

Confronting Militarization: Struggles for Peace and Security by Pacific Island Women

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I am one of the victims of army abuse. A military policeman named Robin Monai raped me. He buggered me and raped me wearing a coffee mug handle on his penis.... This caused me internal damage. This man is still here on Buka and nothing has been done to correct this injustice. This is a man who used to cut the ears off and then kill our men. He is still here. Nothing has been done; there is no justice. There are many women's organizations, but they are of no help. They have funding but I do not know what they do with this money. They do not fight for our women's rights and they do not help us, the victims. Today we must try to forgive and forget.¹

Gender(ed) violence, and resistance to it, are everywhere, including the islands of the Pacific. In spite of their reputation as 'paradise,' colonization and militarization have made the Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) a part of the complex culture of violence which envelops our world. The objective of the present paper is to begin to look at the intersection of militarization, gender(ed) violence and resistance in the gendered and militarized spaces in the Pacific Islands region. It will explore how current cultural governance which emphasizes 'gender' (in this case generally meaning *women*) both creates spaces for resistance to violence and re-creates the militarized culture of violence in the region.

Gender(ed) violence is both pervasive and elusive; we recognize its existence in some forms and spaces, but not in others. Here we will suggest that in order to eliminate gender(ed) violence, we must also address the intricate web of violence created by militarism and militarization. In order to address these questions, the paper will first look at the concepts of cultural governance, militarism/

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militarization and gender(ed) violence. This will be followed by a brief overview of the regional framework for addressing women's issues and violence including the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325.² It will then introduce two brief case studies to offer diverse illustrations of how these concepts intersect. The first illustration will look at an armed conflict — the Bougainville Crisis — focusing on the role played by women in peace making. While this conflict occurred before the adoption of Resolution 1325, it is typical of the kind of conflict which that resolution hopes to address. The second will look at a problem beyond the realm of Resolution 1325 — the situation of the removal of US troops to Guam from US bases on Okinawa. It will suggest that in order to be transformative, resistance must address not only gender and gender(ed) violence, but also militarism/militarization and de-militarization.

I. Colonization and Militarization in the Pacific Island Region

The Pacific Ocean covers approximately one-third of the globe and many of its island countries encompass more water than land. With the exception of Tonga, the Pacific islands dotting the ocean surface were all colonized, and most achieved independence in the 1970's. In a few cases such as that of the British in Fiji or the Japanese in Micronesia, colonization went hand in hand with plantations and labor migration, bringing profits to the colonizers, changing island demographics and incorporating the islands into the world economy. Even today, the presence of much of the world's supply of nickel in New Caledonia is a major factor in the unwillingness of France to grant independence. For the most part, however, from the perspective of the colonizers, the value of the Pacific islands lay not so much in the exploitation of the land resources as in the access they provided to ocean spaces and resources. The strategic importance of marine and deep sea spaces to the extra-regional powers remains significant today, even after decolonization.

Ironically, while the distance of small islands from the suzerain made colonization expensive and difficult, it is precisely that location in a 'far sea' that led to their exploitation by extra-regional powers. For example, for France and Britain, the Pacific was used as a far removed and therefore 'safe' place to send

prisoners. Before modern transportation made crossing the Pacific possible without refueling or provisioning, the islands provided way stations for military, trading and fishing/whaling vessels and aircraft. During World War II, the Pacific was the site of heavy fighting and the Micronesian islands were used as stepping stones for Allied Forces to attack Japan. After the war, the Pacific became a place to test American, French and British nuclear weapons which were deemed too dangerous and unpopular to test at home. Today, some Pacific islands continue to be militarized and colonized spaces, providing harbors and bases for American military forces. The islands also serve to provide access to fisheries and other marine resources as well as potentially to the minerals which lie beneath the ocean surface. As such, they are linked not only with the regional powers but with countries at the center of the world-economy.

The colonization and militarization of Pacific spaces has not been limited to physical spaces, but has created militarized cultures, identities and bodies. Military coercion has become embodied through the inter-generational effects of nuclear and/or toxic contamination on Pacific peoples, their forced migration/relocation due to the contamination of their living spaces, and the Amerasian and other children of mixed background living near military bases. It is visible as well in the Pacific Islanders serving overseas in Peace Keeping Forces, those working for private security companies in Iraq, and the families those soldiers are supporting both through wages and sometimes through death.³

The militarized Pacific is also visible in the increase in intra-regional and internal conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Militarization has exacerbated the difficulty of negotiating post-independence, resulting in, for example, four coups in Fiji, armed conflicts in the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and West Papua, and political violence in Tonga and New Caledonia. Moreover, as Asian countries such as the Philippines and Japan attempt to re-assert their sovereignty and oust US bases, the relative importance of military facilities on US Pacific territories grows. An example that will be considered here is the current US plan to relocate roughly 8000 marines and their families from Okinawa (The Marine Corps Air Station Futenma) to Guam.

Cultural Governance and the Management of Identity

Colonized spaces are controlled not only through military coercion and economic regulation, but also through the creation and management of identity. Colonization creates new and often artificial borders; after independence, post-colonial states take over the attempt to align territorial and cultural boundaries. The creation and maintenance of gendered identities plays an important role in this *cultural* governance which often seeks legitimacy in militarism and capitalist modernity. Resistance comes from many places, some of which may reinforce the objectives of the state. However, “since the state can never exhaust cultural production, resistance to centralizing efforts (may also) take the form of alternative cultural productions.”⁴ Some of this resistance takes the form of work to eliminate and/or stop violence and create peace.

Cultural governance creates and destroys identities, both personal and collective. Colonization created ‘the Pacific,’ an entity composed of islands in a far sea, dry surfaces far from power centers, but ‘the Pacific’ is also a sea of islands, a holistic totality of oceans and islands. In the binary world-view of the West, the Pacific islands were neither Orient nor Occident; even today they are neither East nor West, but ‘other.’ Certainly the mission of ‘civilizing’ the ‘savage’ Islander was a powerful tool in the colonization process. Unlike the Caribbean, where indigenous Island cultures were essentially exterminated, indigenous Pacific Islanders have remained, although the experience of colonization brought many changes to the nature of that ‘indigeneity.’ In those islands that remain under foreign rule, indigenous people are a subordinated and often unrecognized minority, such as the Native Hawaiians in Hawaii and the Chamorus in Guam.

Both the state of Hawaii and the territory of Guam are politically part of the United States, as is American Samoa. Many Pacific Islanders live in the US but Pacific Islanders have not yet gained a place in US ethnic hierarchies. They are often left out of ‘Asia-Pacific’ categories and are not included in American ‘Asian’ identities. Recently, in some parts of the US an ethnic category of ‘Pacific Islander’ has been created, but Pacific Islanders remain marginalized within US society. As seen from Japan, the present-day ‘Asia’ and/or ‘Asia-Pacific’ does not really include the Pacific Islands, and ‘Asia’ does not include Japan, the Pacific or

even in most cases South Asia. Similarly, from the perspective of the islands of the south Pacific, the Micronesian cultures to the north are often marginalized, if acknowledged at all, and Japan is part of Asia. Colonization and cultural governance have drawn boundaries among the islands themselves, mainly on the basis of whether they were/are colonized by Britain, France or the US.

