Framing Japan's Disputed Past Memories in the United States

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Abstract

This study looks at the discourse surrounding Japan's disputed past memories by focusing on the way stories have been framed in the international media to articulate and contest that discourse. In particular, this research seeks to explain the origin and development of the "orthodox" frame that is prominent in the U.S. media. The present examination of the origin and development of this framing in the international news media is focused on U.S. newspaper coverage during the 1980s and 1990s.

This research demonstrates that this "orthodox" understanding originated in Japan itself, where the issue was highly contested. It was also found that the frame was accepted and developed in the United States due to the broader "Japan problem" frame that was forming by the time Japan's disputed war memories started to be discussed. This frame called on past views of Japan and presented Japan as an economic and existential "threat" that was taking advantage of the United States through "unfair" practices. This frame both supported the acceptance of the "orthodox" frame and was supported by it. The process of establishing the "orthodox" frame can be explained as a typical example of this mechanism.

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Chapter 1 —Introduction

> *Japan has repeatedly expressed feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war. In order to manifest such feelings through concrete actions, we have engraved in our hearts the histories of suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbors—those in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and China, among others—and we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region since the end of the war (Abe, 2015).*

On August 14, 2015, just one day before the 70th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II, Prime Minister Abe delivered his statement on the war and colonial rule by Japan. In what would later be called the Abe Statement, he expressed "profound grief and [his] eternal, sincere condolences ... before the souls of all those who perished both at home and abroad."

However, this statement of apology was not accepted as a serious one in international society. The international media reacted indifferently to Abe's apologies. For example, CNN reported on the statement as follows:

> *Overall, Abe appeared unrepentant, outsourced contrition to his predecessors, and failed the apology test. It is naïve to assume that an apology is the magic wand of regional reconciliation in Northeast Asia, but equally naïve to think that it is not crucial to the process. (Kingston, 2015)*

Why was Abe's statement not taken seriously by international society? It is not difficult to find the answers to this question in his own previous political statements and behavior regarding Japan's past. Since the 1990s, Abe has been known as one of the most important nationalistic political figures in Japan (Suzuki, 2013), and his revisionistic messages on the war and colonial rule have repeatedly irritated neighboring countries, such as China and South Korea, which experienced Japanese invasions (Bukh, 2014).

However, here we have to remember one important thing: such negative reactions by the international media to this Japanese political leader's apologies were no different from reactions to earlier apologies of other Japanese political leaders.

As is well-known, Abe's apologies in his 2015 statement were by no means the first official apologies tendered by major Japanese political leaders about the war and colonial rule (Yamazaki, 2006). Such apologies by Japanese political leaders regarding the war and colonial rule have been repeated since as early as the 1950s (MOFA, 1951), including the Prime Minister Murayama's statement on the 50th anniversary of the war's end, in 1995 (MOFA, 1995).

However, the international media did not view such apologies during this period in a positive light. For example, United Press International reported on the Murayama Statement as follows:

> *Many groups said the apology, while courageous and going further than any previous statement, appeared to be a personal expression by Murayama, rather than representing the Japanese government or its people. (Perry, 1995).*

The unfavorable reception of Murayama's apologies was certainly not due to his record of nationalism, as in the case of Abe. Murayama was known as one of the most influential leftist political figures in Japan in that period (Shinomiya, 1994). Hence, his political stances cannot possibly explain why his apology was not accepted as serious.

Why have the international media always reacted negatively to the apologies of Japanese political leaders? One of the keys to understanding this phenomenon is that the international media have always interpreted the various apologies by different political leaders according to the same logical framework, one that frames the apologies as "not sincere" and "not serious," as will be discussed later on this paper. This is the framework Seaton (2006) called "orthodox."

But how did the international media come to see Japan in terms of such a framework, and how was the framework established? This paper will explore these questions and the process by which the international media formulated the discourse.

Chapter 2 —Literature Review and Methodology

2.1 "Orthodox" Framework

What, then, is the "orthodox" framework? Here, Seaton (2006) gives us a compact

and clear picture of it. He argues that "the orthodoxy is critical of Japan through the following pattern of arguments:"

1. *Japan was an aggressor nation and committed numerous atrocities during the Asia-Pacific War and therefore bears a heavy war responsibility;*
2. *the Japanese government has not properly addressed these war responsibility issues;*
3. *Japanese people, like their government, fail to adequately acknowledge Japanese aggression; and*
4. *as a result, "Japan" needs to do more to address the past. In practical terms, the litmus test for Japanese people "adequately" remembering the war will be their government saying and doing the "right" things (Seaton, 2006, p. 2).*

The articles reviewed for this study have been categorized using this definition of the "orthodox" frame constructed by Seaton (2006) and his critique of it.

However, Seaton's study focused mostly on the discourse within Japan's own media to show the "orthodox" frame as being unrepresentative of reality, and he did not explain in detail the mechanisms that led to the formation of the "orthodox" frame. Soh (2007) examined in greater detail the origins of the way Japan's disputed past memories have been framed, but only for specific issues.

Soh (2007), for instance, looked at the framing of the "comfort women" issue in different contexts, noting four different frames. Soh argued that within these frames, the "comfort women" issue emerged as a human rights issue due to the increased importance given to human rights in the post-Cold War era (Soh, 2007, p. 33). Soh noted that the issue gained even more weight as a result of the human rights violations that were occurring in Bosnia at the time (Soh, 2007, p. 33).

Though Soh's work is insightful, it did not expand to encompass the framing of Japan's disputed past memories or how the framing of Japan's disputed past memories might have been affected overall by the way the "comfort women" issue was framed. Similarly, Yoshida (2006) studied the framing of the "Rape of Nanking" in the United States. He came to similar conclusions as Seaton, describing something akin to Seaton's "orthodox" frame. Like Seaton, he also noted how this kind of coverage in the United States has empowered revisionists by portraying them as typically Japanese and

providing them with proof that Japan is being treated "unfairly" (Seaton, 2006; Yoshida, 2006).

So, while these studies contribute to our understanding, they do not provide a broader picture. This is where the present study will try to expand our understanding of how Japan's disputed past memories have been framed. To this end, this study analyzes how the framework in question was formulated. This analysis falls within the study of discourses, focusing on the connection between van Wolferen's framing of the "Japan problem," which he sees as underlying the economic conflicts between Japan and the United States (van Wolferen, 1986), and what Seaton (2006) calls the "orthodox" framing of Japan's disputed past memories. In this way, it expands into new areas of study regarding Japan's disputed past memories by showing the connection between several levels of frames and how lower-level frames can be more easily understood through this chain of frames than by directly connecting to meta-narratives.

