems, many of them involving joint operations with increasingly well-armed Asian allies.

The US Navy now sees its role as continuing to provide strategic nuclear deterrence, but also having to provide immediate responses to sudden developments and turns of events in relatively

unpredictable places. This perception of the world makes forward deployment in overseas locations an essential part of the new strategy, as ships based in mainland US ports would take too long to reach the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific in times of crisis.<sup>14</sup> At the same time, it is predicated on the assumption that the US will work together with Asian allies and in fact there has been a dramatic increase in the number and combat potential of small navies in the Pacific Asia (as distinct from the Pacific Islands) in the past few years.<sup>15</sup>

The economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific, the importance of sea lines of communication, the remnants of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula and between Japan and Russia regarding the northern islands, tensions between China and Taiwan, maritime boundary disputes throughout southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea, and tensions in west and south Asia all provide justification for US interest in, and strategic concerns regarding, the Asia Pacific region. Among these, two situations in particular have provided an excuse for US projection in the region: the nuclear situation in north Korea and the Iraqi

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14 op. cit. Morgan, p.39.

15 *ibid.*, p.39.

nuclear project. These situations both involve the possibility of nuclear proliferation and challenge US nuclear supremacy through the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, and are thus seen as a double challenge to American hegemony in the region.

### (3) NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

One has only to look at the headlines of any newspaper to realize the importance of the problem of nuclear proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region. The most urgent problem has been the question of north Korea's nuclear intentions, although it is most unlikely that, even assuming it were capable of doing so, north Korea would use its supposed nuclear capability in any outwardly hostile way. In fact, a determined attack on south Korean nuclear reactors might prove to be a more powerful 'nuclear' weapon than anything the north Koreans are likely to possess or be capable of building. It is also hard to imagine that it would attempt anything like testing nuclear weapons in the Pacific, although missile tests were held off the coast of the Noto Peninsula in June of 1993 and tests of "no military significance" of anti-submarine missiles were conducted in the Japan (Eastern) Sea in 1994.<sup>16</sup>

From the perspective of the Pacific Islands, the existence of a nuclear-capable North Korea is not in and of itself such a problem per se. The key issue lies rather in the instability created in Asia, and therefore the Pacific, by the division of the Korean Peninsula and the increasing isolation of north Korea. More than Korea itself, the response to a potential nuclear north Korea by the regional powers is of some concern, particularly as it enhances the already growing atmosphere of militarization in the region, thereby encouraging military solutions to militarily defined problems. It is therefore crucial to the stability and further development of Asia that this remnant of the Cold War be resolved; the nuclear-free Pacific movement has a role to play in helping to reduce rather than increase tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in helping north Korea to play a more positive role in regional politics.

Nuclear proliferation is also a concern in west Asia and the Middle East, involving countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Israel. Moreover, there is the question of how India will respond to overt nuclear proliferation in that part of the region. The severity of these con-

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16 *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 June 1993 (Evening edition) and 1 June 1994 (Evening edition).



cerns is reflected in the negotiations currently being held in regard to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. From the perspective of the Pacific Islands, however, even if all the above countries were to begin active nuclear testing programs tomorrow, the environmental effects in the Pacific would probably be less serious (or at least less obvious) than those in places located closer to the test sites. To the extent that those nuclear programs would require a strategic response from the countries of the Pacific Rim, however, the Pacific Ocean and the islands within it would surely be involved. It is perhaps possible to think in theory of a nuclear-free Pacific as independent from a nuclear Asia, but if one considers the growing interdependence and moves toward integration in the Asia-Pacific region, then it seems that such a conceptualization would be difficult indeed. Rather, it would appear clear that work for a truly nuclear-free Pacific would also entail efforts to coordinate work for the denuclearization of Asia and all the seas in between.