Beginning with the independence of Samoa in 1962, most of the Pacific Islands have now moved to independent and/or self-governing status. In spite of this, the extra-regional powers have continued to view the Pacific islands as strategic spaces and to use them for military purposes. Guam, for example, was governed by the US Navy from 1899 to 1950 and World War II brought intense fighting and the establishment of military bases and facilities to many Pacific Islands. Military bases are one place where the priorities of cultural governance, militarization and militarized spaces are visible. Bases bring military activities and create military economies, but military and militarized cultures remain, even after the bases are gone. Violence, particularly gender violence, is one example. Often resistance to this violence seeks to be transformational, aiming at alternative cultural production, but much of it actually serves to promote hegemonic militarism and militarization.

Militarization as a Tool for Cultural Governance

When societies and institutions commit themselves and their resources to the waging of war they are engaging in militarism.⁵ Militarism and militarization happen in all countries, but militarism is a hegemonic project which is “constituted through systematic power relationships that privilege certain ways of knowing, being and acting and that give voice to only certain people’s experiences and agendas....”⁶ It is of course easier to mobilize vast social and economic resources for military purposes if people both recognize the need for, and willingly cooperate with, doing so. This is accomplished through militarization, a mechanism which privileges military concerns, giving ‘value’ to aspects of ordinary life normally not directly related to the military, such as fashion design, and making people accepting of military values and solutions without their necessarily being aware of what is happening. In the Pacific, militarization is

both a reason for, and result of, a growing acceptance and use of violence not only to settle disputes but as an aspect of everyday life. Independence has for the most part reinforced existing power relations, militarism and structural violence; internal conflict is both a cause and a result of militarization and violence.

Militarization is a powerful tool of cultural governance and uses gender to further its goals. The archetype of women as mothers, wives and care-givers commits women to bearing and raising sons to send off to war to fight for their nation. When care-giving institutions are militarized, the people who work in them (largely women) are serving military aims, even if they do not consciously support them.

Cultural governance and militarization also work to define gender violence, as they marginalize women in general and certain women in particular, thereby legitimizing some forms of gender violence but not necessarily others. For example, the construction of masculinity in the military is a major factor in prostitution and the gender(ed) violence which surrounds military bases, but the military often disregards and/or fails to give importance to that violence. In the words of Cynthia Enloe, “Feminists from India, Zimbabwe, and Japan to Britain, the United States, Serbia, Chile, South Korea, Palestine, Israel, and Algeria all have found that when they have followed the bread crumbs of privileged masculinity, they have been led time and again not just to the doorstep of the military, but to the threshold of all those social institutions that promote militarization.”⁷

Laura Kaplan explains the relationship between privileged masculinity and militarization with what she calls ‘patriarchal militarism.’ One aspect of patriarchal militarism is that it encourages men to create images of women as “devalued others” and then use those images as a “model for training and inspiring masculine warriors to devalue and distance themselves from enemies.”⁸ The devalued images of women employed by the military encourage gender violence, often so much so that it is disguised or made invisible. This ‘invisibility’ makes it difficult for the victims to tell even their families and friends, let alone speak out in public. Even if people do speak out, this ‘invisibility’ means that often their voices go unheeded and their claims are not given serious consideration.

Patriarchal militarism uses dual images of male and female, masculine and

feminine to enhance male violence at the expense of women. In that both men and women play the roles based on this gender opposition, they are part of this process. One role for women in many cultures, including the island of Bougainville, is that of 'peace-maker,' based on their care-taking role. It is important to consider how this traditional role fits into the larger system of modern-day warfare. As we will see, while this role as 'peace-maker' may contribute to the establishment of peace over the short term, it may also affirm that "which they seek to avoid: marginalization of the other, which leads to the divisions between people on which wars are predicated."⁹

Conflict and Gender Violence

In the Pacific as elsewhere, militarization and militarized mentalities often constitute a form of structural violence which is gendered and not only violent in and of itself but under certain circumstances results in direct violence. Frequently, this takes the form of gender violence, most often directed against women by men. Gender violence is:

"a systematic, institutionalized and/or programmatic violence (sexual, physical, psychological) that operates through the constructs of gender and often at the intersection of sexuality, race and national identity. Gender violence comprises the acts and practices that systematically target a person, group or community in marginalized communities or any other perceived threats to dominant political structures and practices."¹⁰

In the Pacific, conflict and gender violence are at least in part a legacy of colonial rule which institutionalized male privilege through systems for control over social and economic resources such as land and social position, as well as re-creating and reinforcing gendered roles. Colonization has contributed both directly and indirectly to the militarization of the region as these systems prioritized military/security concerns. Colonization and cultural governance also created ethnic tensions as different ethnic and/or tribal groups were brought together, often in ways that suited the needs of the colonizers rather than the

colonized, and later those of local elites. This occurred both through the drawing of what eventually became national boundaries and through movements of people, such as the British importation of sugar plantation workers to Fiji from India. The pyramid of colonization privileged White over non-White, male over female and some ethnicities over others, generally ensuring white men a secure spot on top and relegating indigenous women to the bottom. Similarly, modern cultural governance metes out legitimacy to some more than others, privileging men over women and giving transgendered people virtually no place at all.¹¹

Pacific women identify the following as the major causes of conflict in the region: “increasingly unequal access to land, paid employment and economic resources, particularly when inequality is based on ethnicity; centralisation of resources and services; lack of involvement in decision-making and authority; a weakening of traditional methods of dispute resolution; and the growth of a ‘Rambo’ culture of violence and guns among young unemployed men.”¹² These causes occur against a background of changing demographics including migration and urbanization and a growing gap between a small wealthy minority which has profited from ‘development’ and an increasing number of impoverished and/or poor people. Thomas identifies a lack of information about political processes as exacerbating the situation, and draws links between the influence of media violence, domestic violence, a growing culture of violence and national conflict.¹³

Local violence is manifested not only in an increase in armed conflict, but also in direct violence by armed youth gangs or increasing domestic violence. It is also visible as structural/cultural violence in such forms as gender and ethnic discrimination, lack of access to social resources for women and particular ethnic groups, and discriminatory legislation. The outbreak of armed conflict in the region, and the use of peacekeepers to contain that conflict, as well as participation by Pacific Island forces in international peace-keeping, has helped to spread the culture of violence within the islands, reaching more and more people and causing more and more pain.