2.2 Methodology

Building on the studies outlined above, this research looks comprehensively at the framing of Japan's disputed past memories in the international media. This paper seeks to explain the origin and development of the "orthodox" frame that Seaton described. To this end, this research will determine where the frame originated and how it developed by studying the effects of changes in society, international relations, and the economy, with a special focus on the effect of other frames, such as Soh's (2007) "feminist humanitarianism and sex slave" frame (p. 33) and the wider framing of Japan.

To begin the process of analysis, the present study first focuses on the way the framing of Japan's disputed past memories developed in U.S. newspaper coverage during the 1980s and 1990s as the United States is a global news leader and has a great impact on the flow of news internationally (Herbert, 2001, p. 45). This time period was chosen because the pertinent issues first started to seriously emerge globally in the 1980s and continued to build significantly in the 1990s as new scandals involving historic memory emerged and several significant war anniversaries took place.

In order to study this unique situation, this study relies on newspaper articles supplements them with other sources, including magazine articles, documentaries, academic articles, and academic books from before Japan's disputed past memories

became an issue of interest in the United States until today. Articles from *The New York Times, The Washington Post,* and *The Boston Globe* were used to track the origin and development of the way Japan's disputed past memories were represented in the U.S. media in the 1980s and 1990s.

In addition, to provide comparison with the U.S. media discourse, this study also examines *The Guardian* to see how the situation developed in a U.K. newspaper and to discover the similarities with and differences from U.S. newspaper articles. While the newspapers selected do not represent all U.S. and U.K. newspapers, they are what Entman (2004) calls "top news organizations whose cues are followed by the rest of the media" (Entman, 2004, p. 10).

Articles from *The New York Times, The Washington Post,* and *The Guardian* were retrieved from the Lexis database, while articles from *The Boston Globe* were retrieved from the ProQuest database[1]. To a lesser extent, articles prior to the 1980s were also examined to determine if there was any significant coverage in the years leading up to the 1980s. These databases were searched for three purposes, although if the categorization of the articles is included, this can be considered a four-step process. First, the databases were searched to find articles that discussed Japan's disputed past memories, which were then tracked and categorized as either presenting an "orthodox" frame or not. Next, the databases were checked to determine the total number of articles that discussed Japan, so that the articles which discussed Japan's disputed past memories could be viewed as a proportion of the total. Finally, they were searched to provide insight into the way Japan was framed in general. Each of these steps will be explained in more detail below.

In order to examine the articles that discussed Japan's disputed past memories, a large number of database searches were first executed to find articles that discussed such memories. Several combinations of keywords were used to narrow these searches[2]. Many of the articles retrieved during the searches were not categorized for various reasons, although the main reason for the exclusion of articles was that they did not discuss Japan's disputed past memories or they only had a single line discussing the topic that was disconnected from the rest of the article. The articles were categorized as they were retrieved. After retrieving all of the articles, they were checked by year to eliminate duplicates.

Then, using Seaton's (2006) definition of the "orthodox" view of Japan's disputed past memories, 465 U.S. articles from the beginning of 1980 to the end of 1999 were categorized as either representative of the "orthodox" frame or not. An additional 158 U.K. articles from the beginning of 1984 to the end of 1999 were checked. Furthermore, 87 articles from *The New York Times* from 2014 and 2015 were looked at to gain a rough understanding of changes that occurred since the end of the 1990s. Additionally, to help determine how the coverage changed based on where the articles were written, they were categorized by where the authors wrote their stories: in Japan, the United States, or other countries. Furthermore, where necessary, internal document text searches were used to drill further down into the sources in order to find patterns. Word counts were also compiled to determine the level of coverage, the most significant of which are noted throughout this paper.

Of course, doing a simple count of the number of stories that discussed Japan's disputed past memories and presented the "orthodox" view would not accurately account for changes in the overall coverage of Japan. So, to adjust for these changes and to provide a more realistic representation of the coverage of Japan's disputed past memories, the articles are looked at as a proportion of the total coverage by year. To determine the total coverage of Japan in these newspapers, three kinds of searches were completed for each year: searches related to Japan's economy, politics, and both. The results of the first two searches were added by year, and the result of the third was subtracted.

Finally, searches were carried out to assess how Japan was viewed in the United States and to better contextualize the development of the framing of Japan's disputed past memories. These databases searches were also expanded to other publications, such as *Newsweek*, and were supplemented by journal articles, books written during that time period, books written since, and documentaries made during the time period studied.

Chapter 3 —Trends of Newspaper Articles

3.1 U.S. Media Trends

Assessing trends of major U.S. newspaper articles is also key to understanding

Figure 1.1. Percentage of Coverage by Origin (USA) (Presenting the "Orthodox" Frame).



This graph shows *The New York Times, The Washington Post,* and *The Boston Globe* articles from 1980 through 1999 categorized as having an "orthodox" frame as a percentage of the total coverage of Japan for each year. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* articles were gathered through http://lexis.com, which was last accessed on 06/29/2017. *The Boston Globe* articles were gathered through https://secure.pqarchiver.com/boston/advancedsearch.html, which was last accessed on 06/29/2017.

the framing of Japan's disputed past memories. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the changes in the percentage of coverage that Japan's disputed past memories received in relation to the total coverage. Figure 1.1 shows the articles that were classified as presenting an "orthodox" frame, and Figure 1.2 shows all of the stories that discussed Japan's disputed past memories.

This research found that the most significant shifts in the amounts and types of coverage occurred in 1985, 1991, and 1995[3]. In 1985, the issue can be seen as gaining in interest while the "orthodox" frame became dominant in the coverage coming out of Japan. 1991 was the first year in which there was a significant amount of domestic interest in the topic and the domestic coverage was overwhelmingly "orthodox." Of all the years covered, 1995 had the most stories related to Japan's disputed past memories, the most domestic coverage, and the most coverage that was predominantly "orthodox."

At first, the coverage in 1995 appears to run counter to the argument that the "Japan problem" frame led to an acceptance of the "orthodox" frame. It appears this way because Japan's economy ceased to be perceived as a "threat" in the way it once was and the "Japan problem" frame had diminished somewhat in significance by this

Figure 1.2. Percentage of Coverage by Origin (USA) (All Articles on Japan's Disputed Past Memories).



This graph shows *The New York Times, The Washington Post,* and *The Boston Globe* articles from 1980 through 1999 that discussed Japan's disputed past memories as a percentage of the total coverage of Japan for each year. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* articles were gathered through http://lexis.com, which was last accessed on 06/29/2017. *The Boston Globe* articles were gathered through https://secure.pqarchiver.com/boston/advancedsearch.html, which was last accessed on 06/29/2017.

time.

