

Transnational Strategies for Norm Creation through Reputational Dynamics[†]

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This paper proposes a theoretical framework in which transnational movement networks have substantial impacts on international negotiations for normative agreement, through strategic usage of international reputation and tactical linkage of international and domestic politics to apply pressure to governments.

It is widely known that transnational actors including international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational social movement networks, and transnational policy networks influence the development of global norms such as those pertaining to human rights, environmentalism, justice, peace, poverty, and gender equality. Most analysts believe that those actors pressure governments through a combination of persuasion or socialization that is based on a moral “high ground” and lobbying activities.

It is not clear, however, why those actors can successfully direct states that have indicated both a high level of power and a will to adhere to pragmatic, anti-normative policy, to exhibit norm-consistent behaviors despite the fact that transnational actors themselves do not have enough bargaining power, compared to nation-states. If the greatest sources of power for transnational actors are knowledge and norms as most constructivists argue their ability to pressure states that follow a consistent utilitarian policy would be quite limited, because moral persuasion usually does not appear profitable to utilitarian actors. The logic of appropriateness per se cannot compete with the logic of consequences on the same horizon of discussion, and we need to explore further how to insert the logic of appropriateness into the context of the logic of consequences¹.

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Though constructivists discuss social sanctions as political leverage for socialization, the purpose of social sanctions is not to change identity and/or normative beliefs, but rather to change preferences in an instrumental sense². The process of socialization includes not only the internalization of a norm, which entails a change of identity, but also a phase of instrumental adaptation that is based on the logic of consequences and demands no change in identity³. Therefore, we need to explain the instrumental process while using the logic of appropriateness.

This paper explains the missing links between interest-based and identity-based explanations for norm compliance a connection that has not been sufficiently investigated in the literature. The first link pertains to the conditions under which utilitarian actors' considerations of their reputation motivate them to comply with norms. The second one relates to political tactics that use actors' reputational sensitivity and vulnerability to produce effective political pressure. Political power could be redefined in iterated social interactions, through political dynamics called "reputation politics." The power shift caused by reputation politics empowers relatively weak non-state actors like NGOs against even great powers on the one hand, and forces a great power to accept normative demands even against its national interests, on the other.

Following a discussion of the concept of reputation in international relations in the first section, reputational politics and reputational dynamics will then be examined in the second section. To verify the model, a case of US leadership in the process of drafting a mine ban treaty⁴ will be examined in the final part of the paper.

Reputation in the constructivist approach

The concept of reputation has been used in various ways to analyze international relations ways that are often characterized by either the rational choice approach or constructivism. In rational choice approaches, "reputation is a judgment of someone's character (or disposition) that is then used to predict or explain future behavior"⁵. A dispositional explanation and predictions based on past records are found at the core of this definition. In the context of deterrence, reputation concerning the credibility of threat is the analytical focus; in the context of a cooperation game, reputation concerning the credibility of promise is considered the key to promoting cooperation⁶.

In either case, credibility of commitment is the issue at stake, as it is critical information used to predict others' future behaviors.

Since the purpose of this paper is to explain the mechanism of norm development, I take the constructivist approach in addressing reputation. In terms of norm compliance, reputation can be defined as the opinions of community members on whether or not an agent is a legitimate member of the community, judging from his or her past record of compliance with community norms. According to Audie Klotz, reputation works to constrain identity and, as such, it is used as a socialization tool⁷.

Socialization is promoted through a two-way process. One way is from a community toward an applicant for membership or a norm-violator of the community norm; the other is from an applicant or a member who wants to change his or her social role vis-à-vis the community. In the former, the community aims to ensure an applicant or a norm-violator will accept and comply with the community norm, principally by bestowing a negative reputation to create pressure, and a positive one to legitimize compliance behavior. On the other hand, an applicant for community membership asks that the community provide a positive evaluation of his/her qualifications. A member who wants to gain a new social role such as leadership on a specific agenda also tries to persuade and negotiate with the community to recognize the role. Without acquiring trust from the community members with regard to his/her leadership, s/he will not be able to exercise leadership and power successfully.

Therefore, a critical reputation, as part of the socialization process, can be defined as the approval or disapproval by community members of a newcomer as a legitimate member on the one hand, or of an existing member for a specific role or for better treatment on the other. Assessments and evaluations of newcomers,' norm-violators,' and revisionist members' past records of norm compliance are crucial parts of such a reputation.

On one hand, when the community accepts an applicant's or member's request, the membership or renewed role will be easily secured. On the other hand, when a community's demand is rejected by the member (i.e., norm-violator) or when requests from a member or applicant are denied by the community, both parties will mutually try to control the other through the manipulation of reputation. This paper refers to such socio-political dynamics, as seen in mutual manipulations of reputation,

as being part of “ reputation politics. ”

Reputation politics: Constructing political power through social relations

Reputation politics refers to a mode of politics used to secure members ' compliance with norms, by demanding and providing credits or discredits on norm compliance and approval or disapproval for social roles, through the process of mutual observation and interaction.

The main actors in reputation politics can be divided into three categories. The first one is norm leaders who create and/or promote a norm. They include norm entrepreneurs who not only find issues and set agendas but also acquire leadership in coordinating interests and drafting salient solutions. The second category is norm supporters, who can be further subcategorized into consistent endorsers and opportunistic supporters. Consistent endorsers may become norm leaders in the course of creating or promoting a norm. The first- and second-category actors give credits/discredits or approval/disapproval, while actors in the third category demand them, or are subject to reputation-related judgments. These individuals are subcategorized as newcomers or applicants to the community, norm-violators, or revisionist members who demand a new social role such as leadership.

One of the distinctive features of reputation politics is the flexible and changeable nature of power. Power in socio-political relations is equivalent to currency in economic relations, as Tarcott Parsons puts it⁸. The former allows a political system to function, while the latter propagates an economic system, by symbolizing the ability to change both outcomes and others ' behaviors and allowing community members to communicate and cooperate. Karl W. Deutsch adopts a similar analogy and argues that the political equivalent to credibility of currency is prestige of power⁹. Political power, as a form of prestige, is formed on the basis of credibility that is constructed through reputation politics.

Credibility is a form of reputation that is formed by assumptions derived from the evaluation of past behaviors and comparisons with similar examples; such assumptions are sometimes distinct from reality. Therefore, a false threat can be perceived, based on false credibility for negative effect, when even in reality a country has little ability or will to cause a palpable threat. The assumption of a domino effect is a case in

point¹⁰. In a sense, a political system is imaginary and sustained by reputation.

Though such analogies are more rhetorical than substantial, what is important is that political power affects others or outcomes only if it is believed to be exercised in an effective way and, in this sense, is trusted to have enough feasibility to influence others and/or affect change. Credibility and/or prestige of power can substantially determine the range, scope, and weight of the power. Potential power becomes a real influence through prestige and credibility; thus, even a country with rich material power cannot successfully exert influence on others without possessing credibility vis-à-vis the possibility of exercising power, which depends on the domestic constraints/supports and the will of decision-makers on one hand, and on the quality and quantity of a source of power on the other.

Even Hans J. Morgenthau who defines “international politics” as a struggle for power defined by national interests argues that political power is exercised through a psychological relationship between a nation that exercises power and a target of that power¹¹. He also argues that in international struggles for survival and power, how the power of a nation is perceived by other nations is as important as the real power it actually has; therefore, prestige or reputation of power is vital for nations¹².

Thus, the effect of power is determined in a dynamic process that involves reputation politics. Contrary to the realist assumption that political power is a direct translation of the actual or potential use of given hard power, hard power should not be made automatically available as political power; instead, it should be converted by socially constructed credibility in the unfolding of reputation politics. In power politics, political power is rather stable because of its direct link to hard power, while political power in reputation politics is relatively changeable in accordance with the volatility of reputation. Actors are empowered by the approval and recognitions by the community members; therefore, reputational power can be determined by the amount and intensity of approval from the community to which the actor belongs or seeks to belong.