Measures such as Resolution 1325 have provided an impetus to deal with gender(ed) violence. At the regional level, the sole organization recognized by

governmental and non-governmental women's organizations as advocating gender awareness, gender mainstreaming and the needs of women is the Pacific Women's Bureau (PWB).¹⁴ PWB has as its goal to foster "empowered Pacific Island women and young people and strong cultural identities." It endeavors to improve the status of Pacific women through the monitoring of the implementation of the Pacific Platform for Action on the Advancement of Women and Gender Equality (PPA)¹⁵ and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). CEDAW¹⁶ and the MDGs have provided a standard by which the progress of these efforts is measured.

The PWB works in close collaboration with UN agencies in the region such as UNIFEM, other international organizations and national Women, Peace and Security Coordinating Committees,¹⁷ which tend to include government and women's NGOs, as well as other NGOs in the region concerned with security issues. Issues are generally addressed in the context of human security.

The regional structure for response to security issues is based on the 2000 (PIF) Biketawa Declaration¹⁸ which mandates response to security issues at the regional level and reiterates the rule of law, individual freedoms, equal rights regardless of gender, race, colour, creed or political belief, and the right to participation in political processes. In 2005, the Pacific Plan adopted a broad definition of security which listed human security as one of four priority goals for the region and included gender equality as a crosscutting strategic objective. The implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 in all countries, including those that have not experienced recent violent conflict, is considered useful as it provides a framework to ensure "due consideration to gender dimensions of peace and stability, particularly with regard to the pervasive nature of violence against women, boys and girls in these countries."¹⁹

Civil society organizations in the Pacific are numerous and some are very active. A regional umbrella organization, Pacific Island Association of NGOs (PIANGO), has coordinating committees in most PICTs. Church-affiliated groups are also prevalent. With regard to women's organizations, most PICTs have a National Council of Women or the equivalent, as well as a variety of primarily development-oriented organizations.

In times of conflict, both women and men have worked to oppose violence

and create peace. Women, often at great risk to themselves, have engaged in vigils and peace marches, lobbied political leaders, talked with soldiers and armed fighters, networked to provide information, shelter, food and other assistance and worked to restore their communities once the direct violence has ceased. In some ways, these activities have been possible for Pacific women precisely because they are women; gender roles and gendered power relations have given them the space to resist. However, those same power relations have meant that their work has not necessarily been widely heard or acknowledged. "What is seldom given adequate consideration is the role that Pacific Island women have played, and continue to play, in establishing communication channels between warring parties, in restoring and maintaining peace, in rebuilding communities and in working to overcome the physical and psychological trauma of conflict."²⁰

Examples from the Pacific and elsewhere show that in many cases, women's demands for peace and for inclusion in decision-making often begins with humanitarian and/or practical considerations during a conflict.²¹ The following examples will show that this has been true in the case of Bougainville, and perhaps can in some ways also be applicable to the work of women in Okinawa. At the same time, there are real obstacles to inclusion of women at the policy-making level on issues of security. Some reasons for this can be identified as follows: Many fewer women are actually engaged in fighting and are thus thought to have less legitimacy than men; it is assumed that what men want is also what women want; negotiation teams generally come from diplomatic and/or military circles where there are few women; women are often excluded from public life by custom or tradition; women's actions are not considered political nor is outright political action considered appropriate for women; logistical and security issues exclude women; and participation is limited by inability of women to access resources or because of their caring commitments.²² These factors serve to encourage women who want to be involved in resistance to do so in women's groups, but also make them subject to the limitations of gendered cultural governance which not only defines the ways in which women and men are expected to behave, but also whether, and in what ways the intersection of women, militarism and militarization/de-militarization will be addressed.

II. Case Studies: Working for Peace and Opposing Violence in the Pacific

As we have seen, militarization is a feature of the landscape of the Pacific Islands Region. The presence of US military bases in Japan, Guam and Hawaii, linked with alliance partners in Australia and New Zealand encompass the region in a military circle. The primary focus of that circle of military installations is outward toward Asia rather than inward toward the Pacific, but in recent years, the region itself has been the site of several armed conflicts (PNG/Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, West Papua), as well as of political violence (Fiji, Tonga). Women have been seriously affected by the militarization of the region, not only where direct conflicts have occurred but also in places where militarization is most visible, such as foreign military bases. Here we will consider two contrasting examples of militarization, both of which include gender(ed) violence: the Bougainville Crisis and the relocation of US marines from Okinawa to Guam. It is hoped that these examples will help to promote discussion of the relationship between gender(ed) violence and militarization, and illustrate the ways in which cultural governance influences both.

Case Study 1: The Bougainville Crisis

“One thing the army did was to make men strip and commit anal sex with each other at gunpoint. People were afraid of the gun and would do these things to avoid being shot.”²³

“Violence is glamorous masculinity in Melanesia.”²⁴

Bougainville Island, together with neighboring Buka Island and several small atolls, forms one of the nineteen provinces of Papua New Guinea (PNG). When PNG attained independence in 1975, Bougainville likewise declared independence, but it lasted only one day. While Bougainville is geographically and ethnically closer to the Solomon Islands than to PNG, the presence of the Panguna mine in central Bougainville ensured that independence would come at a high price, if at all. The mine, at the time of its opening in 1972, was the largest open-pit mine in the world. It was run by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) which was a subsidiary of the British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ)/Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA), and a minority share (20%) was held in the name

of the PNG government. RTZ and CRA later merged to form Rio Tinto.

During the 70's and 80's, the mine was PNG's main source of foreign exchange, and served as the backbone of the PNG economy. Labor for the mine was provided in part by workers from other parts of PNG who were ethnically different from the Bougainvilleans. The mine not only had disastrous environmental effects, but also far-reaching social implications, including dissatisfaction with the amount of compensation provided to land-owners. These warning signs went largely unheeded by the PNG government.

In 1989, a former mine employee Francis Ona changed things. "Claiming to speak on behalf of all Bougainvilleans affected by the huge copper mine that BCL had dug through his ancestral lands, Ona had formed the 'New Panguna Land-owners Association' and delivered an ultimatum to the company: pay up 10 billion kina (A\$14.7 billion {1989 value}) in compensation for the impact of the mine, or else."²⁵ The 'or else' won the day and a campaign was launched to sabotage BCL and ultimately the national government. Explosives were stolen from the mine, arson attacks were waged against strategic locations and then, "to the dismay of the miners and the surprise of everyone, the massive power pylons supporting the feeder lines along the mine-access road began to fall, their supports expertly blown away by one of the first of Ona's recruits; a bright, young, Australian-trained lieutenant from the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, Sam Kauona had joined the 'holy war'. It had been a long time coming."²⁶

For the next ten years, Bougainville saw the longest and bloodiest clash in the Pacific since the end of WWII.²⁷ By its conclusion, between 15,000 and 20,000 people had lost their lives. Women, traditional custodians of the land in Bougainville, were torn from their land and subjected to all manner of violence by not only the 'official' parties to the conflict but also groups of young men who used the chaos to their own advantage, engaging in rape, assault and murder. The blockade of Bougainville Island instigated by the PNG government with Australian assistance deprived local communities of medical and other supplies, seriously affecting not only the wounded, but the reproductive health and rights of women and their children. Many of the stories of the conflict told by women describe their struggle to find medicine or medical relief for their children and

the pain and hardship of being pregnant and giving birth in the bush while on the run. Often described as an internal conflict between the secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces and the local Resistance, it was, like other such conflicts, in fact about control of land and livelihoods.