However, there are several reasons for the persistence of the "orthodox" frame. Frames in general are persistent—once they are created they do not die easily—and this is true for both the "orthodox" and the "Japan problem" frames. So, despite the fact that the "Japan problem" frame allowed for greater acceptance of the "orthodox" frame, the latter was not dependent on the former to continue existing once the latter was established. Additionally, the "orthodox" frame was able to sustain itself because events continued to occur that kept the topic in the news. Furthermore, the development of new issues that were framed negatively for other reasons also fit within the "orthodox" frame and supported it. Specifically, according to Soh (2007), the "comfort women" issue was viewed within a "feminist humanitarianism and sex slave" frame, which fit within and supported the "orthodox" framing of Japan's disputed past memories (Soh, 2007, p. 33).

3.2 Comparison with U.K. Media

However, coverage in the U.S. and U.K. media were rather different in terms of the peak years of coverage and how coverage developed. While the "orthodox" frame

was dominant in the United Kingdom and originated in Japan, much like in the United States, the development of the "orthodox" frame in the United Kingdom followed a significantly different path. In the U.K. media, there was a strong connection between the "orthodox" frame and the efforts of British POWs to receive compensation and apologies from the Japanese government and Japanese businesses. The efforts by POWs also had a connection to the "comfort women" issue and what Soh (2007) called the "feminist humanitarianism and sex slave" framing of the "comfort women" issue (Soh, 2007, p. 33) as well as the greater importance attributed to human rights abuses around this time. This theme in stories about POWs began in 1993 after Morihiro Hosokawa's apology was triggered by the emergence of the "comfort women" issue and there was an expectation that compensation would follow the apology (Weale, 1993).

In response to this apology, Martyn Day, one of the lawyers advising the Japanese Labour Camp Survivors Association of Great Britain, said: "Although I wouldn't expect to be getting my clients a cheque overnight, the chances are we should get somewhere in the next two or three years" (Weale, 1993). This statement highlights the effect of the "comfort women" issue on the development of the "orthodox" view in the United Kingdom, as does the fact that from 1984 till 1993, when this story broke, there were only eight stories about POWs in *The Guardian,* none of which mentioned compensation or human rights. However, from the time the story broke until 1999, there were 73 articles involving POWS, many of which discussed the issues outlined above. These stories gained a domestic connection as war anniversaries occurred and the issue of compensation as well as apologies to POWS developed throughout the rest of the 1990s. Much like in the United States, this allowed for a connection to be drawn to wartime Japan and the prejudices that existed during the war.

These findings are also supported by Figure 1.3 above. In this graph, the shift in the number of articles can be seen as starting in 1993. In that year, the number of domestically produced articles rose to the most significant level to date, as did the total coverage. This was followed by a rather steep incline in the years that preceded the emergence of the "comfort women" issue and the apologies made by Kono and Hosokawa. It is also worth noting that as the issue became tied to the United Kingdom's own disputes for compensation and apologies for Japan's wartime acts, POWs issues in particular, the percentage of coverage that Japan's disputed past memories received, as

Figure 1.3. Percentage of Coverage by Origin (U.K.)
(All Articles on Japan's Disputed War Memories).



This graph shows the number of *The Guardian* articles gathered through http://lexis.com, last accessed on 06/29/2017, that discussed Japan's disputed war memories from 1984 to 1999 as a percentage of the total coverage of Japan for each year. The percentages were calculated using the figures in Table 1.2 (after adjustment for origin of articles) and Table 1.4 in Section 9.

a proportion of the total coverage, far exceeded that of the United States in any year in the 1980s or 1990s, with the gap growing significantly wider in the years immediately following 1993.

It could be argued that this difference in coverage demonstrates that the situation in the United States was not unique and could be simply attributed to the fact that in countries that had a direct connection, the coverage was significant. However, even if the U.S. coverage did not reach the same level of that the United Kingdom, the U.S. case still has unique qualities. In the United Kingdom and the other Allied countries, the "orthodox" framing of Japan's disputed past memories could be directly connected to their own domestic demands for compensation and repentance from Japan. However, this was not the case for the United States. Although there was still some resentment from the war, there were fewer calls for compensation or apologies in the United States for the actions Japan took and little coverage of such demands.

However, these are interpretations inferred from only very rough statistical data. Do details from the articles in the U.S. media support these interpretations? In the next chapter, a more detailed analysis answering this question is presented.

Chapter 4 —Origin of the "Orthodox" Frame in the U.S. Media

4.1 The Roles of Foreign Correspondents in Japan

How, then, was the "orthodox" frame formulated? There are many possible explanations that could be explored. For example, it would be very natural to assume that this perspective somehow came from South Korea or China since these countries and their citizens were engaged in direct disputes with Japan over its wartime acts and the way Japan's government and some Japanese citizens had atoned for and discussed them. However, this does not appear to be the case. In fact, somewhat unexpectedly, the "orthodox" frame appears to have originated in Japan, where it became dominant in 1984; only then did it receive significant coverage, starting in 1985, in the United States.

As can be seen in Figure 1.1 above, the "orthodox" frame predominantly emerged from stories written by foreign correspondents in Japan; such stories originating in the United States and other countries only started to become prominent in the 1990s. It can also be seen that prior to 1991, there were no more than six stories in any year that emerged from the United States or other sources. Additionally, no more than five of the stories originating outside of Japan presented the "orthodox" frame in any single year. The majority of these came out of the United States, with fewer coming out of China and South Korea. Prior to the 1990s, most of the stories written outside Japan tended to be shorter in length than stories written by foreign correspondents in Japan, especially those from the United States. Furthermore, as new stories emerged, the "orthodox" frame tended to be presented by foreign correspondents in Japan prior to appearing in the coverage originating outside Japan.

The "orthodox" framing by foreign journalists can be partially explained by their place within the structure of Japan's media. In the 1980s and 1990s, foreign correspondents were outsiders in Japan's media system, and they continue to be today, as noted by Feldman (1993); Farley (1996); Krauss (1996); McNeil (2016); and Herbert (2001). Moreover, it is well documented that this created certain limitations and opportunities for them when gathering information. Researchers have found that journalists were limited in their ability to gather information from the main power holders, such as politicians and business elites (Feldman 1993; Farley 1996; Krauss 1996; and McNeil 2016). However, previous studies have determined that foreign

correspondents had access to outsiders that the domestic media covered less (Farley 1996; Krauss, 1996; and McNeil, 2016). Based on most of the quotes in articles about Japan's disputed past memories, it is clear that many of these outside sources were either critical of the Japanese government's handling of certain situations[4] or were quoted in articles to demonstrate the extreme views held by some, which were often presented as being representative of the views of all Japanese people. This helped create the impression that Japan is dominated by extreme revisionists and that there was no discussion within the country over how the war should be remembered.