Usually, in international relations, power politics and reputation politics go hand in hand, but they sometimes appear separately when there is a great diversity of interpretation on the nature of conflict and on the political resources most conducive to the acquisition of bargaining power. A political conflict between a major power and

NGOs is a case in point here, where the former has confidence in its power and authority in a relatively stable international political environment, while the latter lacks hard-based power and needs to fight through the use of political power gained through the cultivation of social networks, normative argumentations, and information. While a major power tends to emphasize the use of hard power in effective negotiations and implementations, non-state actors are forced to rely on both reputational power and normative power in pressuring major powers during negotiations.

In addition, a more marked set of reputation-political dynamics is expected to be observed in the process of political transformation or in creating new rules and/or institutions, than within a stable political structure. Since identities are redefined, new rules are created, and new actors emerge as new leaders in a transitional phase, the need for approval with respect to social roles increases. In other words, reputational dynamics become evident in situations where relatively weak actors play a dominant role in the process of creating a new order.

Leadership credibility in terms of norm compliance

As discussed above, credibility is essential to effective leadership. Whether an actor is credible as a leader is judged on the basis of two criteria. One is the feasibility and sustainability of a proposed policy per se, and the other is whether or not behaviors of the actor are appropriate in terms of the community's norms. The second point is especially important, from a reputational perspective.

Norms can be classified into two categories: principled norms, and codes of conduct. Principled norms are those related to humanitarian norms, human rights protection, environmental protection, social justice, gender equality, and the like. Compliance with these norms is prerequisite for participation in normative policy community; in such cases, it is necessary for an actor who wants to take an active role in such a policy community to comply with principled norms.

In addition to compliance with principled norms, it is vital that participants comply with codes of conduct, if they wish their actions to have credibility. The most important codes of conduct include consistency of speech and of actions, correspondence of words with deeds, active and voluntary participation with regard to

collective actions, and the explicit and consistent endorsement of normative policy. When an actor does not observe these codes of conduct, s/he cannot be treated as a trustful player, whether as a negotiator or a leader. Not only behaviors contrary to principled norms but also those against such codes of conduct will be the target of shaming tactics, which will be discussed in the next section.

Reputational tactics: Reputational method of getting approval and triggering the rally effect

Social sanctions are basic reputational tactics that are imposed on an actual or potential norm-violator, by embarrassing and isolating him or her from the community. The tactics, called “name and shame” or “shaming,” are well-known as effective measure of social sanction, wherein a norm-violator’s illegitimate actions are exposed and s/he is discredited in public¹³. Stigmatization is a disrespectful type of shaming that emphasizes punishment by harshly damaging the reputation of the violator¹⁴.

The shaming methodology is typical and effective for NGOs engaging in moral issues involving human rights, humanitarian protection, and anti-corruption issues. As Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, puts it, “the principal power of groups like Human Rights Watch is our ability to hold official conduct up to scrutiny and to generate public outrage.”¹⁵ This means that the effect of shaming is derived from public disapproval of violation and depends upon the public’s understanding of what was wrong about the target. Therefore, the ability to persuade the public and acquire the public’s disapproval of the target is the key to success. This type of reputational tactics for gaining public approval or disapproval is not limited to “naming and shaming.” Collectively, I would like to refer to such tactics as “theatrical politics.”

Theatrical politics is a type of reputation politics, in which actors dramatize a political situation and display their own “moral high ground” in a debate, in order to trigger a rally effect by stimulating the sensitivity of opportunistic audience members with respect to their own reputation and mobilizing them to “jump on the bandwagon.”

This type of tactics is effective in reputation politics, because it is vital to gain approval from the audience in a reputational context. Here, the term “audience” means members of a world society who observe an ongoing process and usually sit on

the sidelines as outsiders. The primary audience comprises states, since they are legally legitimate subjects of international society, but civil society and public opinion in each country, as well as international organizations, are also considered significant audiences, because they have the power to pressure governments and shape world opinions. Even though the audience merely observes and does not participate in the actual negotiation process, it is politically critical in terms of reputation politics, given its power to approve or disapprove actors. Therefore, in terms of aforementioned “name and shame” tactics, stigmatization can especially be interpreted as a necessary part of theatrical politics.

Considering the above-mentioned characteristics, theatrical politics have several distinctive features. First is to accentuate the competitive relationship and display the mainstream by projecting an image of “we are more influential and/or legitimate than they are on the issue,” so that seemingly more influential and/or legitimate actors can garner more approval from the audience than their rivals. In order to impress the struggle for mastery, combative styles including harshly criticizing a rival in public tend to be preferred.

Second, images, rhetoric, symbols, and slogans, more so than logical reasoning and persuasion, are important in theatrical politics. The primary purpose of theatrical politics is to mobilize the public, especially opportunistic audience members, who have little time, information, and will to understand complex reasoning. Therefore, to mobilize opportunists, it is effective to appeal to the cognitive maps and belief systems of the major audience with codes and symbols presented in the form of images and rhetoric.

Related to the second point, simple reasoning that emphasizes the good - evil dichotomy is another critical feature of theatrical politics. This kind of dualistic thinking usually entails normative framing that could create norm resonance among the audience members.

Another category proximate to the aforementioned two features is one in which claims are based on a biased assessment of past performance. In order to claim the political “high ground,” actors tend to underscore their own brilliant past achievements while discrediting a rival’s past performance.

As a result of playing theatrical politics, the party labeled as less influential and/or

less legitimate will be forced to counter against the impression of a potential loser, as suggested by a rival, and eventually get involved in reputation politics, even if it places more value on power politics. Thus, actors can enhance reputational dynamics by playing theatrical politics, even in negotiations where power politics prevail.

Norm cascade as a reputational social dynamics

An opportunistic audience tends to be encouraged to approve a normative policy via theatrical politics, as argued above; if the number of supporters reaches a critical mass or tipping point, a norm cascade begins, as Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink predict¹⁶.

According to the norm life-cycle model created by Finnemore and Sikkink, norms are slowly accepted and institutionalized, after a norm entrepreneur internationally sets an agenda in the emergence stage. When the number of states that accept the norm exceeds a threshold, supporters of the norm increase drastically. This stage is called a “norm cascade” because it is likened to a waterfall where a tipping point is reached and a large amount of water suddenly flows down. In this stage, states can accept a norm only through international pressure even in the absence of domestic pressure that is usually essential to any decision-making. After this process, the norm enters an “internalization” process, where the norm is deeply integrated into domestic and international legal and administrative systems and goes on to function as an internal constraint.

If the norm cascade is defined only as a rapid increase in the number of supporters following a threshold, as mentioned above, the definition cannot explain the cascade’s development following the tipping point. According to some studies concerning domestic cascades, cascading dynamics can be explained sociologically as an outcome of social interactions within a community¹⁷. This understanding allows for a detailed explanation of the cascading process. Therefore, by focusing on the internal social dynamics of the cascade phenomenon, this paper defines a “norm cascade” as a dynamic social phenomenon where the number of norm-supporters increases rapidly and drastically, due to the mutual behavioral adjustments of each member in response to social trends toward a norm, such that the total amount of support spirals upward. A dynamic process involving mutual observations, as well as chain reactions of

behaviors, are the prime characteristics of this definition.

Under a norm cascade, the bandwagon behaviors of opportunistic supporters mix with the rallying behaviors of faithful supporters who are motivated by normative belief. The bandwagoners create momentum that is the main pillar of cascade phenomenon. Momentum is accelerated by opportunists as they make a progressive response in one direction by following the social trend. Therefore, a cascade emerges when opportunists regard bandwagon behaviors as rational. A bandwagon approach is perceived as rational when the cost of damaging one's reputation through non-compliance with a norm (i.e., reputational cost) exceeds the cost of accepting the norm (i.e., cost of policy change), due to an increase in the number of norm supporters and hence the possibility of social isolation. A cascade occurs under such a situation, because opportunists who have remained on the sidelines begin to jump on the bandwagon. This is how bandwagoners drive momentum, based on reputational calculations.