### III NUCLEAR ISSUES — PAST AND PRESENT

#### (1) NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE PACIFIC

The legacies of years of colonialism can be found in the structure of the modern world-system itself, as well as in the structure and values of both the colonized and erstwhile colonizing societies. Colonization and colonialism began in the Pacific as elsewhere with devastation brought on by disease and environmental destruction. The Pacific is unique, however, in that it had its own special brand of colonial horror - nuclear testing.<sup>17</sup> On August 6, 1985, the former Pacific colonies which now comprise the membership of the South Pacific Forum made an attempt to stop nuclear testing in the region forever by signing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. That treaty outlaws the testing of nuclear devices within the zone. Unfortunately, the United States, France and Britain have not yet seen fit sign the Protocols which would commit them to compliance with the conditions of the Treaty.<sup>18</sup>

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17 France used a different colony, Algeria, before that country attained independence and France moved its test center to the Pacific. In a different form of colonialism, indigenous peoples and minorities in Canada, USA, USSR, China and Australia have born the brunt of the danger of nuclear development.

As regards the details of nuclear testing, there is not sufficient space here to adequately describe the blatant disregard shown for the people of the Pacific and their island homes during the course of close to 50 years of testing. Nuclear tests in the Pacific began in the Marshall Islands in 1946, although the US trusteeship of those islands did not officially begin until the following year. Until the cessation of US testing in the Marshalls in 1958, at least 66 tests were conducted, including at least ten involving extremely powerful thermonuclear devices. In the course of those tests, six islands were vaporized, and parts of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls remain uninhabitable even today.

Nuclear testing in the Pacific by the United States did not end in 1958;

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18 In the US, the Congressional Subcommittee on Asia Pacific Affairs voted unanimously to support the SPNFZ Treaty. This recommendation needs the approval of both the Senate and House of Representatives. *Pacific News Bulletin*, November, 1993, p.13). The South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) has also drawn up a treaty entitled the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region. Article 12 of that Convention calls on all parties to "take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution in the Convention area which might result from the testing of nuclear devices." Article 10 of the Convention bans nuclear dumping the region.

tests were also conducted at Johnston Island and Christmas Island in 1962. The British also used Christmas Island for nuclear tests, before transferring their operations to Australia in 1957-8. French testing began in 1966 at Moruroa Atoll. In spite of the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty prohibition on atmospheric tests, France did not move underground until 1975, and then continued to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific until a moratorium was announced in 1992.

When considering nuclear testing, it is important to recognize that the Pacific has been used for testing more than just nuclear warheads. The US, USSR and China have all used the Pacific for missile testing and the United States maintains one of its most important military facilities on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands - the Kwajalein Missile Testing Range. This facility is used for testing missile, communication, tracking and delivery systems. It played an important role in the development of the high-tech weapons used with such fanfare during the Gulf War, and is expected to play an expanded role in post-Cold War American strategy and defense.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to missile testing, there are three issues of importance directly

concerning nuclear testing in the Pacific today, in spite of the fact that no testing is actually being conducted there at the moment. In fact, none has occurred since 1992, when France joined the CIS and US in a testing moratorium.

The first issue involves France. In July, 1993, France extended its 15-month ban indefinitely, but has never agreed to either the principle of permanent cessation or to cessation itself. Unlike the US, China and Russia, which have done the bulk of their testing within their own national borders, France does not consider testing its nuclear weapons in France itself to be a reasonable option. If French testing happens, it will happen in the Pacific, a situation which does not bode well for the independence of the remaining French colonies in the region. Moreover, if France continues to make its independent nuclear deterrent a pillar of French security policy, then there is indeed ample cause for concern. It al-

ready appears that there are tremendous internal pressures from military and nuclear experts to resume testing in order to keep the French nuclear weapons operational.<sup>20</sup> The current 'French problem' is thus not only the question of when, and whether, France will agree to a complete test ban, but also that of when, or whether, France will agree to dispose of its nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, it is at present difficult to envision the security situation developing in Europe to such an extent that France would be willing to forego its independent nuclear alternative. From a Pacific perspective, even under the best of circumstances, there would remain concern over whether France, having ceased testing in the Pacific, will then decide to dispose of its nuclear weapons there.

The second current testing issue pertains to China, the only country of the five established nuclear weapons powers which is continuing to test, albeit not

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19 Regarding Kwajalein, refer to Radio Australia, 13, 14 May 1993. Also see for example "SDI is Dead - Long Live GPACS!", *Pacific Report*, August 1993, p.26; Vol.8, no.6, May, 1993; and "Star Wars Reverts to Maiden Name", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol.49 No.6, July/August 1993, p.8. Recently, the US military budget cuts have threatened the jobs of many of the 1500 Marshallese working at the base. (*Pacific News Bulletin*, February, 1995, p.13).