The place of foreign correspondents in Japan's media system was further complicated by the foreign correspondent system in the United States. In the 1980s and even throughout the 1990s, most U.S. journalists in Japan were only stationed within the country for a short period of time; therefore, they could not develop advanced Japanese language skills or networks, further limiting their ability to gather information[5]. It is probable that this deficiency led to a greater reliance on Japanese newspapers, fixtures that could explain the situation to them, and The Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan.

4.2 Impacts of Japanese Media

The reliance of foreign correspondents on Japanese media appears to have had a significant impact, since the coverage of Japan's disputed past memories tended to be rather critical in Japan, especially in the more left-leaning newspapers. In particular, the *Asahi Shimbun,* Japan's most left-leaning mainstream newspaper, was noted by Seaton (2006) as being very critical of the way the Japanese government handled Japan's disputed past memories.

This paper also appears to have been a favorite of foreign journalists as the references to the *Asahi Shimbun* outnumber those of all other Japanese newspapers combined, followed by the *Mainichi Shimbun*, which, according to Seaton (2006), also leaned more to the left of the spectrum than other Japanese newspapers[6] when discussing Japan's disputed past memories. Moreover, these liberal newspapers would cover Japan's disputed past memories more than other newspapers and occasionally discussed issues related to them that were not covered or barely covered in the other

newspapers, such as the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the *Sankei Shimbun*, as reported by Seaton (2006)[7]. This means that regardless of preference, the greater reliance might not have been by choice but out of necessity. Since journalists could not get information on some stories about Japan's disputed past memories from the *Yomiuri Shimbun* or the *Sankei Shimbun*, they had to reference the *Asahi Shimbun* or the *Mainichi Shimbun*.

The more critical view that these left-leaning newspapers had of the war had been building for years prior to disputes over Japan's past memories gaining interest internationally. For example, in 1971, Honda Katsuichi wrote a series of articles on the topic: "After traveling in China for nearly two months and interviewing more than 100 Chinese survivors of the war, Honda reported Japan's atrocities in China, supplementing his work with photographs." (Yoshida, 2006, p. 81). Seaton (2006) noted that these articles were so influential that they were a "trigger for the patriotic education movement that led to the 1982 textbook controversy." (Seaton, 2006, p. 44). Another example is the book *Akuma no hoshoku* (The Devil's Gluttony), written by Morimura Seiichi in 1981, which focused on Unit 731's human experiments. These more critical portraits that came out prior to the Western media picking up on the topic of Japan's disputed past memories allowed for the "orthodox" frame to form.

4.3 Continuity of Discourse

As noted above, the "orthodox" frame originated in Japan; however, this does not explain how the "orthodox" frame spread to stories produced domestically within the United States or why foreign correspondents in Japan were so receptive to it. This can mainly be explained by the fact that the "orthodox" frame fit within and supported an already existing framing of Japan, the "Japan problem" frame. This frame, which includes macro-level images of Japan and the Japanese, has deep roots, but they are most easily visible in the perceptions of the Japanese that were formed in America during the buildup to WWII and the war itself, as Seaton (2006) insists. These views saw a revival in the late 1960s and continued to grow until the early 1990s. This is interpreted as a product of the economic conflicts that started to become more prominent between Japan and the United States and the perceived "threat" that Japan's growth posed to the latter[8].

Already by the end of the 1960s, Japan's economy had recovered to such a

degree that its trade with the United States was starting to create friction, which continued to worsen into the 1970s. This tension continued to build as Japan's economy thrived, despite several efforts by the United States to decrease the trade imbalance. Japan's economic rise was viewed as a "threat" and as resulting from Japan's "unfair" economic activities. For example, Packard (1972) captured well the connection between the perceived "threat" of Japan and the rediscovery of anti-Japanese sentiments in an article discussing a book that was newly translated from Japanese:

> *The Pacific Rivals…. The title is unfortunate, rivalry is not what this book is all about (the Japanese title was, simply, Japan and America. But it reveals our penchant for contriving simplistic wrappings in which to rediscover Japan. In World War II, the Japanese were treacherous and cunning. In the 1950s, they were dispirited and grateful for our benevolence, hanging like juicy plums outside the Communist world' backyard, ripe for the seizing. In the 1960s, we were warned that left-wing elements might take over Japan from within. In the 1970s, as the pendulum swings back in favor of the Chinese, the rumblings of distant thunder are heard: competition, unfair trade practices, economic animals, Pacific Rivals (Packard, 1972).*

Packard highlights how Japan was being viewed as different from the United States. He illustrates the growing perception that the Japanese were "unfair" and "uniquely different" from "us Americans." They were viewed as "rivals" who were only concerned with economic growth, and their growth was viewed as a direct "threat" to the United States.

This perceived "threat" of Japan's rising economy to the United States that built up and evolved throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s created a broad frame (or what Reese (2001) called a "cultural" frame) that drew on earlier representations of Japan (Reese, 2001, p. 6). In them, Japanese people, Japanese businesses, and their government were often portrayed as inscrutable, different from "us," "unfair," "deceptive," and "not playing by the rules." This understanding of Japan has been noted by many researchers, such as Dower (1986), Morris (2011), Packard (1987), and Vogel (1979). This frame was labeled the "Japan problem" frame in 1986 by van Wolferen (van Wolferen, 1986).

The "Japan problem" frame did not solidify overnight but rather was built up by

drawing upon preexisting prejudices from the war era as Japan's economy continued to grow. As noted, it is what Reese (2001) called a "'cultural' frame [which] do [esn't] stop with organizing one story, but invite[s] us to marshal a cultural understanding and keep on doing so beyond the immediate information" (Reese, 2001, p. 6). Reese (2001, 2010) claimed that once a strong "cultural" frame is formed, it does not disappear easily—it may therefore outlive the reason for its creation[9].