According to such a conceptualization, three indicators certify a norm cascade: a relatively rapid and drastic increase in the number of supporters (i.e., the waterfall effect) the mobilization of opportunists, and the relatively long-lasting political effect that accompanies substantial achievements.

The threshold, set down by Finnemore and Sikkink as a condition for the occurrence of a cascade, can be understood as the condition for bandwagon behavior to become rational, based on the aforementioned cost calculations. That is, an increase in the possibility of social sanctions due to the large size of mainstream supporters provides sideliners an incentive to comply with a norm. From this viewpoint, the threshold should not be set at a given, fixed value, as assumed by Finnemore and Sikkink; rather, it is reasonable to think that a threshold varies depending on the size of the community and the nature of the issue at hand. This is because reputational cost fluctuates depending on certain environmental conditions, including the size of the community, its institutional features, and the social priorities of its agenda. The expansion of human rights laws and human-rights networks up until 1985¹⁸, for example, can be understood as an institutional feature that has increased the reputational cost.

Reputational vulnerability: When does the reputational effect become larger than interest-based or power political calculations?

Reputation politics encourage norm-violators and opportunists to accept a norm, but it does not always work as expected. Even under the dynamics of a norm cascade where opportunists can be easily mobilized it is difficult to persuade opponents that have consistent alternative policies based on national interests, because the total cost of changing their existing policies exceeds that of damaging their reputations.

The extent to which a state places a high value on its reputation depends on both external and internal factors. Here, “ external factor ” refers to a state’s perceived need for its international image as a cooperative internationalist, or for its good standing in international society. The most critical “ internal factor ” for reputational calculations is the stability of the regime, or whether the government holds strong control over decision-making. The combination of these factors determines a state’s sensitivity and vulnerability to its international reputation.

Sensitivity to reputation is similar to the concept of sensitivity in complex interdependence, which “ refers to the amount and pace of the effects of dependence; that is, how quickly does change in one part of the system bring about change in another part? ”¹⁹ Similarly, one’s reputational sensitivity determines the speed of the effects of reputation imposed by others, and so a high level of sensitivity suggests that one can be affected in the short term by reputational changes.

Reputational sensitivity can be measured by political-adjustment costs in avoiding potential reputational damages within existing political institutions. If a state is highly sensitive to its reputation, it will be motivated to adjust its foreign policy into a more cooperative fashion by making the best of its existing policies. Such an adjustment does not usually incur a substantial change, but rather an instrumental and rhetorical one.

The concept of vulnerability is also similar to that of complex interdependence, which “ refers to the relative costs of changing the structure of a system of interdependence. It is the cost of escaping from the system or of changing the rules of the game ”²⁰. In a reputational context, “ vulnerability ” refers to the costs of escaping from or changing the reputational structure that is unfavorable to the actor.

Reputational vulnerability can be measured by the costs of changing the basic

policy and adopting a new policy on the issue, in order to mitigate damage caused by incurring a bad reputation. The costs of vulnerability are relatively higher than those of minor adjustments caused by sensitivity, because governments need to build political consensus prior to undertaking substantial policy changes—changes that often entail costly negotiations with opposing actors.

The international and domestic factors that determine sensitivity and vulnerability include not only structural components, but also situational ones; hence, they can change along with situational changes. Even a state that has a long tradition of placing high value on its international image sometimes prioritizes its practical calculations over reputational concerns, depending on temporal conditions.

The structural or systemic causes that determine a state's perceived need for its cooperative images include the state's position as a small state, as a middle power, as an emerging power, as an ally, and as an economic partner. Allies, economic partners, and small states tend to value their reputations in relatively specific relationships, be it alliances, economic relations, or as a donor of development aid; middle powers and emerging powers, meanwhile, tend to be sensitive to their reputations in a wider international society, in order to enhance their presence in international politics by gaining greater recognition for their leadership.

In addition to these structural causes, there is another structural dimension that is ideational—namely, the political culture firmly built into its foreign policy and public opinion, the latter of which is usually embedded in the identity of a country.

Situational causes include diplomatic isolation, the destabilization of foreign relations, and the redefinition of identity. In order to cover the loss of interests caused by isolation and/or damaged diplomatic relations, states are expected to be more sensitive to their images as good neighbors. When a state needs to redefine its identity and search for a more internationalist role in response to major systemic changes—as was seen among many nations at the end of the Cold War—it will be more sensitive to the world's recognition of its renewed internationalist position; this was the case with Canada during the early 1990s.

Domestic structures that determine the vulnerability of a regime include the centralization or concentration of power, a system of checks and balances (i.e., separation of powers), the nature of the political-party system therein, and the

strength of civil society²¹. The relative strength of oppositions to the ruling decision-makers, presidential approval rates, public opinion, and social mobilizations can determine situations under which the regime gets vulnerable.

Figure 1 shows different types of situations under which a state values or undervalues its reputations. Each category will be discussed in brief.

Category I: Reputationally sensitive: reputational effect depends on policy priorities

The first category (category I) signifies the situation under which a government is sensitive to its international image on one hand, and the administration is stable and the ruling coalition's political clout prevails over the opposition on the other. In this case, the government's basic policy is to comply with international norms and rules, given its sensitivity to its reputations; however, sensitivity does not necessarily guarantee norm compliance. A state has various national interests, such as those pertaining to defense, economic prosperity, prestige, and welfare; if the cost of changing a policy of a vital interest like defense is higher than that of changing a policy concerning an international norm, especially in response to blame for not supporting a certain normative agreement, the state has a good reason to prioritize the former over the latter and accept the cost incurred by ignoring the blame and




Figure 1: Reputational Typology

committing a small norm violation. Since the administration is stable enough to shoulder the strong opposition, it can successfully resist political pressure applied by internationalists that push for a further normative shift. Therefore, reputational effects under category I depend on the government's priority areas vis-à-vis both domestic and foreign policies, and on which national interests are the top priorities.

Category II: Reputationally vulnerable: the largest reputational effect possible

If a reputationally sensitive administration cannot control domestic opposition, it would not be easy for a government to ignore a demand from the opposition for a normative shift. This situation falls under category II, where a government is sensitive to its international image as a cooperative internationalist and, at the same time, is politically weak against domestic opposition. In this case, the state is vulnerable to its international reputations and inclined to accept international norms and rules even those that run counter to some of its vital national interests if pressured by domestic or transnational forces from within.

Category III: Internally vulnerable: reputational effects depend on domestic normative winning coalitions and opposition forces

Since a category-III government is impervious to its reputation, it tends to behave unilaterally, often creating antagonistic relationships or preferring to make isolationist policies. Nevertheless, the government can change its policies in response to pressures applied by domestic and/or transnational internationalists, since the administration is politically weak against its opposition. Whether the state complies with a norm depends on domestic internationalists' capability to apply effective pressure to the government.

Another effective strategy by which to encourage a category-III government to accept and/or officially support the norm is to internationally isolate the state so that it will become sensitive to critiques and recognitions from international society that is, move it into category II. Once a state grows sensitive to its reputations, it becomes easier for internationalists to pressure the government to change its policy. Therefore, a strategic linkage of domestic and international pressures, usually mediated by transnational actors, is most effective in prompting category-III governments to

change their policies in deference to international norms.