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20 See "Resumption of testing could come as early as 1995", *Pacific*, May/June 1994, p.10. Also see for example *Pacific News Bulletin*, September 1993, p.10 & February, 1994, p.15, *WISE New Communique 409* p.5. The January/February edition of *Pacific* notes that the president of French Polynesia, Gaston Flosse, has said that French testing should be resumed for both strategic (French) and economic (Polynesian) reasons. (p.44).

in the Pacific Ocean. China has claimed that, "after a comprehensive test ban treaty is concluded and comes into effect, China will abide by it and carry out no more nuclear tests. History has shown that a conditional 'moratorium' designed to maintain nuclear superiority while refusing to renounce nuclear deterrence and commit oneself to complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons in of extremely limited significance." <sup>21</sup>

The third issue is in fact a by-product of previous testing, and concerns recent revelations by the United States that in addition to the 66 announced tests it conducted in the Pacific, an additional 48 were also held in that region, an increase of 70% over the previous figures. It was also revealed that Bikini and other Islanders were intentionally exposed to radioactive fallout while precautions were taken to protect US personnel. This information is part of a series of extremely troubling revelations made recently by the United States Department of Energy, and which also include, for example, the use of prisoners for the

testing of plutonium. The revelations about the Pacific are not only significant in terms of underscoring the illegitimacy of nuclearism in and of itself, but they may also work to the benefit of the Marshall Islanders because they have bearing on the amount of compensation given to those affected, and may well result in new claims which under ordinary circumstances would no longer be admissible.<sup>22</sup>

In spite of the uncertainty about the intentions of the French, the moratorium on nuclear testing, and the participation of France in that moratorium, did take the wind out of the sails of the anti-nuclear testing movement in the region. Testing, however, continues to be relevant not only because a complete test-ban treaty has not yet been achieved, but also because ultimately the development

21 Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, No.32 in *Pacific News Bulletin*, February, 1994, p.15. Also *Pacific News Bulletin*, September 1993, p.10 & *WISE News Communiqué* 409, p.5.

22 "America's Painful Atomic Secrets", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, April 1994, pp.11-13, *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 February 1994. Also see *Pacific News Bulletin*, March 1994, p.14. The Compact of Free Association between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the United States has a provision which gives the Marshall Islanders tens of millions of dollars in return for not filing any additional nuclear testing damage claims against the US. There is, however, also a clause, Section 177, which allows for such claims under "changed circumstances", which these new revelations might very well indicate. *ibid.* p.12, also Compact of Free Association between the United States and Republic of the Marshall Islands.

of a nuclear weapons capability requires at some point that the weapons be tested. In this sense, not only is testing still an important issue in the Pacific in and of itself, but its significance is increased by the inherent connection between testing and proliferation.

## (2) NUCLEAR WASTE AND OTHER TOXIC GARBAGE

Another nuclear issue of particular concern of late in the Pacific is that of nuclear and hazardous waste disposal. In particular, the government of the Marshall Islands has embarked on a feasibility study regarding the use of one of their islands as a repository for nuclear waste. The aim of the plan is to "develop a compact" with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan for the disposal of their nuclear waste.<sup>23</sup> The countries of the region are, not surprisingly, very worried about this move, and voiced their concerns at the South Pacific Forum in August, 1994. One result was for the Japanese government to host a seminar on nuclear safety for South Pacific government officials, much to the dismay of the anti-nuclear movement both in Japan and throughout

the region.