Reid (1991) claimed that the "Japan problem" frame not only gained popularity in the press but also among many scholars[10]. He traced this back to a negative backlash to the line of thought that Ezra Vogel pioneered in his work, *Japan as Number 1: Lessons for America.* As the title suggests, Vogel argued that the United States had much to learn from Japan. Reid noted the following:

> *In the mid-1980s, a new breed of analysts, called "revisionists" in academic circles and "Japan bashers" in the press, came to the fore. Their argument—that Japan is an unfair trader taking a free ride at America's expense—has now flourished in the marketplace.… "It's easier to get published if you complain about the Japanese," says Ronald Morse, a Washington-based Japan expert who falls somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. "It's easier to get an advance, to get into magazines, if you beat up on Japan" (Reid, 1991).*

To summarize, when Japan's disputed past memories started to be discussed in the 1980s, the "Japan problem" frame, which portrayed Japan as "unfair," was already developing. This frame became more prominent throughout the rest of the 1980s and the early 1990s, coloring the way Japan's disputed past memories were understood. How Japan remembers the war and its atonement for it only really started to be discussed in the U.S. media in the 1980s, in response to the disputes in Northeast Asia. However, at this time, the discussion of Japan's disputed past memories mostly emanated from correspondents in Japan, with little domestic discussion taking place within the United States. For example, in 1982, only 25% (six out of twenty-four) of the sampled articles published in 1982 were written in the United States, the longest of which was only 775 words long. This trend continued, and the number of articles written within the United States that looked at Japan's disputed past memories never exceeded six until 1991.

4.4 "Japan Problem" Framing of Economic Conflicts and "Orthodox" Framing of Japan's Disputed Past Memories

In order to understand the context of the formation of the "Japan problem" frame, it is important to discuss how Americans perceived Japan as it recovered from WWII. At the end of WWII, Japan's economy was in ruins. However, despite this, the country was able to recover quickly to the point where it was already being seen as a serious economic "threat" to the United States. One of the important points here is that in the United States, it was generally believed that this was partially due to the assistance the United States provided[11], which led to further frustration within that country over the economic disputes with Japan (Shapiro & Hiatt, 1989, p. 2). As Japan's economy grew, it was seen as "taking advantage" of the United States "after all the United States did for Japan." This was viewed as a betrayal by many, and it was a continuing theme in the discourse, with the argument often being made that Japan had "lost the war but won the peace" at the expense of America (Morley, 1985).

The declining willingness of Americans to keep their economy open to Japan was another sign of the growing frustration with Japan's progress in industries that "threatened" U.S. jobs (Reischauer, 1988). Again, this situation created fear and made it easy to think of the outsiders, the Japanese, as beating "us" by being "unfair" and "unlike us" (Lee, 1979).

Morris (2011) also clearly highlighted the fact that Japan was already being seen as a "threat" in the early 1970s in the passage below:

> *[As] Willard Price and others began to point out in the early 1970s, Japan's "miracle" appeared to be a peril for other countries. This view was especially evident in the United States, which had seen its bilateral trade deficit blow out from US$380 million in 1970 to $2.5 billion in 1971 and then $3 billion in 1972, each year in Japan's favour. Such figures revived the perception that Japan might be an economic "threat" to the United States, if not the entire world. For example, President Richard Nixon described this Japanese "threat" in 1971 as "far more serious than the challenge that we confronted even in the dark days of Pearl Harbor" (Morris, 2011, p. 21)*

Japan continued to be viewed as a greater "threat" as the 1970s continued and into the 1980s (Bergsten, Ito, & Noland, 2001, p. 16). This perception that Japan was

"unfair" in the 1970s was well captured in a *New York Times* article written by John M. Lee (1972) in which "Nixon's chief trade negotiator" is quoted as "describing Japan as a country that plays 'dirty' in international trade."

As these kinds of statements and economic conflicts continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, so did concerns in the United States. As noted by Hayes (1985), some, such as former foreign minister Saburo Okita, went as far as saying that the atmosphere in the situation in the United States "is like that before the outbreak of a war." Ronald A. Morse (1984) also demonstrated the prevalence of this point of view when stating that "the U.S. has identified Japanese economic competition and lack of trade reciprocity as signs of unfairness and insularity. Japan is increasingly seen as an economic threat to the United States with all its potential implications for national security" (Morse, 1984, p. 29).

This statement was actually made as the "Japan problem" frame was starting to solidify. As Morris (2011) mentioned, it was in the mid-1980s when the "Japan problem" started to solidify. However, another important point to note here is that also during this period, the "Japan problem" frame on economic conflicts started to influence the U.S. media's discourse about historical issues related to Japan. One of the earliest demonstrations of the link between the "Japan problem" framing of economic conflicts and the "orthodox" frame representation of these historical issues is included in an article written by Vogel (1983) published in *The Boston Globe*. In the article, which discusses Nakasone's prospects as Prime Minister, Vogel states:

> *While other East Asians are enraged at Japanese textbook changes that play down World War II aggression, many Japanese reading their own press are more concerned that Japanese are victims of irrational emotional pressure from Asians demanding textbook changes. In the case of Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric accused of stealing secrets from IBM, although it is hard for Americans to imagine how Japanese could be the victims, in the Japanese press and public opinion, IBM is not the victim. Rather, Japanese are the victims of American entrapment. (Vogel, 1983)*

The article highlights the idea that Japan had become the economic "aggressor," just as they were the military "aggressor" in the past. Furthermore, it shows Japan claiming that it is the victim of "unfair" characterizations over historic disputes, just

as it is a victim of "unfair" economic aggression, protestations that run counter to what many Americans argued at the time. This is a view that many Americans would have seen as another example of Japan's "underhanded" tactics. In this way, when the "orthodox" frame emerged, it was already being influenced by the "Japan problem" frame that was forming. As time passed, the links between these two frames only strengthened as the "Japan problem" frame solidified and took on a greater significance.

However, in the early 1980s, the negative image of Japan in economic disputes was just loosely related to the negative image of Japan with regard to historical issues. In the following years, though, the linkage between two frames was consolidated.

Chapter 5 —Solidification of the "Orthodox" Frame

5.1 Competing Frames

The important point to note here is that the "Japan problem" frame formed in the mid-1980s, which was before Japan's disputed past memories had become a subject of discussion and great controversy. As we saw in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, it was only in 1991 that U.S. media reports about Japan's historical issues increased significantly; however, the "Japan problem" frame around economic disputes was firmly established by the end of the 1980s. As is well-known, the late 1980s were the heyday of the Japanese economy, and the criticisms leveled against Japan on economic issues reached its peak in that period.

Hence, the "Japan problem" frame, which had formed earlier based on economic disputes in the 1980s, had to cast a long shadow to reinforce the later frame related to Japan's historical issues. For example, in an article discussing how Japan remembers the war, published in *The Boston Globe* on July 29, 1985, Tom Ashbrook wrote as follows:

> *Forty years after its surrender, Japan's war shrines may be quiet relics of history, but its economic advances still have the flavor—often deliberately cultivated by Japanese executives—of military campaigns.… "For the Japanese, business is a continuation of war," said Edward Seidensticker, Columbia University professor of Japanese. "For all this talk of peace, I don't think the Japanese ever really stopped fighting." (Ashbrook, 1985)*

In the article cited above, connections between World War II and Japan's economy at the time not were not only drawn but connected to the way in which Japan viewed its history. It was therefore simple enough for a further connection to be made: that just as Japan fought WWII "unfairly," it would fight its economic wars "unfairly."