Bougainvilleans traditionally live by gardening, hunting and fishing. In physical appearance, Bougainvilleans tend to be more dark-skinned than those from the PNG mainland. Most language and cultural groups are matrilineal, giving women an important role in family and the clan. In particular, it is the woman's line that determines inheritance and use of land. Women are thus powerful, although they seldom raise their voices directly in the public arena but instead use a male relative. Due to their strong connection with the land, women are often referred to as "Mothers of the land," a term that has been used frequently in describing the role played by women during and after the conflict.

Society is built around land, of which the women are the traditional custodians. The development of the mine disrupted the social fabric not only through the presence of ethnically and culturally different workers, but also through destruction of the land itself and forced relocation. Moreover, the PNG Constitution only provides for compensation for the surface of the land, giving complete ownership of everything else to the PNG government. Compensation for use by the mine was made once and only once (if at all); there was no re-negotiation.

"I can't pass the land on now because most of it has been covered up by the mine,' Patricia Dave said in 1988 as she stood among her grandchildren. "The traditional system will never work again. The company has only paid the parents for this. What Ona is fighting for is that everybody, right down to the last born, should get compensation because our traditions have been broken and we will not be able to pass anything down to them.' It was this loss — the loss of land not to just one generation but to all the generations to come and all those that had been, that the miners did not seem to comprehend."²⁸

The mine was closed in May 1989, and in June, the PNG government declared a state of emergency in Bougainville and the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces (PNGDF) were sent to quell the violence. Occupation and violence by the

PNGDF served only to make things worse. By the early part of 1990, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) had gained control of the closed mine, airstrips, roads and other strategic locations. Violence at the hands of the PNGDF was rampant and after a ceasefire in March 1990 was declared, the Defence Forces left the island. They returned, however, by force. A blockade, enforced with patrol boats donated by Australia, halted almost all air and sea transport, with the exception of the sea border with the Solomon Islands. The blockade prevented emergency medical and food supplies, as well as emergency evacuations and eventually led to more deaths than the fighting itself. Ona declared independence for Bougainville on 17 May 1990, and a free-for-all of violence began. In the absence of traditional and/or modern cultural restraints, murder, rape and robbery in the name of the 'war' became everyday occurrences. Local Resistance forces armed and supplied by the PNGDF sprang up in communities, adding a new party to the conflict. Thousands fled into the bush in an effort to avoid the violence.

In 1997, after the fall of PNG Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan, peace negotiations began in earnest with the help of New Zealand. In 2000, the peace agreement was finalized and in May and June of 2005, elections for the first Autonomous Bougainville Government were held.

The war had an impact on all women and men on Bougainville, both in terms of their everyday lives and in terms of their communities. To the extent that generalizations are meaningful, life was probably most difficult for those living in the BRA-controlled areas of the bush but it was hard for women in government-controlled areas and care centers, too.

The lives of women in government-controlled areas were regulated by the curfew and other measures, and their access to food, medicine and other necessities was limited. Women could not go daily to their gardens due to restrictions and fear of violence. The breakdown of services affected women's reproductive health due to shortages of human and material resources including medicine. Interruption of the supply of sanitary protection made it difficult for women to leave their homes during menstruation.

Militarization and the presence of weapons brought sexual violence to

Bougainville for the first time. Rather than being in the hands of chiefs, power was in the hands of young men because they had guns. Women were raped and tortured, often in front of their husbands and children.²⁹ Women in care centers were subject to sexual abuse by PNGDF and Resistance soldiers, often being required to pay for necessities with sexual acts.

The crisis affected children, too. Many mothers complained that traditional social rules and conventions could not be maintained in the care centers, and as a result their children were growing up without any socialization and were just running wild. "Men, women and children as young as nine mix fruit juices with yeast and sugar, ferment it, and a few days later, drown their sorrows... Children who have seen close relatives die make their own home-brew because they have learnt from their mothers. Absenteeism from school is high and exam results are poor. Prior to the crisis the people were well-educated and went to university. Now, 80% of children don't go to school.... Children who were eight or nine when the crisis started are in their late teens now. They have joined the fighting and they don't even know why they are fighting."³⁰

For women in the BRA-controlled areas, however, the situation was even more difficult. They had to endure attacks by the PNGDF and Resistance, the Blockade prevented access to basic necessities and medical care, and those who fled into the bush had to plant new gardens and build shelters to live in. Women in the government-controlled areas suffered from sexual violence and harassment from the government and resistance forces, but women in the BRA areas experienced violence and rape from all three factions.³¹

Life in the bush was hard, but it enabled some people to put their skills and creativity to work. For example, they figured out how to make 'blockade soap' from cocoa pods, run their cars and trucks on coconut oil and store the hydro-electric power they generated from mountain streams in used car batteries. Women supporters of the BRA became 'mamas' for the men when they came to the villages, and in exchange for feeding and caring for them, the men brought smuggled supplies or smuggled sick children out to the Solomon Islands for treatment.³²

In terms of community and women's organizing, before the conflict, there

were two women's organizations on Bougainville. In the 1960's, the Churches' Women's Organization held programs for self-reliance in the villages and the Northern Solomons Provincial Council of Women was active in the 70's and 80's. The latter was trying to form a network of women's organizations when the conflict began, putting an end to their efforts.³³

The 'divide and conquer' strategy of the PNGDF and Resistance Forces made networking difficult, and peace groups had to begin work within their own communities in isolation from one another. Women formed church and other groups to provide aid and assistance to one another and their children. Sometimes women used their traditional role as 'peacemakers' to go into the bush and bring their sons back from fighting. High status women served as go-betweens to help negotiate peace, and in some parts of the island, women went into the jungle to negotiate with the BRA. Through activities such as prayer meetings, reconciliation marches, peace marches and petitions, women were able to influence the peace negotiations, particularly since some of the women's groups used contacts in Australia and New Zealand to bring in international support. For example, in 1991 efforts by local women resulted in the declaration of a 'Peace Area' by the Selau people, disarming the local BRA and getting the agreement of the Resistance to stay out of the area. Peace marches led by women in 1993 and 1994 led to peace negotiations, and in 1995 women from both sides sent delegations to the Beijing Women's Conference. The Bougainville Inter-Church Women's Forum, established in 1995, attempted to bridge the gap among women of different denominations and helped to organize a Women's Peace Forum for 700 people later that year. The following year, another Forum attracted participation from women from both sides of the conflict.

The Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom³⁴ was a group of BRA and Bougainville Interim Government supporters who worked for peace and unity from the BRA side. From that perspective, the hardship of daily life led women to begin to organize themselves, forming family, church and non-denominational groups to feed orphans and widows and to generally help each other and those in need. By 1996, some of these groups had come together to form the Bougainville Community Bases Integrated Humanitarian Program (BOCBIHP).

They established their headquarters in the Solomon Islands, run by Bougainville refugees, and part of their work entailed establishing blockade-breaking access to Bougainville, ferrying of supplies donated by NGOs in other countries.³⁵ This network was in place by the time of the first serious peace negotiations in 1997, and helped to get women a place in the negotiation process.

One of the traditional community roles played by Bougainvillean women is that of 'peacemaker,' so it is not surprising that women were able to organize and participate in the peace building process. According to one of the founders of Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom, Ruth Saovana Springs, one of the reasons they were able to be persuasive was their emphasis on unity. "...women have made it our mission to speak with one voice, a far larger voice than individual women's groups previously achieved, on separate issues of unity, reconciliation, an end to war, and rebuilding our lives and homes."³⁶

While women were no doubt very much involved in the peace-making process, the perception of the extent of that participation varies. While women were present and active in the official negotiations, it was a struggle to be heard. In spite of general acknowledgement of the importance of women's initiatives, actual negotiations and decisions were carried out by men.³⁷ Political participation by women in post-conflict Bougainville is minimal. Only six out of 106 people appointed to the Bougainville People's Congress were women, the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government had only four women. The Bougainvillean delegation to the 2001 talks on autonomy, referendum and arms disposal had only two women. The Autonomous Bougainville Government has three seats (out of 33 elected seats) reserved for women in the House of Representatives.³⁸

In general, media and other coverage of the role of women in the Bougainville conflict tends to be self-congratulatory, with a few reservations regarding the future. At the same time, there is another voice which says that even when they speak, women are not necessarily heard. "Women's public status, condoned male violence, the law — both formal and traditional — and the ways in which it is interpreted and implemented, are crucial elements in the lack of attention paid to women's views and opinions."³⁹ Moreover, while some extol the role of women, Macintyre claims that, "Men listened to women when they finally

got sick of fighting — not when their wives died in childbirth because of the lack of hospital facilities; not when women were being routinely raped by soldiers, police and other Bougainvillean men; not when women had to struggle to find food for their families away from their villages. Women had no political presence when so-called peace talks were foundering. Violence by men was constantly met by counter-violence. Rapes were avenged by rapes, killings by killings.”⁴⁰ Macintyre goes on to say that in post-conflict Bougainville, the reality of women in reconstruction is that “women’s organizations are heavily dependent on outside funding, and that, in projects aimed at reconstruction and development, men are the major decision makers and beneficiaries.”⁴¹

The Letania Nehan Women’s Development Agency, founded in 1992 and recipient of the first UNIFEM Millenium Peace Prize in 2001, is one of the women’s organizations working for peace and reconciliation. Letania recognized that the violence experienced by women during and after the crisis did not arise solely as a result of the conflict but rather was related to violence that existed in peacetime, too. Moreover, they recognize “a strong connection between violence against women and militarization of Bougainville society.”⁴² As a result, they are currently working with entire communities, including men, youth and ex-combatants. This work is based on a belief that gender-mainstreaming needs to be improved and strengthened. This need is demonstrated by the fact that when they began to work on arms disposal, they were told “bluntly that arms control was not a women’s issue.”⁴³

The reality of women’s participation and the success of women’s efforts for peace depends on the perceptions and aspirations of the viewer. If women see themselves as having been instrumental in the creation and maintenance of peace, then no doubt they have been, at least from their own perspective. UNSC Resolution 1325 comes equipped with defined areas for improvement in women’s participation, but this, too depends on one’s perception of how things ought to be carried out and how they ought to be measured. Of course, Resolution 1325 did not exist during the conflict in Bougainville, although it is applicable to efforts for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The real problem however is in a different context. The success of women in peace making in Bougainville was through use

of their traditional gender roles as women, combined with an acknowledgement from outside that women are important in reconstruction and rehabilitation. In other words, women used their gender in a form of cultural governance to promote peace. A feminist analysis of this use of traditional women's roles would conclude that it limits the opportunities for peace making. However, an anti-militarist approach to peace "insists that traditional images of masculinity and femininity reinforce both militarism and sexism," as it fails to challenge the ways these roles contribute to the continuation of patriarchy and militarism.⁴⁴ Hence, efforts for peace making might in fact be successful, but only in so far as they stay within the general confines of established gender roles. Unless the conceptions of masculinity and femininity that sustain systems and structures of domination and oppression are changed, post-conflict society will return to pre-conflict modes of gender expression and domination. Perhaps what we are seeing in Bougainville today is a version of continued oppression due to the inability to totally dismantle and rebuild traditional gender and power relations after the war ended.

Case Study 2: Okinawa/Guam (Guahan)

*"If the presence of the Marines is such a good thing for Guam, why is Japan willing to pay US\$ 6 billion to get them out?"*⁴⁵

*"In times of war, the military takes people's lives. In times of peace, the military takes the dignity—and often lives—of women."*⁴⁶

Conflict arises in all social situations, but most conflicts do not escalate into war, or even violence. 'Othering' is a form of cultural governance that legitimizes violence against certain groups. It imposes distinctions on people, often in contradiction to their personal preferences and identities. Gender hierarchies are a form of 'othering;' cultural governance combines these with ethnic, religious and other hierarchies to create difference. One form of resistance is thus trying to overcome or redefine difference. Gender mainstreaming, in its ideal form, is one such attempt. Another example would be the struggle of women on Bougainville. In the Bougainville Crisis, women on both sides recognized the importance of unity in ending the fighting, and arranged first for discussions among Bougainvilleans

of opposing viewpoints, without participation from PNG, New Zealand, Australia or other outside parties. These discussions paved the way for the official peace talks.

In the case of Okinawa/Guam, the requirements of cultural governance from the perspective of Tokyo call for the incorporation of Okinawa into Japan, glossing over its history of colonization and different culture. A similar process occurs with Guam, which from a Washington perspective is essentially, if not technically, a part of the United States. Opposition to the planned relocation of US marines from Okinawa to Guam has created a new site for resistance to US and Japanese cultural governance, as it has brought women of both sides together in a united stand. This has also meant that they address the question of militarization as one of structural violence, and has forced them to look at the violent intersection of militarization, gender and racism. Here we will focus on how a group of women opposing the bases in Okinawa has changed to incorporate the struggle in Guam.