The question of nuclear waste is not a new issue for the South Pacific Forum. When it was addressed at the annual meeting in August of 1993, it was agreed that a regional convention should be drawn up banning the importation into the South Pacific region of hazardous and toxic wastes, as well as "non-environmentally friendly" or "dirty technologies" used for the treatment, recycling or disposal or marine dumping of hazardous and toxic wastes.<sup>24</sup> The final draft of that treaty should be ready to be submitted to the Forum in August, 1995. In addition, late in 1993, the London Dumping Convention passed a ban by consensus prohibiting the ocean dumping of radioactive wastes, although the UK, France, China, Russia and Belgium all abstained from the vote.<sup>25</sup> Since the Japanese have for a long time wanted to dump nuclear waste in the Pacific, the good news is that thanks to Russian dumping of nuclear wastes in the Japan (Eastern) Sea, Japan finally agreed to the ban. Apparently, Japan did not like the experience of having the tables turned; having nuclear waste in

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23 *Pacific Magazine*, Jan./Feb. 1995, p.41. Japan has refused the offer, but has commended the Marshalls for the good idea. (*Asahi Shimbun*, 3 November 1994).

24 "Saying 'no' to waste," *Pacific Islands Monthly*, May 1994, p.47.

25 *Pacific News Bulletin*, November 1993, pp.8-11.

one's own backyard is never a pleasant experience. The bad news is that of course with that many abstentions, the ban will not prevent countries committed to dumping from continuing to do so. Similarly, having a South Pacific convention will not solve all the problems with hazardous and toxic waste, but it might help to start.

Another issue which bears mention here is that of disarmament; what happens to dead dinosaurs, particularly dead toxic dinosaurs? Pomp, circumstance and burial in the Pacific? In 1990, the United States began beefing up the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) on Johnston Island, an American possession about 1300 kilometers southwest of Hawaii. The purpose was to dispose of nerve gas and other chemical weapons which had been deployed in Germany and which had to be removed before reunification. This facility is the only one of its kind in the world, and as bans on chemical and other weapons progress, its services become more and more in demand. The advantage is again that Johnston Island is located far away from the countries most in need of its facilities; the problem is that most Pacific Island countries are right next door.<sup>26</sup>

The Johnston facility is not being used for the destruction of nuclear weapons, and was not designed for that purpose. While rumors abound as to the possibility that it will be used for nuclear weapons, the processes involved are very different, and chemical weapons present serious enough problems in and of themselves. The point, however, is that while independence may have been achieved and numerous environmental protection agreements enacted, the attitude of the former colonial powers has not changed significantly. The Pacific has been used for the unwanted burdens of Western society since the 19th century, and there is every indication that it will continue to be used in similar fashion in the 21st as well. The question is thus one of finding ways to change that attitude to one of concern for the protection of the Pacific Ocean and all the life which it supports, human and otherwise.

### (3) THE JAPAN CONNECTION: LINKING NUCLEAR ISSUES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Although purporting to be a 'nu-

<sup>26</sup> Concern is being raised by Pacific Island governments after a number of accidents at the JACADS facility. See Ed Rampell, "Johnson Atoll revisited," *Pacific Islands Monthly*, February 1995, pp.46-50.

clear-free country,' Japan contributes to the nuclear threat in the Pacific in major ways: through an aggressive nuclear power program, the transport of nuclear waste through the region, and through the production of plutonium. Moreover, that threat is enhanced by the apathy of the general public to nuclear safety issues. Let us consider these in turn.

At a time when most countries are seriously reconsidering the necessity and safety of nuclear power, Japan alone is aggressively pursuing the development of plutonium-fueled energy. Plutonium, a highly toxic by-product of uranium, is produced in conventional nuclear reactors, and has a half-life of about 24,000 years — long enough to effectively be considered forever. The spent fuel from conventional reactors is either disposed of as high level nuclear waste, in which case a disposal/dump site has to be found, or else the plutonium can be extracted and used for other purposes, including fueling power plants and making nuclear weapons.

There was a time not long ago when plutonium was the energy dream-substance of the future, the long-sought solution to resource dependency. Plutonium could be used to fuel fast breeder reactors (FBRs), whose continuing chain

reactions produce more plutonium than they burn as fuel. For resource-poor countries like Japan, the FBR seemed at first to be the perfect crown to top their already strong commitment to nuclear power.<sup>27</sup>

As is the case with most high-tech dreams, the reality has turned out much less promising than originally planned. Due to the extreme toxicity of the plutonium, expensive safety and protective measures are necessary. The costs of building and running FBRs are prohibitively high and the technological difficulties immense. Moreover, in most countries working on developing FBRs, strong public opposition to nuclear power in general and plutonium in particular made the political cost extremely high as well. After giving it a try, the US, Germany and Britain have all abandoned their FBR projects. Even France, dedicated to nuclearism as it is, was forced