At this point, it should be noted once again that even as the "Japan problem" and "orthodox" frames were forming, there were other competing arguments made against them. For example, in *War Without Mercy—Race and Power in the Pacific War,* John Dower (1986) warned against the kind of prejudices that were building at the time over economic concerns and drew upon the extreme rhetoric of WWII. Many other authors, including Edwin O. Reischauer and George R. Packard, also spoke against these frames, and for it were attacked as "Japan sympathizers" and members of the "Chrysanthemum Club" by revisionist supporters of the "Japan problem" and "orthodox" frames[12]. Even though the "Japan problem" and "orthodox" frames were not the only existing frames, they were nonetheless pervasive within the news media. But how could such frames have dominated other frames?

5.2 The Unique Situation of 1991

To answer that question, we have to consider in detail the situation of Japan-U.S. relations in the early 1990s. There are several important points to keep in mind to help understand the situation at that time. Internationally, it was the era just after the end of the Cold War, and the United States no longer had any serious concerns about Russia. In contrast, although Japan was already sinking into a prolonged recession after 1990, the economy still looked very strong, and the recession was predicted to be a very short one. China was still struggling under the controversial situation created by the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, and the threat of terrorism was not nearly as serious as in the 2000s. As a result, much of the U.S. media at that time still regarded Japan—not Russia, China, or terrorism—as the major threat facing the United States. The Gulf War drew to an end in the same year, a war in which Japan was viewed as "not doing its fair share."

The year 1991 was also unique regarding the historical issues of Japan. It was well-known that Kim Hak-sun had come out in Seoul as a former "comfort woman" in August of that year, after which "comfort women" issues started to escalate. However,

the U.S. media also had their own domestic reason to report on the historical issues of Japan, namely, that 1991 was the 50th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and many U.S. media outlets were preparing to make special reports about the war in December.

Primarily for these two reasons, the sense of Japan as a major threat to the United States and the coming war anniversary, the U.S. media dramatically increased reports on problematic Japanese historical issues in 1991. In this situation, it was very natural for the U.S. media to report on the dual issues of the Japanese economy and Japanese history in ways that overlapped, using the logic of the "Japan problem."

One *Frontline*[13] episode that originally aired on November 19, 1991, captured how extreme the perceived "threat" of Japan had become as well as the negative views of Japan that came along with it. The Emmy-award-winning *Frontltine* episode entitled *Losing the War with Japan* was as critical of Japan as the title suggests (Koughan, 1991). In the episode, Japan is described as perhaps the greatest "threat" the United States has ever faced, with the narrator and those interviewed making the following claims: the U.S. military was becoming dependent on Japanese technology; one in three U.S. cars was made in Japan; Japan had unfairly dominated sunrise industries, such as the flat panel display industry, through dumping; and Japanese companies were able to prevent any blowback from the United States through lobbying its lawmakers.

The *Frontline* episode overwhelmingly represents Japan as homogenous and extremely "unfair." This is best captured by one businessman appearing in the episode, Al Pace, who ran a manufacturing plant that went out of business. Pace blamed Honda for his company's bankruptcy, claiming that Honda went into business with him with the intention of putting him out of business and replacing the parts he supplied with those supplied by a Honda subsidiary. In the episode, Pace declared, "No Japanese business is an individual; when you talk to a Japanese businessman, you might as well be talking to their government, to their finance ministers in banking, to their trade representatives, to their industry representatives. You're dealing with a plan, a blueprint." (Koughan, 1991). Later in the episode, Pace has the last word: "We need a Desert Storm for American industry." This *Frontline* episode appeared toward the end of 1991 after most of the articles presenting the "orthodox" frame had been published for the year, so it did not have a direct effect on the coverage for that year. Despite

this, it was effective in capturing the prevailing mood in the United States at that time: the view that Japan was "beating" the United States and threatening to destroy it by "cheating."

This growing discontent was apparent in how visible the "Japan problem" frame and the "orthodox" frame were in the contemporary media coverage. In one of the first *Newsweek* articles looking at Japan's disputed past memories, written by Powell (1991) and entitled "Sweeping History Under the Carpet" with the highlight *The Japanese haven't confronted their wartime past—or the way it still shapes attitudes toward Japan Inc.,* the "orthodox" frame is shown as not only being influenced by the "Japan problem" frame but also fitting within it. Moreover, it highlights how the "orthodox" frame had reinforced the "Japan problem" frame.

An American ambassador in Asia states flatly that, at best, the attitude toward Japan is an unstable amalgam of trust and worry. "Nothing hurts the Japanese more today out here than their singular inability to come to grips with the war," he says. "Germany was allowed to reunify because it has gone through that process. Japan still makes people nervous because it hasn't." Japan's tortured interpretations of the war also help prop up the suspicions that linger in American union halls and executive suites that Tokyo has simply harnessed its intrinsic martial instincts and directed them toward commerce (Powell, 1991).

The connection between the two frames that is highlighted in the above article is fairly apparent in many articles on the subject of Japan's disputed past memories. For example, in the article below, written by Colin Nickerson in 1993, Japan is described as seeing itself as a "victim" and unable to accept the past, just as it saw itself as the "unfair victim" of the United States at that time.

> *Deep down, World War II still haunts the Japanese far more than most Americans. Possibly because America has won—and lost—more wars since. More probably because Japan has never quite come to grips with Taiheiyo Senso, the Great Pacific War.… Today, in the great trade debate between the United States and Japan, Japanese tend to see themselves almost entirely as victims of American bullying while reflecting little on the economic damage their aggressive export policies have caused American workers. (Nickerson, 1993)*

These representations and connections were fairly common up until the decline of Japan's economy became apparent. Thus, as the "Japan problem" frame reached something of a peak, the "orthodox" frame solidified in the domestic stories written about Japan's disputed past memories. However, as Japan's economy started to decline and the strength of the connection declined, new issues emerged that supported the "orthodox" framing of Japan and helped that frame maintain its dominant position.

5.3 Independence of "Orthodox" from "Japan Problem" Frame

Japan's economy started to falter in the early 1990s, but the continuing perception that it was "unfair," supported by its perceived "threat" status, did not instantly disappear. As Gilpin (2003) pointed out, "the revisionist charges against Japan have not disappeared from the American political agenda and, in fact, resurfaced in the late 1990s" (Gilpin, 2003, p. 300). However, before Japan's supposed "threat" could subside to even a small degree, a new frame emerged along with new issues that reinforced the "orthodox" frame. In particular, the "comfort women" issue became the most internationally recognized and most sympathetically viewed of Japan's disputed past memories.