In general, it seems easier for domestic and transnational actors to persuade vulnerable administrations (i.e., those in categories II or III) to change their preferences than to persuade stable administrations belonging to category I or IV; however, whether a government actually changes its policy depends on domestic demand for better international reputations—that is, on whether the diplomacy is at the top of public and media agendas, and whether or not opposition forces are calling for improvements to the state's international image. Especially, a reputationally insensitive category-III state requires political demands from the opposition and/or the public, as well as from international society, if it is to change its policy. When there are sufficient domestic demands to push the government, the possibility of a change in policy in favor of internationalists increases drastically.

Category IV: Independent: Isolationist or unilateralist: the smallest, almost no reputational effect

States included in this final category are impervious to both internal and external pressures; reputational politics hold little sway in such states. Authoritarian states that are either isolationist or unilateralist are good cases in point.

Transnational actors in promoting norms, through the use of reputations

The purpose of reputational strategy is to build an environment that makes actors sensitive and vulnerable to their reputations, in both international and domestic arenas. In the domestic arena, the basic strategy is to expand a normative winning coalition by acquiring tactful access to domestic policy-making and utilizing the increased legitimacy wrought by international momentum. Another strategy is to reduce the government's cost of norm compliance by helping to improve legal systems and transfer technology and knowledge that make norm-consistent behaviors easier.

In the international arena, it is effective to build momentum that triggers a norm cascade. In order to build momentum, it is effective to drive up the cost of social sanctions or reputational cost, which can be achieved through theatrical politics, monitoring, lobbying activities to great powers and international organizations, and the disclosure and dissemination of information. A strategic linkage is needed to utilize

the benefit of an international cascade in domestic politics.

Therefore, norm leaders influence a target state that violates or opposes a norm by taking advantage of reputational effects and state structure. They can reduce the cost of norm compliance in a country where normative winning coalitions are atypical, by influencing domestic politics and changing the size of the winning coalition. At the same time, they can apply diplomatic pressure from outside by creating a norm cascade.

Such simultaneous pressures are made available only if norm leaders can access policy making and enjoy enough political impact inside the country. Therefore, we expect the chances to be fairly good that norm leaders will succeed in changing a category II or III country's governmental policy, because the domestic structure there is relatively open to transnational actors.

Impact of transnational politics

Even in a country that falls under reputational category II or III, a transnational actor's political impact varies depending on domestic structure. According to Risse-Kappen's hypothesis, in a country where a social actor cannot easily gain access to the policy-making process, s/he can have a great impact on policy once s/he does succeed in gaining access²². He classifies countries into six categories, along three axes: "state structure," "societal structure," and "policy networks."

"State structure" refers to the degree of concentration of power coupled with the political culture that emphasizes centralization of authority. A societal structure is categorized as belonging to strong or weak societies; a strong societal structure can be characterized by fewer ideological cleavages, active participation by civil society, and the fairly large political leverage of interest groups against the government. The third axis relates to negotiation styles of "policy networks" comprised of political parties and other intermediate organizations. Policy networks prefer consensus-building in a "consensual" policy, while they emphasize conflictual and distributive bargaining style in a "polarized" polity. Table 1 categorizes domestic structures and transnational actors' possibility of access and policy impact on decision-making.

The relationship between accessibility and impact is inversely proportional, except in the case of a "stalemate,"²³ as shown in Table 1. Note that transnational actors have

Table 1 : Domestic Structure and Policy Impact of Transnational Actors

State \ Society & Intermediate		Society			
		Strong		Weak	
		Policy networks			
		Consensual	Polarized	Consensual	Polarized
Political institutions	Centralized	Corporatist (Incremental but long-lasting) x x x Japan; European small states	Stalemate (Impact unlikely) x x x x India; Hungary in Cold War era	State-dominated (Profound) x x x x x South Korea; Singapore; Zimbabwe	State-controlled (Profound) x x x x x Soviet Union; Eastern Europe
	Fragmented	Society-dominated (Difficult and not so long-lasting) x x US; Hong Kong; Philippines		Fragile (Impact unlikely) x Kenya, Russia after the collapse of USSR	

() : policy impact of transnational actors

x : degree of accessibility (More x-marks indicate more difficulty in gaining access)

(Source: Risse-Kappen, Thomas, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 23 - 28.)

an impact on decision-making only after they have succeeded in building a winning coalition with domestic actors. Therefore, they can have a profound impact if they succeed in building a coalition with state actors who share the same goal with transnational actors in a state-controlled or state-dominated country, and they can have a long-lasting impact if they succeed in building a coalition with powerful intermediate organizations in a corporatist country.

Therefore, norm leaders need to take different strategies and collaborate with diverse domestic actors, depending on the domestic structure, when they look to apply pressure to the government from inside. For example, in a country like the United States, where the political institution is rather fragmented and society is strong, it is relatively easy to access policy-making, while impact on decision-making is limited. In order to make a great impact in such a country, norm leaders are expected to use multiple channels for policy-making, along with a variety of negotiation, persuasion, and campaign methods.

Transnational networks

When political opportunities become open in terms of either reputational vulnerabilities or state structures, what types of resources does a transnational network mobilize, and how does it mobilize them to bear a substantial impact on decision-making? It is widely known that networks are productive for transnational actors in effectively mobilizing resources; these networks include epistemic communities²⁴, advocacy networks²⁵, and anti-neoliberal networks, starting with the model marked by the highest network cohesion²⁶.

Epistemic communities primarily comprise experts such as scientists, lawyers, and academics, and they participate directly in the policy-making processes of international regimes and individual governments. Simply put, they are transnational lobby groups formed by specialists, and they not only provide expertise but also drive international policy formation; they do so by adjusting the interests of parties concerned, discovering the point of compromise, and proposing feasible and politically valid policies. It is well-known that a series of agreements concerning the protection of the ozone layer was led by an epistemic community.

Advocacy networks center on activists that include non-experts; they pressure each government by arousing public opinion, both domestically and abroad. They have a greater tendency than epistemic communities to bring norm awareness to the forefront, and while epistemic communities participate in international policy formulation through the power of knowledge, advocacy networks mobilize international and domestic public opinion and pressure governments through the power of norms. A prime example would be a case of human-rights violation in which advocacy networks pressure a repressive government to end human-rights abuses.

Recently, however, the number of activists possessing a wealth of expertise and experience has increased on the one hand, while on the other, experts have begun to acquire techniques that appeal to the public opinion. Moreover, there are more and more areas of overlap between epistemic communities and advocacy networks. The result is that there has been an emergence of networks that feature the characteristics of both epistemic communities and advocacy networks, where domestic and international public opinion is mobilized to pressure the government, while also possessing a high degree of expert knowledge; as a result, actors within these

networks have been able to enter governments or international organizations and participate directly in the formulation of policy. This type of hybrid network is ideal in developing international norms by exercising influence on both international and domestic fronts, because it can participate synergistically in both international and domestic policy formulations, either simultaneously or on a coordinated basis.

Major powers and reputation politics in drafting the Mine Ban Treaty²⁷

The model of reputation politics, argued above, can neatly explain the detailed process of political interactions throughout the course of norm-making. In this section, I will use this framework to explain the process of drafting the Mine Ban Treaty, with a focus on inquiring into the reasons why the United States became isolated in the final stage of the negotiation process.

Actual work on the Mine Ban Treaty began in October 1996, however, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) which played a central role in that process, launched in 1992. At the time of the ICBL launch, the degree of the damage done by landmines²⁸ was almost unknown; however, international efforts towards the restriction of landmines started when the United States and France set an international agenda in 1993. The United States took the initiative by adopting an export moratorium and drafting a United Nations General Assembly resolution that called for an export moratorium. In addition, landmine restrictions began to be discussed within the framework of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)²⁹ in the same year, when France requested revisions to the CCW.