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27 As of September, 1994, Japan had a total of 48 nuclear power plants in operation, with a combined capacity of 39,641 MW. This is nowhere near the original goals for nuclear power development, but still makes Japan second only to the US in nuclear power. The oldest, (Tokai, GCR, 166 kw) located outside of Tokyo, went into operation in July, 1966. The newest is Tokyo Electric Power's Kashiwasaki-Kariwa 4 (BWR, 1, 1000 KMW) went into operation in August of 1994. *Nuke Info Tokyo*, Sept./Oct. 1994, No.43, p.9.

to stop work on its Super Phoenix FBR project due to technical setbacks in 1989, and it is likely that it will be permanently shut down.

The Japanese nuclear industry, however, is not only very persistent, but has utter and complete faith in the power of its own technology. In fact, in response to concerns by residents after the recent earthquake, Japanese electric companies began passing out fliers with messages assuring citizens that the current safety measures will be sufficient, even in an earthquake of comparable size.<sup>28</sup> In general, however, in the absence of what are perceived to be major threats, popular opposition to nuclear power tends on the whole to be fairly weak and poorly organized. This is partly a function of the traditional political divisions in the Japanese Left, and also due to an approach to nuclearism which has traditionally condemned nuclear weapons while leaving other issues alone. Moreover, opposition is concentrated in local areas near nuclear plants, far away from population centers and media coverage.

In spite of setbacks on all fronts, the Japanese have continued to pursue

plans for a major nuclear complex in Rokkasho, a city on the coast of northern Japan. The complex will eventually include facilities for nuclear waste storage, reprocessing, and uranium enrichment. When completed, the Rokkasho complex will be the largest such facility in the world, with the capability of separating five tons of plutonium per year from conventional nuclear reactor waste.

There has from the start been strong local and foreign opposition to the Rokkasho nuclear project, and construction has been plagued with delays and problems, not the least of which has been the reluctance on the part of the IAEA to allow Japan to conduct its own plutonium extraction. An essential part of Japan's vision of nuclear sustainability involves the newly completed \$5 billion FBR *Monju*, located in Fukui Prefecture. The *Monju* facility attained criticality, the stage at which the nuclear chain reaction becomes self-sustained, on 5 April of last year.

A recent article in *The Japan Times* suggested four inherent weaknesses which could cause *Monju* to go out of control.<sup>29</sup> Considering that just one gram of plutonium can cause cancer in 22,000 people, that is a very high risk to be taking. Given that like the rest of Japan's

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28 *Asahi Shimbun*, 24 February 1994.



nuclear plants, *Monju* is located on the coast, that is not only putting in jeopardy the lives of people living in Japan but those in the surrounding countries as well. Thus from the point of view of those likely to be affected, the only rational response to the threat of a Japanese nuclear disaster would be to urge Japan to abandon its nuclear program immediately.

Until recently, Japan has had to depend on outside sources of plutonium. Since 1978, Japan has shipped over 5,000 tons of spent fuel across the Pacific, through the Panama Canal and across the Atlantic to France and England, where it has been reprocessed. The first shipment of separated plutonium, representing less than one percent of the eventual total to be returned, was shipped back to Japan in November of 1992, amidst international protest. There are expected to be an additional 30 shipments over the next 20 years.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, despite protests from more than a dozen governments along the proposed shipping

route, the first shipment from France to Japan of high-level radioactive waste from which the plutonium and uranium have already been extracted took place in February of this year.<sup>31</sup>

While the transport of waste and spent fuel is dangerous, the process in which Japan is engaging - the extraction of plutonium from spent fuel and the production of plutonium through the FBR program - is to a great extent the same as that in which north Korea engaged. It is a fact that there is an excess of plutonium available; there is even some question as to what has happened to plutonium in Japan already. Japan has already admitted to the possibility that if north Korea were to possess nuclear weapons, Japan would consider embarking on nuclear weapons development.<sup>32</sup> Given that the cost of energy produced by *Monju* is likely to be substan-

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29 These are: (1) the fission process which could easily get out of control, (2) the liquid sodium used as coolant is highly explosive if it touches water or oxygen, (3) the piping is susceptible to earthquake damage and (4) the plutonium in the fuel is highly toxic and can be used for nuclear weapons purposes. *The Japan Times*, 7 April 1994.