Militarization is enhanced and exacerbated by actual fighting, but in fact it is more a product of preparation for war than of war itself. Preparing for war requires the justification of resource use and the mobilization of human and other resources for reasons which might not be immediately apparent. Preparation for war has enormous economic benefits for weapons manufacturers, but may wreak havoc on the people and environments where the actual preparation takes place.

In the Pacific, peacetime 'defense' policy has resulted in contamination of some islands and their surrounding oceans from nuclear testing, as well as contamination from Agents Orange and Purple and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) purported to have been left on Guam and perhaps elsewhere by the US military. Today, the Guahan Coalition for Peace and Justice is saying that US military expansion on Guam is threatening the very survival of the indigenous Chamoru people.⁴⁷ One aspect of that expansion is the relocation of US military forces from Japan.

The US exerts its military power throughout the world in part through a network of military bases and other installations on US and foreign soil. It is

reported that the number of military bases operated and/or controlled by the United States is between seven and eight hundred, with 255,065 US military personnel in 156 countries, 63 of which contain US military bases.⁴⁸ In terms of land holdings, if one were to add the domestic, occupied territory and foreign military bases, “the total land area occupied by US military bases domestically within the US and internationally is of the order of 2,202,735 hectares, which makes the Pentagon one of the largest landowners worldwide.”

In order to fully understand the impact of militarization on Guam and its implications for Okinawa, it is useful to first take a quick look at the history of the US military occupation of that island. As was mentioned earlier, Guam came under US administration in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War and was under the jurisdiction of the US Navy.⁴⁹ The US control was interrupted on 8 December 1941 by an attack on Guam by the Japanese Imperial Army. The Japanese occupation of Guam was brutal, growing more and more harsh as the war situation worsened for the Japanese. On 18 July 1944, the US bombardment of Guam began and by the 21st, it had become “the most intense crescendo of conventional firepower ever inflicted on any locality in the Pacific War.”⁵⁰ The US bombardment eroded the last vestiges of discipline in Japanese soldiers and policemen. In Agana, eleven Chamoru men, women and young children were bayoneted to death. At a cave near Agat, more than a dozen teenage girls were raped by Japanese soldiers, and at another cave, an unknown number of Chamoru men were killed by Japanese.⁵¹ The fall of Guam was acknowledged by Tokyo on 11 August. By 31 August, US military records show 18,377 Japanese dead on Guam, of whom about 200 were civilians. About 1,250 Japanese had surrendered. American casualties numbered 1,747 dead (1,520 US Marines) and 6,053 wounded. About 600 Chamorus are reported to have been killed during the Japanese occupation.⁵² Once the Japanese had surrendered, the US Navy lost no time in re-instating its authority on Guam, and proceeded to use the island as an entry point from which to invade other Mariana Islands and the Japanese mainland. During this time, most of the Chamorus on Guam lived in refugee camps run by the US and their lives were governed by the needs of the US war, although the US did put some effort into providing education and employment.

After the war, the number of military personnel on Guam was greatly reduced, but the island remained under the administration of the US Navy until 1950 when the passage of the Organic Act made Guam an organized unincorporated territory of the United States and the Chamoru population of Guam became US citizens. The president appointed the governor, and the administration fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. The first popularly elected governor took office in 1971, and Guam elected its first delegate to the US Congress in 1972. Guam continues to house important US military, primarily naval, facilities.

What has the US military presence on Guam meant thus far? The testimony of Victoria-Lola Montecalvo Leon Guerrero (Guahan Indigenous Collective) to the UN Committee on Decolonization in 2006 is both moving and informative. The following is a lengthy quotation from her testimony.

“...Since World War II, the US military presence on Guahan has been devastating to the survival of our language and culture as a Chamoru people, our right to create our own form of government, our right to own the land that was passed down to us by our ancestors, our civil right to vote for all our leaders including the US president that is the Commander in Chief of the military that occupies 30 percent of our island, and our basic human right to survival. The legacy of World War II has led to the toxic pollution of our land and surrounding waters from nuclear and other carcinogenic waste and has increased the amounts of cancers and deaths among Chamoru people. And the legacy of World War II has meant that our Chamoru sons and daughters are forced to leave Guahan, their homeland, because the United States has limited our economic resources to tourism and military spending.

...There is a shortage of competitive jobs for young Chamoru people, who choose to enlist in the US military because they are told it will give them a brighter future. Yet, **in every war the US has fought since World War II-Vietnam, the Gulf War and the current ‘War on Terror’ more Chamorus have died per capita than any other soldiers.** And what do Chamoru families get when they lose a son or daughter to war? What do we get when we lose a life we poured 21 years and our hopes for the future into? We get a small sum of money, a US flag and a free

burial spot to visit at the veteran's cemetery. What about that life? How do we get that back?...

How do we get back the lives we've lost, the Chamorus who have been forced off their homeland, and the land we need to build on so that they can return? We do not get these resources back with an increased military presence on our island. But without the right to self-determination, we have no power, no legal recourse in which to stop this military build-up that will further displace the Chamoru people.

...Earlier this year, the US Department of Defense unveiled its plan to move 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa and Japan to Guahan, and to increase the existing population of Navy and Air Force personnel on the island. **By 2014, there will be an estimated population increase of at least 35,000 people**, which will greatly impact the island's current population of 168,000 and change our cultural, political, social and ecological environment...."⁵³ (*Emphasis in the original*).

In 2007, Chamoru people from Guahan again testified before the UN Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization Committee), again appealing to the committee about the violation of their right to self-determination posed by the military escalation on Guam. The reference by military personnel to 'Fortress Guam' or reference to the island as the "tip of America's spear" is symbolic of the patriarchal nature of military control.⁵⁴ Needless to say, the repeated appeals of the Chamoru people for decolonization and self-determination remain unsuccessful, and the influx of military and other personnel as a result of the military build-up there has served to further reduce the percentage of Chamoru residents.⁵⁵ Today, more Chamorus live on the US mainland than in Guam. This trend underlies the appeal of the Guahan Indigenous Collective to the UN Fourth Committee to bring an end to the "great exodus" of "young Chamorus, doctors, teachers and future leaders leaving the island as US Marines, fighter aircraft bombers, unmanned aerial vehicles, fast-attack nuclear submarines and foreign construction workers take their place."⁵⁶

The exodus of Chamorus from Guam comes partly as a result of the rising cost of living, making Chamorus unable to afford to live there any longer. This will be further exacerbated by the influx of 8000 marines and their families, and

local residents are concerned about the environmental, healthcare, education and social impact of the population increase. These concerns mirror those of local residents in Okinawa, where most of the US bases are located. Let us now turn to the Okinawa side of the question.

In Japan, the US operates military bases under the auspices of a US Status of Forces Agreement with the Japanese government. While there are bases located throughout Japan's four main islands, 75% of them are located in Okinawa, taking up 10% of the total land area of the Okinawan islands, and 19% of that of the main island, Okinawa. (The Okinawan Islands comprise 0.6% of Japan's total land area).⁵⁷ Okinawa was the site of the only land battle on Japanese soil during WWII. The toll of the Battle of Okinawa was exceptionally high on both sides; one out of every three civilians died.