After the talks in a series of expert meetings held between 1994 and 1995 on the restriction of landmines, the CCW Review Conference in 1995 failed to reach an agreement. The revised Protocol II was adopted during the reopening session in the following year. However, the ICBL, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and countries playing a leadership role, which called for an immediate ban of landmines without exception (hereafter, collectively referred to as “ the pro-ban coalition ”) were not satisfied with the details of the revised Protocol and searched for a way to form stronger international consensus.

This resulted in the idea of creating an original treaty by like-minded states, outside the framework of UN disarmament negotiations. Thus, the Ottawa Process started at the Ottawa Conference held in October 1996, where NGOs officially participated in negotiations outside the UN framework. As a result, more than 120 countries signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997.

This overall process carried considerable momentum. Although only 50 countries officially agreed with the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, which explicitly stated the policy of an immediate ban on landmines, the number of countries which signed the agreement more than doubled in little over a year and a treaty was signed that generally followed the demands of the ICBL. In fact, a majority of advocates who analyzed this case identify the occurrence of a cascade³⁰. However, the time frame for the occurrence of the cascade is somewhat different depending on the advocate, and the criteria for the beginning of the cascade and the dynamic process of the cascade have not been elucidated yet.

The United States held an ambivalent role in the history of this anti-landmine policy formation. Although it first took a leadership role in the anti-landmine movement during the early 1990s with export moratoriums, it preferred partial ban over immediate and comprehensive ban and tried to launch an arms control regime. The United States, however, could not garner enough international support for partial ban to establish the control regime, and eventually made a complete diplomatic failure in the final negotiations of draft treaty at the Oslo Conference in 1997, where the US suggestions of reservations and exceptions were totally denied. Thus, the United States decided to withdraw from the Ottawa Process and not to sign the treaty.

The United States, which has strong interests and influence in numerous fields, usually wields a great bargaining power over many other countries. Above all, the US consent is usually regarded as indispensable to the success of negotiations on arms control. Contrary to expectations, however, the United States was unable to win over the pro-ban coalition and experienced international isolation after all of its requests were denied at the Oslo Conference.

Previous studies focus mainly on inductively explaining the factors of the ability of NGOs as the reason of US failures. According to them, coalitions between NGOs and middle powers produced political power comparable to major powers by effectively

using information and norms. This explanation fails to clarify the reason how information and norms were converted into a sufficient political power to exceed the power and authority of a major power. It is also unable to explain why the pro-ban coalition chose to antagonize and reject US proposals after failing to persuade it.

Another explanation that the US isolation at the Oslo Conference was an inevitable result of its delayed entrance into the talks seems merely a spurious correlation, considering the fact that some members in the pro-ban coalition supported the United States to join the process, even at the last minute. Such an argument cannot explain the structural causes at the bottom of the superficial events. Therefore, I would like to answer these questions by using the theoretical framework argued in previous sections.

US Isolation in the norm cascade

The international anti-landmine policy-making process can be largely divided into two stages. In the first, from 1992 to around April 1996, partial ban discourse was primarily in the mainstream, and the United States took the lead, though imperfectly. The latter half gradually began after the second resumed session of CCW Review Conference started at the end of April 1996. In this phase, mine-ban discourse was prioritized from late 1996 to the end of 1997, and the mine-ban cascade occurred. Especially after an intensive mine-ban cascade occurred in Africa in April to May 1997, international momentum to support the ban reached its peak. The United States could not exert any influence over the final stage of drafting the Mine Ban Treaty, because the total-ban cascade had gathered sufficient strength and momentum at that time.

Although the United States downplayed the degree to which the Ottawa Process was being driven by middle powers and small countries, the collective trends of these countries which together comprised a majority had the effect of minimizing the impact of US political powers at the Oslo Conference. This was reflected remarkably in US diplomacy towards Africa at this time. The United States tried to undermine the pro-ban coalition through bilateral talks with African countries countries that represented a majority in Oslo. Nonetheless, the United States could not make the African countries change their minds. Since the mine-ban momentum was huge not

only in Africa, but also around the world, possibility of the US sanctions on countries which didn't side with the United States appeared small. As South African President Nelson Mandela rightly told US President Bill Clinton, there was no prospect of support from the international community, even if the United States had invoked social and economic sanctions at this point as it had with South Africa under apartheid and the situation was such that Clinton's desired effect could not be hoped for³¹.

Thus, at the Oslo Conference, US suggestions were not supported at all, despite its intensive bilateral talks and Clinton's urgent requests to Canadian, British, French, and South African presidents to support the US policy. The United States could neither push through its suggestions nor agree to the draft treaty, and thus had no choice but to leave the negotiation table. The enhanced power of pro-ban coalition through norm cascade diminished US influence over the negotiation.

The rivalry between the United States and the ICBL through theatrical politics

The international isolation of the United States is partly attributed to the pro-ban coalition's confrontational attitudes against it, which was strengthened according to the dynamics of norm cascade and coalition's demand for unity.

In early stages where the military utility of landmines was largely recognized, the pro-ban coalition conducted the theatrical politics in order to impress humanitarian frame, and condemned as evils the countries that insisted on the military utility of landmines. Given that international mines control conducted under the US leadership during 1994 to 1995 did not make a significant progress, the ICBL got to emphasize further the importance of humanitarian frame instead of military frame. Therefore, in the second resumed CCW review conference in 1996, the pro-ban coalition conducted theatrical politics that raised the simple, straightforward, and radical push for an "immediate ban with no exceptions, no reservations and no loopholes"; made extensive use of tragic images; stressed the limits of mines-control system; clearly distinguished friends and foes (i.e., supporters and opponents) and denounced inconsistency in policy and between words and deeds, all to highlight the humanitarian frame.

In the process of distinguishing friends and foes, the question of how to deal with the United States became a focus of debate. In early April, ahead of the second CCW conference, Bobby Muller, who is a founder of the movement and had rich experience

in negotiating with the US government, and Jody Williams, ICBL coordinator, clashed with each other over the ICBL's campaign strategy. Muller emphasized the importance of the United States in solving the landmine problem, and insisted on cooperation with it. Williams, on the other hand, did not trust the US administration, which gave priority to partial ban policy while simultaneously claiming to support the total ban; she also insisted that the strategy of painting the United States as a symbolic enemy and thus rallying small countries that bore anti-American sentiments would be more prompt and effective for success of the campaign than cooperating with the United States³².

Furthermore, the US policy of promoting the self-destructing or self-deactivating "smart" mines as a solution to the mine problems was another reason for the exclusion of the United States from the mine-ban policy making. Smart mines were quite unpopular among developing countries because they are far more expensive than ordinary "dumb" mines and so difficult to be produced in developing countries. For this reason, the debate as to whether or not smart mines should be an exception to the mine ban was seen by developing countries as demonstrating the unfair relations between "haves" and "have-nots" in the context of North - South issues. Therefore, the United States, as the country most active in promoting smart mines, came to be considered as a prominent symbol of enemy used to gain the support of southern countries.

Ultimately, the debate between the two sides resulted in Williams' victory. It is not clear, however, whether theatrical politics played by the pro-ban coalition actually influenced the US policy, since there was no need for the United States to be sensitive to its international image, as the pro-ban coalition was an international minority at that point and the United States didn't put high priority on the mine policy. In any case, ICBL got to change its direction toward excluding the United States rather than cooperating with it.

A similar situation occurred again during the period from the Brussels Conference in June 1997 to the Oslo Conference in September of that year. This time, an internal division was more serious, for not only the reproduced confrontation between Muller and Williams, but also for different opinions between the Canadian government and NGOs. From the beginning of the Ottawa Process, the Canadian government

consistently sought possibility of cooperation with the United States, while always paying close attention to maintaining the momentum. Thus, Canada actively lobbied the United States to join the Ottawa Process in preparatory stages for the Brussels Conference³³. Even at the meeting of core countries for final preparations for the Oslo Conference in early August, it insisted on offering a compromise to make some US-made smart mines an exception to the ban³⁴.