Soh claimed that when the "comfort women" issue emerged in 1992, it was framed as being a "feminist humanitarianism and sex slave" issue due to the changing importance of human rights in the post-Cold War world. This argument is also supported by others, such as Lee (2015), and Hicks (1994). It is clear in the coverage that the response to this issue both fit within and reinforced the "orthodox" frame by making human rights violations in general and women's rights in particular much more salient issues in the discourse. For example, the proportion of articles in the sample that used the phrase *war crimes* doubled since the "comfort women" issue emerged, and over a third of all stories since 1992 mentioned "comfort women," many of which were not focused on that issue in particular.

The stories that mentioned or focused on "comfort women" often evoked a great deal of sympathy as the individual stories of comfort women were told. For example, Nickerson's (1993) article in *The Boston Globe* recounted the experiences of Kang Soon-ae, a former "comfort woman," as follows:

I was dragged from my home at age 14 and cruelly forced into a military brothel," recounted Kang Soon Ae, now 67, one of scores of Korean women who recently have broken decades of shamed silence to describe their ordeals. Kang spoke in Tokyo at an academic forum on World War II atrocities. "I had to provide sex for 30 Japanese soldiers every day," she said. "When I cried for my home, I was beaten. I cried so often that by the end [of the war] every tooth was knocked from my head. (Nickerson, 1993)

The impact that these stories make and the way they reinforce the "orthodox" frame cannot be ignored. Similar stories were told prior to this when discussing other issues, such as the 1937 capture of Nanjing by the Japanese army or the human experiments conducted by Unit 731. However, the particular timing of when the stories discussing "comfort women" were released into the international community coincided with a wave of enthusiasm regarding the promotion of human rights. Rape was now being viewed as a war crime and not just a part of war. This change in perceptions gave these stories a salience that they would not have had if they had emerged in an earlier period. However, the "comfort women" issue alone cannot be viewed as solely responsible for the continuation of the "orthodox" frame.

After the influence of the "Japan problem" frame began to wane in the mid-1990s, Japan's disputed past memories continued to receive more interest domestically, with other significant spikes after 1991. Such large spikes in U.S. coverage predominantly presented Japan's disputed past memories in an "orthodox" frame and occurred in 1995, 1998, and 1999. The continuation of the "orthodox" frame after the decline in significance of the "Japan problem" frame shows how persistent frames are. However, the recurrence of issues that kept related stories in the news as well as a number of significant events allowed for the "orthodox" frame to solidify its dominant position. Some of the events that had a significant impact will now be discussed in detail.

Focusing first on 1995, it is not surprising that there would be, as in 1991, a peak in domestic coverage since it was the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII. This opened up the possibility of drawing connections between Japan's disputed war memories in Asia and in the United States. However, this alone could not explain the spike in coverage. Rather, it was mostly due to domestic stories that could be linked to Japan's disputed past memories. In particular, the 1995 dispute over the Enola Gay exhibit at

the Smithsonian Museum made the issue of Japan's—and the United States' —past memories salient in a way that they would not otherwise have been. There were also a number of events that kept Japan's disputed past memories in the news, such as Murayama's statement and revisionist statements of conservative politicians in Japan.

On the other hand, 1998 saw a somewhat unexpected jump in the number of stories written, rivaling even 1991. This can be linked partially to the publishing of Iris Chang's book, *The Rape of Nanking—the forgotten holocaust of World War II,* which stimulated a lot of discussion within the United States. That year also saw a large number of issues related to Japan's disputed past memories which kept them in the news, such as Akihito's visit to the United Kingdom, the apology to Tony Blair, the written apology to Kim Dae-jung, and the failure of Jiang Zemin to receive a written apology. However, it is still surprising that there would be so much domestically produced coverage, particularly "orthodox" coverage since there was little that could be linked directly to the United States occurring that year. This change points to a broadening acceptance of the "orthodox" frame and to the development of interest in Japan's disputed past memories.

Like 1998, 1999 saw some discussion of *The Rape of Nanking.* That year, the discussion mostly revolved around the fact that the book was not being released in Japan. There were also a number of books written on Japan and Japanese disputed historical memories as academic interest was growing. Another incident that gained some attention was the Japanese government's refusal to provide the records of Unit 731 veterans to the U.S. Department of Justice. However, there was once again little that linked the stories to particular domestic interests, again suggesting that interest in the subject had increased along with the acceptance of the "orthodox" frame.

It is also worth mentioning that there were large spikes in the number and ratio of stories in these years that emerged from the United States in line with the "orthodox" frame; however, the number of stories from countries outside Japan and the United States remained rather flat. This suggests minimal influence from other Asian countries on how the stories were framed. The total number of stories related to Japan's disputed past memories that were produced outside the United States and Japan only amounted to 15% in the 1990s, down from 16% in the 1980s. On the other hand, the percentage of stories written in the United States had risen from 19% in the 1980s to 29% in the

1990s. This increase in the number of stories being produced in the United States was also accompanied by much more in-depth stories being written in the 1990s.

However, this still does not explain the increase in the coverage inside Japan. This can be explained fairly simply as a reaction to news events in Asia and by the linkage of these recurring events that maintained the "orthodox" frame and increased the amount of coverage in line with it. That is why the years with the most coverage from Japan are the ones in which the most events related to Japan's disputed past memories occurred; in those years, prior events relating to Japan's disputed past memories were often cited in articles to give them more impact. Of course, the impact of the increased interest in this topic within the United States cannot be ignored; this certainly influenced the amount of coverage the topic received from foreign correspondents in Japan as well.

Looking at the more recent years of 2014 and 2015, the number of stories emerging from outside the United States and Japan had greatly increased. This is likely due to the increasing interest in other countries, in particular China, as its economy rises. The articles from the United States, China, and South Korea show a predominantly "orthodox" frame, but American articles originating in Japan are no longer dominated by the "orthodox" frame. This decline in the "orthodox" frame is likely due to the way in which the U.S. foreign correspondent system has changed. Since the late 1990s, more journalists have been staying long term within Japan, allowing them to develop extensive networks and strong Japanese skills that were not obtainable under the old style of journalism (Herbert, 2001). A similar drop off can be seen at the end of the 1990s in the ratio of stories that present the "orthodox" frame coming out of Japan.