On 28 April 1952, the Treaty of Peace with Japan entered into force, ending the Occupation on the mainland but not in the Okinawan Islands which remained under US control until 1970. US soldiers stationed on Okinawa have been sent to fight in the Korean, Vietnam, Gulf, and Iraq Wars, and bases in Okinawa have served as logistical backup. On the main island, one cannot avoid the US bases; the sound of planes taking off and landing interrupts school lessons, military vehicles clog the roads and military personnel roam the streets. Even today when the economy is bad, the bases are surrounded by bars and shops with large signs in English advertising their desire to attract military customers. Of course, one aspect of those businesses is military prostitution; another is rape and other forms of sexual violence.⁵⁸

Okinawa is home to twelve US Marine Corps installations, including the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), located in Ginowan City on the main island of Okinawa, and has been a US military airbase since the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The Futenma Base is located very close to an urban area, and there has been much concern over safety. Air and noise pollution have been a subject of controversy, and these concerns were amplified on 13 August 2004 when a Marine helicopter crashed and burned inside the campus of Okinawa International University. Three Marines were injured in the crash, but no one at the university was hurt.

In 1995, a twelve-year old Okinawan girl was kidnapped and repeatedly raped by three American servicemen. This incident brought to the surface the smoldering anger of the people of Okinawa and a month later, an anti-base rally drew 85,000 people.⁵⁹ In 1996, in what was initially seen as an attempt to quell the anger of the Okinawan people, the government announced that the Futenma Base was to be returned. It soon became clear, however, that the base was to be relocated to an off-shore location in Henoko Bay in the northern part of Okinawa Island.⁶⁰ The new base was to be built in a beautiful section of ocean, rich in marine wildlife and home to the endangered dugong, as well as the Okinawa woodpecker and Okinawa rail. Plans call for filling in a huge section of ocean, 2500 meters long and 730 meters wide. It would be used for helicopter flight training, as well as other activities.

Shortly after plans for the relocation became known, a sit-in was begun at Henoko, organized by the Henoko 'Society for the Protection of Life.' This sit-in is still continuing today, ten years later. In 2004, authorities attempted to begin construction of offshore towers to be used for boring the seabed. Protesters in kayaks and other small craft engaged in non-violent resistance, impeding construction of most of the planned towers. Although plans had called for boring in 63 locations, the protestors succeeded in completely preventing it. In 2005, the towers that had been successfully installed were removed.

In October of 2005, US and Japanese authorities announced a change in plans. The designated area for the relocation was changed to a section of Henoko that was already included within the area of Camp Schwab, another Marine Corps facility. The base is to have two runways in a V shape. The reason given for the change was that it would make construction easier, although members of the Society for the Protection of Life believe that the real reason was the success of their protest. At the time of this writing, authorities are engaged in environmental assessments and it is hoped that the presence of endangered species such as the dugong will help to at least further delay, if not prevent, construction.

From the perspective of most of the people of Okinawa, the relocation of US bases and military forces outside of Japan (or at least outside of Okinawa) is considered to be desirable.⁶¹ While US bases do bring some opportunities for

employment, tourism and some businesses, these supposed advantages are off set by the reality of accidents, sexual and other violence, various kinds of pollution, and other hazards. Moreover, the psychological cost of having US bases on Okinawa is very high, and many Okinawan people strongly oppose their forced role in hosting US troops who provide logistical support for foreign conflict or train on Okinawa and then leave to kill people in other parts of the world.

Suzuyo Takasato is one Okinawan who is strongly opposed to US bases. In 1995, after the rape of the Okinawan girl by US soldiers, Takasato and her supporters established 'Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence' (OWAMV), an association with the objective of stopping military violence and military power. At the same time, they opened the 'Rape Emergency Intervention Counseling Centre — Okinawa' to support victims of sexual violence. One of their activities was to compile a list of sexual violence committed against women by US soldiers, and they were surprised to find how pervasive that violence had been. In addition to the many unwanted and forced pregnancies which resulted from frequent raping of women and girls at gunpoint after the war, they found instances of a nine-month of baby who was a victim of sexual violence in 1949 and a six-year old girl who was raped and killed in 1955. During the Vietnam War years, it is reported that two to four people were strangled to death every year by US soldiers. The violence continued even after Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, where rape and/or attempted rape victims included both a ten year-old and a fourteen year-old girl.⁶²

When the rape of the twelve year-old girl occurred in 1995, Takasato had just come back from the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing where she had given a presentation with other women from Okinawa on 'Military Violence against Women in Okinawa.' She was furious when she heard the news, and took immediate action to mobilize women to protect themselves and their families, taking the position that the very existence of the military bases on Okinawa was an example of structural and direct violence against women.⁶³

The initial objective of Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence was to break the silence surrounding sexual violence by US soldiers and to oust US bases from Okinawa. They soon learned that most Americans knew little or

nothing about the sexual violence committed by US soldiers abroad, and so Takasato organized a peace caravan to the US to educate interested American women about the problem. Gradually OWAMV learned that the problem did not concern just Okinawa and the US, but actually involved women wherever US bases were located. This awareness led to the formation in 1997 of the 'East Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women's Network Against Militarism' with women from the Philippines, Korea, US and Puerto Rico. Through the network, the women realized violence against women is not only a violation of human rights, but that it is fundamentally related to the racism, patriarchy, sex discrimination and economic oppression brought by militarism and globalization.⁶⁴

After the Seoul Conference in 2002, the OWAMV network further expanded to include Hawaii and Guam. This expansion of membership brought a new issue to the fore. While there were similarities among the women in the different countries, there was not a direct and obvious link. This changed, however, with the inclusion of Guam and growing awareness that the relocation of US soldiers from Okinawa to Guam might mean relief for Okinawan women but would at the same time threaten the very existence of the Chamoru people because the plans for Futenma include the relocation of 8000 marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam. For OWAMV, this realization meant that it was no longer possible to simply oppose the presence of the military on Okinawa; they found they could only oppose bases on Okinawa if they were also willing to oppose them on Guam. The OWAMV has now embarked on a campaign to address this question, calling for security policy which is based on getting rid of the military and weapons, rather than being based on military strength.⁶⁵ They are beginning with a study tour to Guam in January 2008 to find ways in which they can cooperate.

III. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to look at the intersection of cultural governance, militarization and gender(ed) violence in the Pacific. It has addressed three very different aspects: regional structures for gender mainstreaming and implementation of Resolution 1325, the role of women in the Bougainville Crisis and

resistance to presence of US bases abroad and the relocation of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. These three aspects are linked through hegemonic militarism and its demands for the governance of gender.