In contrast, many of the NGO activists had a deep distrust of the United States and felt threatened by it. It especially angered many activists that the United States declared its participation in the Oslo Conference, even though it didn't sign the Brussels Declaration which was regarded as prerequisite for participation in the Oslo negotiations. At the same time, as mentioned previously, it was strategically crucial for Williams to use the United States as a symbol of enemy to rally followers and thus maintain momentum. For Williams, the most important audiences were almost always the developing countries, from which most landmine victims came; securing those countries' support was the linchpin of her strategy. Generally speaking, individual developing countries tend to leave international unity among developing countries lured, oftentimes, in individual negotiations with a powerful country, with promises of aid and trade incentives as proverbial "bait," and leaders need to employ a strategy to strengthen the solidarity within the developing-country coalition³⁵.

Same was true in the case of landmines, and the ICBL took the strategy of strengthening the unity of the African countries by taking advantage of a regional power and a regional institution: South Africa and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), because it was concerned that Western powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France might disturb the unity of African countries by making bilateral negotiations with them. Indeed, the ICBL was afraid that the unity of the developing countries would be undermined by their individual desires to compromise with the United States.

Furthermore, Williams expected that tactics to use the United States as a symbol of enemy would work effectively, as developing countries have a perverse anti-American sentiment in the context of North-South issues. Her scenario must have been confirmed by the African cascade in spring 1997. At the OAU Conference in Kempton Park, South Africa in May 1997, the resolution that called for landmine free

Africa was adopted almost unanimously except for Egypt, despite the objection of the United States that participated as an observer. Ultimately, when the conference was over, more than 40 out of 53 OAU members declared their support for the Ottawa Process at the Conference³⁶.

When the Oslo Conference started, the controversy had not yet abated vis-à-vis the US participation or just how important the southern countries' unity was. During the Conference, however, the option to compromise with the United States was totally abandoned. This is because the last-minute participation of the United States threatened the pro-ban coalition, and encouraged them to strengthen theatrical politics in defense of the cascade. Meanwhile, the death of Princess Diana who was an enthusiastic supporter of a ban on landmines gave rise to media attention to the Oslo Conference, and led to the reinforced strategy of appealing to the public, which resulted in the supremacy of logic of campaigns over the logic of diplomacy.

The actual negotiations, however, were products of diplomatic compromise. During the negotiations, anti-handling devices and anti-vehicle landmines were excluded from the ban, in consideration to European countries such as Germany. The draft treaty included clauses for a grace period for destruction of the stockpile and for assistance for mine clearance in favor of potential supporting countries such as Australia. It was also considered to include clauses conciliatory to the United States. Technically speaking, some argued that the US proposal to limit exceptions to smart mines would enhance effectiveness of the treaty, compared to the exclusion of the anti-handling devices accompanied by dumb mines³⁷. Therefore, there had been plenty of room to incorporate the request of the United States to make that exception, if the negotiations had been sufficiently pragmatic as is often the case in arms control negotiations, which tend to follow the logic of diplomacy.

Paradoxically, however, it was precisely because there had been pragmatic negotiations that they could not accept the request of the United States. It was necessary for campaigners to cover up the realities of internal divisions and pragmatic negotiations, in order to maintain the mine-ban momentum in a contradictory situation where a public-conscious theatrical campaign had been held on one hand, and compromising negotiations were being carried out on the other. Thus, it was all the more critical for the campaigners to appeal to the public with idealistic rhetoric and a

coherent argument that refused any exceptions demanded by the United States.

As a result, the United States had to negotiate in an atmosphere where it was assigned the role of a villain, and whatever suggestions it made were rejected. However, the United States, which did not fully understand the situation, had aggravated the villain image by taking a firm attitude towards the pro-ban coalition and discouraged the pro-American diplomats and campaigners within the pro-ban coalition. In this way, the United States narrowed its own bargaining space a space that might otherwise have been wider, had it shown an attitude of compromise.

The radical slogan “no exceptions, no reservations, no loopholes” was used as a political maneuver to hide the reality of the compromise and prevent a slowdown in the momentum; the United States had been painted as a villain and hence fully exploited in the scenario.

Behaviors incompatible with norms: The source of distrust in reputation politics

The Ottawa Process, particularly after 1997, has operated in line with a set of unique norms and rules within the community. An immediate and comprehensive ban which had been the policy goal of the pro-ban coalition was the principled norm, and consistency of speech and conduct, consistent policy, proactive participation to the process, and clear declarations of support were shared as codes of conduct. Moreover, there were informal procedural rules that had been formed during the Ottawa Process. The United States had cultivated distrust among the pro-ban coalition by violating these various norms and rules.

The US government had been engaging in double-dealing diplomacy, in which the United States declared a total ban to the UN General Assembly while simultaneously subscribing to the principle of partial ban or of restricting but not altogether eliminating landmines. This was a political maneuver used to appease the pro-ban coalition, but this kind of inconsistency of policy instilled a deep distrust among the campaigners a distrust that resulted in the exclusion of the United States from negotiations.

The US disregard of the important procedural rules within the Ottawa Process was another factor that weakened the US position. An extreme case was its non-participation to the Brussels Declaration that was adopted during the Brussels

Conference. The Brussels Declaration promised the adoption of a total ban treaty through the Ottawa Process, and it had the characteristics of a kind of “loyalty test”: only the “good nations” that signed the Declaration would qualify for official participation in the Oslo Conference. In other words, only those members that promised to support a total ban, to recognize the Ottawa Process as the legitimate venue to negotiate the treaty, and to officially express their support to the Ottawa Process, were qualified to participate in the final treaty negotiations. The United States, however, did not share the common understanding and tried to participate in the Oslo Conference without following the necessary step of signing the Brussels Declaration. Thus, the United States aroused resentment among campaigners.

The United States consistently positioned itself as an outsider, and most high-ranking officials underestimated the political importance of the Ottawa Process. The United States had too much confidence in its international influence and believed that negotiations could not reach an agreement without the United States. While the United States was paying attention to the international bandwagoning to the Ottawa Process, it focused mainly on military powers, such as Russia and China. The United States overlooked the importance of the Ottawa Process, in which these major powers did not participate and whose major participants comprised small and midsize countries³⁸. The United States clung to the convictions in power politics that the hard power mostly ensures political consequences and legal effects, and so, overlooked the potential of the Ottawa Process.

Since the Ottawa Process was a process of forming an intimate community that shared norms and a sense of solidarity based upon the principle of participatory democracy, the United States, an outsider country that did not share the norm and fellow feeling, was thus excluded from the process.

The United States not only could not take an appropriate leadership but also lost diplomatic games, because it misunderstood the international context. The structural reason for the misunderstanding was that the United States did not recognize the political context of reputation politics in the norm cascade and coped with the situation by the logic of power politics. In reputation politics, a great power that does not participate in the process cannot have political strength, because the trust and credibility established through mutual observations and interactions are one of the

major resources of the political power. Nevertheless, the United States tried to cope with the situation from a perspective of great power and made a mistake of pushing where pulling was appropriate. Thus the United States pushed itself into the corner.

Transnational politics in the United States: US reputational type and transnational strategy

The ICBL, which played a pivotal role in creating the Mine Ban Treaty, is a typical example of the hybrid network described in the previous section. As a hybrid network, it was able to have practical influence both in international and domestic politics by utilizing the specialized knowledge and the power of norms, conferred by the features of the epistemic community and the advocacy network.

The ICBL could function as an epistemic community, where international NGOs (e.g., Human Rights Watch and Handicap International) that are highly specialized and have the trust of government institutions played central roles. Also, having built close partnership with the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), which is equipped with sophisticated research and advocacy skills and international legitimacy as a group of humanitarian-issue experts, the ICBL was able to enhance its ability and legitimacy as an expert organization. By utilizing such expertise, the ICBL could set international agendas and become involved in the creation of treaties.