To summarize, it is clear that even though the "Japan problem" view of Japan still exists, it is not as prevalent as it once was. However, the "orthodox" frame has continued to dominate in domestically produced U.S. media. One of the main reasons the "Japan problem" frame waned is that Japan's economy slowed down and its perceived "threat" was overtaken by more pressing issues, such as China's economic "threat" and the "threat" of global terrorism. Nevertheless, certain perceptions inherent in the "Japan problem" frame still exist today. The "orthodox" frame, on the other hand, has managed to persist, kept alive by repeated incidents and new frames that have allowed for a continuation of the narrative as well as a lack of any new narrative that can neatly

supplant it. Additionally, the "orthodox" frame fits well within the perception that Japan is "unfair," which appears to be the most persistent holdover of the "Japan problem" frame, as U.S. President Donald Trump demonstrated so well[14]. The next section will summarize this paper and clarify that the coverage in the United States was distinct and did not merely follow the coverage in Japan.

Chapter 6 —Conclusion

To summarize, using a framing analysis to examine the discourse surrounding Japan's disputed past memories, the present study has shown how the "Japan problem" frame, which was established in reaction to economic disputes, affected the formation of the "orthodox" frame that shapes the discourse on Japan's disputed past memories.

In this process in which one frame influences the other, two elements are important. First, the "Japan problem" frame was established in the 1980s, before the "orthodox" frame around Japan's disputed past memories was established in the early 1990s; hence, it was natural for the former to influence the latter. Second, the "Japan problem" frame entails a general image of Japan and Japanese people; therefore, as the more general frame, it would of necessity influence the frame that affected discourse on issues regarding the nation.

However, the fact that the previous and more general frame affected the formation of the following and narrower frame does not mean that the later one had to be influenced by the earlier one after its establishment. Because of the Japanese economic recession after the 1990s, there was a decrease in the number of reports in the U.S. media criticizing Japan in line with the "Japan problem" frame. However, even while the "Japan problem" frame waned, the "orthodox" frame, which shapes the discourse on Japan's disputed past memories, was maintained. One of the reasons was the impact of newly emerging historical issues regarding human rights, such as "comfort women" issues. With the emergence of such issues, controversies around Japan's disputed past memories began to be framed not simply as Japan-related but also as tied into universal human rights. As a result, the "orthodox" frame enjoyed a degree of independence from the image of Japan itself.

However, a more convincing reason for the persistence of the "orthodox" frame

may be the persistence of cognitive frames themselves. As Karla and Joseph (2010) mentioned, once cognitive frames about an issue are established, people tend to understand the changing of the environment around the issue in accordance with those established cognitive frames. Therefore, changing elements that do not fit into the cognitive frames are unconsciously overlooked, allowing the cognitive frames to be preserved.

Accordingly, the situation with regard to today's international discourse about Japan's disputed past memories is a typical product of the persistence of cognitive frames. However, the cognitive frame in question was established in the early 1990s, more than a quarter century ago, in a very different international situation. Not only Japan but also international society has experienced tectonic shifts during those years. However, the United States and other international media have been satisfied to simply echo arguments appropriate to past situations with little revision to accommodate changes over time.

Of course, it is not within the scope of this paper to pass judgment on the sincerity or insincerity of Japanese efforts to apologize. The point made here is that the international media have always received Japanese apologies in the same way. As can be easily seen through the comparison of the Murayama Statement and the Abe Statement, each has its own distinct background and intentions; hence, in could be expected that the media would interpret the different apologies differently based on their own merits. In doing so, the international media could support and stimulate the efforts of those Japanese leaders who sincerely want to deliver apologies from the bottom of their hearts, as Murayama did. Through the kind of international pressure that the Japanese term *gaiatsu*, the international media has a unique influence on Japan (Penpel, 1999) that they might use to play a more positive role in assisting Japan and the Japanese government in offering sincere apologies. However, thus far, the international media has been content with the "orthodox" frame and viewed such efforts inside Japan with suspicion. Greater progress might be made, however, if the media would examine more scrupulously their own cognitive biases.

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Notes

1 On the reliability of media databases such as Lexis and/or ProQuest, please see Entman (2008), Entman (2010), Inoue and Patterson (2007), and Smith, N. W. and Joffe, H. (2008).

2 Some of the phrases searched for included: Japan and Yasukuni; Japan and Unit 731; textbook and Japan and history; "Prisoners of war" and Japan; Nanjing and war and Japan; Nanking and war and Japan; Japan and apology and war; Japan and "comfort women"; Japanese and Yasukuni; Japanese and Unit 731; textbook and Japanese and history; "Prisoners of war" and Japanese; Nanjing and war and Japanese; Nanking and war and Japanese; Japanese and apology and war; and Japanese and "comfort women".

3 We also see some shifts in 1982. However, most of the articles in that year were short and did not include messages regarding the "orthodox" frame; hence, we excluded that year's articles from the analysis in this paper. See Figure 1.1.

4 One typical example of this can be seen in Susan Chira's (1988) article, in which she quoted Ienaga Saburo in 1988 as stating, "There is the inclination in teaching children to avoid the bad sides, and there isn't a willingness to learn a lesson from past mistakes."

5 According to an interview with an anonymous Western journalist in Tokyo (March, 2017). The short length of journalists' stays was also confirmed by looking at how long journalists reporting for *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post,* and *The Boston Globe* stayed in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s.

6 The *Asahi Shimbun* accounted for 74% of all references to Japanese newspapers in the sample from 1980 to 1989 and 57% from 1990 to 1999. If the references to Kyodo are accounted for, it changes to 65% from 1980 to 1989 and 50% from 1990 to 1999. The *Mainichi Shimbun* accounted for 17% of all references to Japanese newspapers in the sample from 1980 to 1989 and 24% from 1990 to 1999. If the references to Kyodo are accounted for, it changes to 15% from 1980 to 1989 and 21% from 1990 to 1999. Also, when executing general article searches through lexis.com, the *Asahi Shimbun* is referenced more than any other Japanese newspaper.

7 It is also worth noting that the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the *Sankei Shimbun* were not as nationalistic at the time as they are now.

8 See also Dower (1986).

9 We also can see the impact of the frame, for example, in the speeches of Donald Trump. See Soble and Bradsher (2016).

10 However, it should also be noted that there were a lot of academic works that stood in opposition to the "Japan problem" frame, such as Hamamoto (1994).

11 On the contribution of the United States to the Japanese economic recovery, see Reischauer (1988) and Gordon (2009).

12 For example, Pat Choate (1990) launched a scathing attack on Packard and what he and others have called the "Chrysanthemum Club." He claimed, "While most of them hold their views honestly, almost all are stroked, supported, and promoted by the Japanese, who recognize the enormous value of having earnest American defenders who will make Japan's case."
13 Frontline is a highly respected documentary series that first aired on PBS in 1983 and continues even today.
14 Please see the previous reference to Trump's views on Japan.