30 *Pacific News Bulletin*, Oct., 1992, p.1 and Jan. 1993, p.5. That first shipment of returned waste, aboard the *Akatsuki Maru*, was taken around Australia and through the Pacific, violating the territorial waters of the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia on its way back to Japan. (*Pacific News Bulletin*, February, 1993, p.7 and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 28 Oct. 1992 and 24 Dec. 1994).

31 *The Japan Times*, 24 February 1995, *Asahi Shimbun*, 23 February 1995.

32 *Mainichi Shimbun*, 2 July 1993, p.14. Also see "Japan's Nuclear Path: From Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Plutonium Superpower" in *Earthship*, Vol. 1 No.1, Fourth Quarter 1993, p.1.

tially higher than what is already available in Japan, there is no rational reason to have plutonium here in the first place.

The final point has to do with the general lack of concern of the Japanese people. World War II ended almost 50 years ago; since that time young people in Japan have grown up confident that their Constitution will prevent them from ever having to go to war. Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution prevents Japan from having a military force or fighting overseas,<sup>33</sup> but there are great pressures, both internal and external, to amend Article 9 or perhaps to abandon it all together.

Japan also has a policy regarding nuclear weapons called the Three Non-Nuclear Principles: not to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons or have them brought into the country. Despite the recent discussions about amending the Constitution and sending troops overseas, a surprisingly large number of Japanese,

33 Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan reads as follows: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

particularly young people, have never seriously considered the possibility of Japan going to war. They have never bothered to make the connection between *Monju* and nuclear weapons, or even *Monju* and nuclear disaster. Their faith in Japanese technology, coupled with that in the Constitution, have made many complacent and unconcerned about these issues. Their eyes are open, but many have lost the ability to interpret what they see.

In spite of declining interest, Japan does have an aversion to nuclear weapons which is close to fifty years old, and a population which is basically in agreement with the nuclear weapon-free status. It would therefore take quite a lot of maneuvering to make Japan into a nuclear power, and if the situation in Asia remains relatively stable, the probability of a nuclear Japan is very slight. In the event, however, that the DPRK takes a very aggressive nuclear stand (and it is highly unlikely, particularly now, that it will) and if it also adopts a belligerent attitude toward Japan, then things may change. It is therefore important for the entire region that Japan be both legally and morally bound to uphold its status as a non-nuclear and pacifistic state.

CONCLUSION

It is unfortunate that this paper has no conclusion, or at least not a happy and optimistic one. Many of the problems of the Cold War are still with us, and for every one which has been solved there are plenty of new and perhaps even more complex ones awaiting attention. The conclusion, put succinctly, is that there is still a lot of work to be done before the Pacific is truly nuclear-free.

At the beginning of the paper, it was suggested that there are three levels for work for a nuclear-free Pacific: individual, institutional (local/national) and institutional (international/global). In order for continued work to be meaningful, it must be done at each of these levels, with considerable cooperation and networking within, as well as among them. Most of this work must be focused on problems as they arise, and geared to local situations. However, a few suggestions as to directions are listed below.

(1) INDIVIDUAL/NGO

As always the individual movements must be at the fore of the struggle for a nuclear-free Pacific. They must continue to work for independence, and to

achieve a comprehensive test ban and waste ban in the region. They must also be sensitive to the problem of militarization in all its forms, and work to oppose it. One of the most important targets for continued work is Japan. This is true for two reasons. One is military. The Japanese Self Defense Force is growing and its role is expanding, and it is only with the help of people all around the region that alternative forces within Japan will be able to uphold the original spirit of Article 9 and keep the Self Defense Force at home. The second reason is the expanding nuclear industry, especially the plutonium problem. Again, because Japanese society does not tend to look inward and reflect, outside pressure is essential to keep Japan and its technology-worship in line. Korea and Taiwan are also important targets for nuclear-free pressure, but Japan, due to its size and potential, is the most important one.