Additionally, the ICBL reframed the landmine issue as a humanitarian issue that related to landmine victims, rather than as a disarmament issue, and it developed a normative debate to this end. In sympathizing with the normative arguments, small-scale NGOs specializing in mine clearance and victim assistance, NGOs engaging in relief of the poor, development NGOs, and religious organizations such as Christian churches and Buddhist and Muslim organizations added their resources to the movement, and many other people lacking technical or socio-economic knowledge of landmine issues have also been mobilized, effectively expanding the range of participants in the movement. The ICBL thereby could exert influence effectively on the politicians that would face the election in the near future and on the governments with vulnerable domestic bases.

The ICBL's strategy to treat the landmine issue as a humanitarian and human rights issue helped build close relationships with humanitarian organizations such as

UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It also helped form an effective strategic partnership with middle powers like Canada, Belgium and Norway that tried to establish their international leadership in the areas of humanitarian issue and international cooperation. Arousing and mobilizing national and international public opinions broadly by normative appeal, the ICBL put pressure, from inside and outside, on the governments which tried to justify the production and use of landmines and led them to change their landmine policy³⁹. This process reflects the characteristics of the ICBL as an advocacy network.

However, there were not a few countries where national and international campaigns were not coordinated; the United States was one of them. In the next section, I will answer the question why the US NGOs most of whom were rich in quantity and quality and included ICBL core members could not push the US government to accept the mine ban norm.

The US Reputational Type

In the period of Clinton administration from 1993 to 1997, the presidential approval ratings were generally high partly because of his political style of appealing to the public. However, the administration needed to cooperate carefully with the Congress, and could hardly take a unilateral leadership, after the government became divided in 1995. In addition, the administration's relationship with the military had become somewhat strained by Clinton's conscientious objection to the Vietnam War in his young days, and by his administration's directive which allowed homosexuals to serve in the military. As a result, the administration found it difficult to take a strong leadership vis-à-vis the military. The Clinton administration's political base had not been rock-solid.

What role did the United States' international image play? While Clinton personally preferred internationalist cooperative diplomacy, there was no need for the United States to focus on improving its international cooperative image under the international environment of the time. The US influence on the world stage following the Cold War starting especially with the Gulf War had grown enormously; requests for and trust in the US leadership had grown accordingly. Coupled with the UN failure in Somalia and Rwanda, the US unilateral leadership independent of the

UN, such as in the case of military interventions by NATO, was widely accepted. Therefore, the United States emphasized relations with European allies, Russia, and China, in line with the diplomatic tradition based on power politics. In addition, there was widespread awareness among international communities including the United States itself that multilateral agreement without American buy-in was impossible. Therefore, it was unlikely that the US national interests would be seriously affected by the improvement or deterioration of its cooperative image, and in this sense, the US reputational sensitivity was relatively low.

Given this history, the United States between 1993 and 1997 was of a category-III reputation type. Therefore, theoretically, in order to lead the government through international norms, it would be effective to make an international environment where deteriorated reputation would seriously damage national interests, in combination with domestic pressures led by transnational actors.

It was only in the final stage of the Oslo Conference, however, that the United States was forced into international isolation. The United States was not at all isolated in earlier stages, because the pro-ban coalition was apparently an international minority till mid-1996; the CCW was revised according to the US expectations; and major powers were in favor of negotiations in the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in which the United States intended to get a leadership. It was only when CD talks reached an impasse and the United States entered the phase of wanting to take part in the Oslo Conference that it exposed its position as an outsider. The United States, however, did not recognize that it was internationally isolated right up to the Oslo negotiation, because it did not know much about what was going on in international anti-landmine policy-making. It was only at the last moment of the Oslo Conference that the United States finally moved into the category-II situation.

According to the model of reputation politics, transnational movements could have a chance to pressure the US government from inside, which was in category-III at first and later in category-II. It seems, however, the US decision was not heavily influenced by the mine-ban campaign. The reason for the campaigners' failure can be explained in terms of domestic structure.

Transnational Politics in the United States

In general, there are three routes by which a transnational social movement can affect the US government on diplomatic issues: the route of affecting the president by mobilizing the public opinion; of coalition with members of the Congress; and of the direct collaboration with government officials⁴⁰.

The first route is very complicated, but its importance in influencing the president via a sort of political sanction through elections has been highlighted by many public-opinion researchers. Douglas Foyle argues that decision makers sometimes prioritize predictions of future public response over the current public opinion. That is, some policies that could conflict with the demands of the current public opinion are adopted based on the prediction that the public opinion would make a different response at the next election time⁴¹. This implies that decision-makers are more susceptible to the influence of the public opinion if elections are close at hand⁴².

The second route is one in which influence is exerted on policy-making through members of the Congress by forming a political coalition with them. According to Alfred Knopf who studied on anti-nuclear movement, this route was essential for anti-nuclear movement, and it could not have effectively influenced decision-making without the coalition with the Congress⁴³.

The third is the most direct route among the three. Since arms control policy has been formed not by Congress, but by the administration, especially Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), civilian officials of Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), participation in the policy community of officials in these institutions enhances the possibility of direct influence in the policy making.

As already mentioned, transnational actors need to utilize various routes to effectively influence decision-making in a fragmented society like the United States. Taking the above argument into consideration, it can be expected to be difficult to influence decision-making on a new issue unless they exploit diverse channels, including mobilization of public opinion shortly before an election, coalition with congressional members, and participation in the policy community.

The US mine-ban campaign, however, primarily exploited the congressional route and failed to have enough influence on the administration to change its policy⁴⁴. The

US mine-ban movement depended mostly on Senator Patrick Leahy and did not have enough access to active-duty military personnel, civilian officials of Department of Defense, ACDA and State Department officials. Furthermore, compared to European countries, the grassroots mine-ban movement was less active and could not pressure the administration effectively by mobilizing the public even in the presidential election year 1996. Thus, after the export moratorium failed to lead international anti-landmine policy, the US Campaign failed to put the mine ban on the top policy agenda. In other words, the US Campaign devoted itself to the assistance of the congressman and didn't exploit other routes so much⁴⁵. The campaign denounced the ignorance and arrogance of the administration⁴⁶, but part of the blame for the governmental misunderstanding must be apportioned to the mine-ban campaign side. In the United States, transnational politics did not function sufficiently well vis-à-vis national and international situations in forming a positive correlation.

Conclusion

This paper examined how humanitarian norms are institutionalized as international policy, through reputation politics in cascade dynamics, mediated by transnational actors. This is a special mechanism in which transnational actors that are often regarded as having impact merely on the agenda setting⁴⁷ can exert a substantial influence on the policy-making as well.

This model can explain the aspect that cannot be grasped by a model that focuses merely on the leading side, such as an epistemic community or an advocacy network, by focusing on the change in international political trend. That is, one can indirectly move a target country via a collective trend, even when s/he is not able to convince the target country by taking an individual approach. This perspective re-evaluates positively the political influence of followers on the political periphery.

By employing this theoretical framework, the reasons why the United States lost to the pro-ban coalition in the Mine Ban Treaty-making process can be explained systematically: a change in power relations in the international social dynamics, which was created strategically by the pro-ban coalition; the US political failures in reputation politics; and the confrontational reputation strategy of the pro-ban coalition under the norm cascade.

Moreover, there were four factors that led to the US isolation in the final phase of the Ottawa Process. One is the pro-ban coalition's distrust to the United States, which was resulted from the US insensitivity to its reputation and to the codes of conduct of the pro-ban coalition. The second factor is that the ICBL strategically used the United States as a symbolic enemy for rallying support and covering up the internal division among developing countries. The third is that even small countries stopped meeting the US demands as a result of the mine-ban cascade. Lastly, the US Campaign could not persuade the US government.