(2) INSTITUTIONAL (Local/national)

As the island countries of the Pacific become more affluent and incorporated in an active way in the world-economy, the perceived costs of denuclearization become higher. National leaders become less vocal when aid

dollars are at stake. Denuclearization cannot be achieved by individuals and NGOs alone; it is essential that governments continue to voice their concerns about nuclear issues in the region, and to work to make the region nuclear-free. Solidarity groups around the rim and in other parts of the world can help Island leaders to maintain their nuclear-free stance by providing international support for their activities.

### (3) INSTITUTIONAL (International/ Global)

It has already been suggested that the institutionalization of efforts for denuclearization in the form of treaties and conventions is an important goal. In the Pacific, the South Pacific Forum is the primary forum for such efforts. In addition to the waste ban convention, work to expand the area of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty to include Micronesia and the Pacific north of the equator is important. The coordination of efforts for denuclearization with those in Asia and other regions is also essential. International pressure through solidarity networks must be brought to bear on countries such as France which are reluctant to comply with independence and nuclear-free efforts.

At the international level, work for complete disarmament of land and sea is of course essential. It is encouraging that efforts are being made by both governments and non-governmental bodies to increase opportunities for dialogue in the region. The establishment of fora such as the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (to which Papua New Guinea is a party), the ASEAN Regional Forum, Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP)<sup>34</sup> are all examples of institutions established to provide opportunities for the reduction of tensions, greater understanding among the countries of the region, and greater transparency in military matters. It is unfortunate that most of these regional confidence building measures do not involve the Pacific Island Countries, and it is hoped that efforts in the direction of

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34 The Western Pacific Naval Symposium is held in alternate years. The first was in Sydney in 1988. Most participants are naval officers at the CNO level plus a small number of academics. Participants for 1994 came from Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. CSCAP was formally announced in June of 1993 by 10 founding institutes. The main purpose is to create a structured regional process through a new non-governmental institution that is open to all countries and territories in the region.

greater regional understanding will be expanded to include those countries. More importantly, it seems that while the significance of democratization as a political style has been generally accepted around the world, the involvement of non-experts in security policy is still categorized as an idealistic dream. It is hoped therefore that the efforts for regional dialogue will include attempts at 'democratizing' security policy-making, involving a wider range of people with a wider range of concerns.

In sum, there are three major tasks for denuclearization in the Pacific. The first is the expansion of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and the implementation of other international structures and institutions to prevent "things nuclear" from entering the region in any form whatsoever. This includes waste to the Marshall Islands as well as the return of waste to Japan. The second is to focus on Japan in an effort to control both the Japanese nuclear industry and uphold Article 9 of the Constitution. Pressure must be brought to bear on not only the Japanese government but on industry as well, since it is industry which is in large part responsible for the presence of hazardous and toxic wastes, particularly in Asia.

Finally, efforts must be made to work in conjunction and cooperation with efforts for denuclearization, democratization and demilitarization in Asia, particularly Pacific Asia. The original idea of nuclear-free zones was to create pockets of regional trust and confidence which could eventually be expanded to encompass the entire world. The nuclear-free Pacific, like the countries within it, does not and cannot exist in a vacuum. It is only through a denuclearized and demilitarized Asia that a truly nuclear-free Pacific can be achieved, and perhaps it is only through a truly nuclear-free Pacific Asia that steps can be taken to achieve a denuclearized and demilitarized south and west Asia.

In recent Japanese survey, 42% of the Australians responding said that they thought Japan possessed nuclear weapons.<sup>35</sup> That statistic probably came as a surprise to most Japanese, but not to most other people. The problem, however, is not whether Japan or north Korea or India possess nuclear weapons so much as whether (a) they want them and (b) they have the knowledge to produce them if and when they decide they are necessary. To a certain extent, the spread of

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35 *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 May 1994.

knowledge can be contained, or at least the pace of dissemination can be slowed down, but in this world of multimedia communications, the prevention of knowledge dissemination is virtually impossible. The primary focus for movements for denuclearization everywhere therefore, should not be in the prevention of knowledge, but rather the legitimization of the choice not to be nuclear. The Pacific has made that choice; let us hope the rest of the world follows suit.