The influence of transnational campaigns was limited in the United States, and there was no sufficient synergistic interplay between national and international campaigns to change US policy. Nevertheless, the success of transnational politics in other countries that contributed to an ever-growing norm cascade forced the United States into international isolation and prevented it from wielding diplomatic power. This indicates that even the power of a superpower can be diminished in the dynamics of reputation politics and norm cascade.

Finally, let me conclude by mentioning this paper's theoretical contributions to constructivism. The model of reputation politics functions based on actor's instrumental calculations mixed with normative considerations, because it incorporates states' perceived need for a positive international image, which is rooted in either its identity or its instrumental calculations. Since reputation-political dynamics can enhance the political power of norm leaders that exploit it on one hand, and diminish the power of deviants on the other, iterated reputation politics can increase the role of the logic of appropriateness in decision-making, so that internal normative constraints will be eventually enhanced. Also, by introducing domestic factors, reputation-political dynamics can expand the possibility for further internalization of norm and even for a change in identity. Thus, this model bridges the transitional phase, which allows it to move from being a mere instrumental, consequential game to an argumentation or persuasion game that is based on the logic of appropriateness.

Notes

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- 2 Checkel, Jeffrey T., "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," *International Organization* 55, 3, Summer 2001, pp. 553 - 88, esp., pp. 558 - 60.
- 3 Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- 4 The formal title of the so-called Mine Ban Treaty is the "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction."
- 5 Mercer, Jonathan, *Reputation and International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 6.
- 6 Tomz, Michael, *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
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- 10 Deutsch, *op.cit.*, pp. 48 - 49.
- 11 Morgenthau, Hans J., revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985, p. 32.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- 13 Schimmelfennig, Frank, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55, 1, Winter 2001, p. 64. For detailed discussion of shaming from the perspective of criminal law, see Wexler, Lesley, "The International Development of Shame, Second-Best Responses, Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty," *Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 20, 3, pp. 561 - 606.
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- 16 Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 887 - 917, esp., p. 898.
- 17 Granovetter, Mark, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology* 83, 3, 1978, pp. 1420 - 43; Lohmann, Susanne, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989 - 91," *World Politics* 47, 1994, pp. 42 - 101; Kuran, Timur, "Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades," *Journal of Legal Studies* 27, 1998, pp. 623 - 59; Sunstein, Cass R., "Social Norms and Social Roles," *Columbia Law Review* 96, 1996, pp. 903 - 69; Kübler, Dorothea, "On the Regulation of Social Norms," *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization* 17, 2, 2001, pp. 449 - 76.
- 18 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, *op.cit.*, pp. 21, pp. 264 - 67.
- 19 Nye, Joseph S., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 7th ed. Pearson Education, 2008, p. 211. The original concept appeared in Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed., London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- 21 These structural features will be discussed again in the next section.
- 22 Risse-Kappen, Thomas, "Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Introduction," in Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 3 - 33; Risse-Kappen, "Structures of Governance and Transnational Relations: What Have We Learned," in *ibid.*, pp. 280 - 313.
- 23 In a stalemate country, both state and society are strong and political forces are inclined to bargain in a distributive fashion, and so the decision-making process tends to be dysfunctional and effective policy change can only rarely occur. Therefore, even if transnational actors could gain access to the decision-making process, they could not bring about revolutionary policy change without changing the domestic structure itself. Risse-Kappen, "Bringing transnational relations back in," p. 27.
- 24 As a representative work, see Haas, Peter M., ed., *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997.

- 25 As a representative work, see Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, *op.cit.*
- 26 The aim of epistemic communities and advocacy networks is the formation of specific international and domestic policies; they share information and solutions essential to problem-solving and act in a policy-oriented manner. Therefore, although they are said to take on decentralized network structures, opinion collections and a chain of command function for every important point are organically operated so as to lead to a comprehensive output. In contrast, while they may share broad goals, there are also dispersed movements where specific goals, demonstration methods and timing, etc., are not regulated. This is a type that has become prominent since the late 1990s and was seen remarkably in the anti-globalization movement, also called the third wave of social movements. The dispersal movement is a new type that emphasizes the maintenance of a high degree of diversity; it can be said that the movement's network restrictions are maximally relaxed and its ability to propose policies has been lost. In that sense, this movement is clearly distinct from policy networks that develop activities coordinated to one specific goal, while existing as an extension of the network.
- 27 This section summarizes the details of the author's article below Nishitani, Makiko, "Kihan Kasukehdo ni okeru Hyoban-seiji, (The Reputational Politics of the Norm Cascade)(V)" *Journal of International Cooperation Studies*, 15, 2, 2007, pp. 75 - 111.
- 28 In this paper, the term "landmine" refers only to anti-personnel landmines.
- 29 The formal title of CCW is "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects."
- 30 Finnemore and Sikkink, *op.cit.*; Price, Richard, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52, 3, Summer 1998, pp. 635; Kenki, Adachi, *Ottawa Purosesu Taijin-jirai Kinshi Rejimu no Keisei, (The Ottawa Process The Formation of Antipersonnel Landmine Ban Regimes)* Tokyo: Yushindo, 2004, pp. 182 - 84; Lawson, Robert J., Mark Gwozdecky, Jill Sinclair, and Ralph Lysyshyn, "The Ottawa Process and the International Movement to Ban Antipersonnel Mines," in Cameron, Maxwell A., Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, eds., *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 174; Lawson, Robert J., "Ban Landmines! The Social Construction of the International Ban on Landmines 1991 - 2001," Ph.D. diss., Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, 2002, chap. 6.
- 31 Sigal, Leon V., *Negotiating Minefields: The Landmine Ban in American Politics*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 214.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 138.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 170.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 192.
- 35 This is an important tactic for transnational networks fighting major powers. A case in point is that Greenpeace International succeeded to revise the Basel Convention, partly because it managed to reignite a coalition among developing countries, most of which preferred favorable trade treatments among major powers that led to effective regulation vis-à-vis trade in toxic wastes. Smith, Jackie, "Global Politics and Transnational Social Movement Strategies: The Transnational Campaign against International Trade in Toxic Wastes," in della Porta, Donatella, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht, *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, pp. 170 - 88.
- 36 Nishitani, Makiko, "Kihan Kasukehdo no Hyoban-seiji (The Reputation Politics of the Norm Cascade) (III)" *Journal of International Cooperation Studies*, 13, 3, 2006, p. 103; Sigal, *op.cit.*, p. 181.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 201.
- 38 *Ibid.*, pp. 149 - 50.
- 39 A case in point is South Africa. Its mine policy changed drastically from 1994 to 97: At the beginning, it preferred a partial ban associated with development of smart mines, but it declared a total ban at the Ottawa Conference in 1996 despite the military's objections. Although the military continued to resist the total ban policy of the administration even after the Ottawa Conference, it eventually accepted a total ban by February 1997. This changing process was largely attributable to the successful transnational politics mainly conducted by ICBL and South African Campaign to Ban Landmines (SACBL) On details, see Nishitani, Makiko, "Takokukan Joyaku Keisei ni okeru Toransunashonaru Shakai Undo no Doteki Kyoshin Moderu, (The Dynamic Interplay Model for Multilateral Agreement Making)" *International Relations*

147, pp. 95-115, 2007.

40 Knopf, Jeffrey W., *Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

41 Foyle, Douglas C., *Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 20.

42 *Ibid.*, pp. 271 - 72.

43 Knopf, *op.cit.*, p. 251.

44 Sigal, *op.cit.*, esp., p. 58.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 234 - 39.

46 Wareham, Mary, "Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the United States," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, *op.cit.*, pp. 234 - 39.

47 Risse, Thomas, "Transnational Actors and World Politics," in Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons eds., *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 265.