The adoption of Resolution 1325 has led to an increase in cooperation among governments, international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations at transnational as well as local levels, and as we have seen, the Pacific is no exception. This should have had enormous implications for organizations working with women in conflict situations, yet while we do hear more about the ways conflicts are affecting women, there is still a long way to go before those situations are rectified in the Pacific Islands region as well as elsewhere.

One reason for the seeming inability of transnational networks to end gender violence has its roots in the liberal gender perspective and its concomitant substitution of the word woman for gender. Rather than changing gendered hierarchies and structures which adversely affect women, most of these organizations seek to find solutions by merely increasing the number of women involved. These attempts are in some ways very effective, but they also help to reproduce traditional gender/power roles and their accompanying violence.⁶⁶ Transformation requires calling attention to, and changing, the power imbalances that underlie gender roles. Substituting the word 'gender' for 'women' is not enough.

Every conflict has at least two sides, and in order for the conflict to continue, it is essential that the parties continue to view one another in a negative way, as the 'enemy' or at least 'other.' Cultural governance imposes these 'we/they' distinctions on people, often in contradiction to their personal preferences and identities. Initiatives such as Resolution 1325 and other international work for gender mainstreaming seek to involve women in every aspect of the conflict resolution process. So far, these efforts do not appear to have been substantively effective in the PICTs. The voices of women are given relatively little notice, even when they play an active and constructive role in bringing armed conflict to an end. Moreover, 'peace' is not necessarily accompanied by demilitarization nor does it provide new roles for women. Here it is suggested that traditional roles of women as 'peace makers' and gender initiatives which fail to recognize the

gender(ed) and structural violence upon which they are predicated can be of limited use over the long term in truly involving women in the processes of governance and peace building. These processes must redefine the terms of cultural governance, making gender(ed) violence visible, and engaging in demilitarization

In the Bougainville Crisis, women on both sides recognized the importance of unity in ending the fighting, and arranged first for discussions among Bougainvilleans only, without participation from PNG, New Zealand, Australia or other outside parties. These discussions paved the way for the official peace talks. In the case of Okinawa/Guam, the requirements of cultural governance from the perspective of Tokyo call for the incorporation of Okinawa into Japan, glossing over its history of colonization and different culture. A similar process occurs with Guam, which Washington treats as being essentially a part of the United States, even though it technically is not. Opposition to the planned relocation of US marines from Okinawa to Guam has created a new site for resistance to US and Japanese cultural governance, as it has brought women of both sides together in a united stand. This has also meant that they address the question of militarization as one of structural violence, and has forced them to look at the violent intersection of militarization, gender and racism.

In both the case of Bougainville and that of Okinawa/Guam, women used their gender identity as a starting point for their opposition to violence and militarization. In Bougainville, they used their traditional role as 'peace-makers' to call for unity among the warring parties and pave the way for official peace talks. In the case of Okinawa/Guam, the rape of a twelve-year-old girl became the catalyst for a growing network in opposition to militarization and military violence.

In Okinawa, opposition to the US bases often becomes a discussion of the injustice of having the majority of US bases located in just one prefecture. In forming an international network around gender violence, the OWAMV has been able to move beyond this discussion of 'fairness' to a position which opposes bases entirely and calls for a redefinition of the basic concepts of security, calling into question militarization and other forms of structural violence as well as

direct violence. This transformation would not have been possible if they had not been able to overcome the binaries imposed by cultural governance, particularly in the case of solidarity with people on Guam. Similarly, in demanding and finding ‘unity,’ the Bougainville women were able to transcend their allegiance to one side or the other in order to re-create and re-embody themselves as ‘Bougainvilleans.’ In both cases, ‘unity’ would have been impossible without a rejection of militarization and military means to problem solving.

What is less clear is the extent to which ‘unity’ and the rejection of militarization in a particular situation leads to a more generalized stance in opposition to structural violence and ultimately to non-violent work for peace. Without such an analysis, the success of ‘women’s efforts’ in such situations may in fact lead to perpetuation of factors underlying the violence in the first place, giving temporary relief without providing a long-term solution. Gender mainstreaming through measures such as Resolution 1325 seek to address this issue through increasing the participation of women and through focusing on their needs. In theory, these measures seek to address both ‘gender violence’ and ‘gendered violence’ but in practice, the conflation of gender with women has kept attention on the former to the detriment of the latter. This paper has shown that work to overcome gender(ed) violence must include efforts to address militarization in all its forms, including racism and patriarchy. This involves recognition of various forms of difference, and also acknowledgement that we are both similar to, and different from, both our friends and our enemies. Efforts to resist cultural governance and create alternatives must include such work if they are to be truly transformational. Focusing on women, or gender, or even ‘unity’ is not enough.

Notes

- 1 Sirivi, Josephone Tankunani & Marilyn Taleo Havini, eds. *...as Mothers of the Land: The Birth of the Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom*. Pandanus Books, 2004, p.65
- 2 This resolution, adopted in 2000, encourages member states to “ensure increased representation of women at all decision making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict,” and calls on all involved actors, “when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective,” particularly with regard to needs of women and girls during post-conflict repatriation and reconstruction, support for women’s peace initiatives, and protecting the human rights of women and girls.
UNSC Resolution 1325(2000):1 http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/res_1325e.pdf (accessed 13 Nov.

2007)

- 3 In 2005, about 1000 Fijians were said to be working as private security contractors in Iraq and another 2000 former Fijian soldiers were working for the British army. See for example Inter Press Service News Agency, 'Fijian Deaths in Iraq Revive Mercenaries' Issue,' <http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=33580> (2007.12.27). By the end of 2006, 13 Fijians had been killed. The number of military personnel from American Samoa killed in Iraq on a per capita basis is almost 13.5 times the US national average. News: US Department of the Interior, (http://www.doi.gov/news/06_News_Releases/060706.htm) (2006.11.16)
- 4 Callahan, William A. 2006. *Cultural Governance and Resistance in Pacific Asia*. London and New York: Routledge, p.4
- 5 See for example Reardon, Betty. 1985. *Sexism and the War System*. NY: Teacher's College Press
- 6 Nayak, Meghana and Jennifer Suchland. "Gender Violence and Hegemonic Projects." *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. Vol.8, No.4 2006, p.469
- 7 Enloe, Cynthia. 2000. *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*. London: University of California Press, p.33
- 8 Kaplan, Laura Duhan. "Woman as Caretaker: An Archetype That Supports Patriarchal Militarism." *Hypatia*, Special Issue: Feminism and Peace, Vol.9, No.2, Spring 1994, p.124. Kaplan lists two additional features of patriarchal militarism: (1) Since war is seen by many to be a creative masculine act, the commitment of social resources to war is a male project and (2) the public is convinced that militarism is necessary for safety because those who are different must be dominated for the good of both themselves and the dominators.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p.128
- 10 Nayak, et al., *op.cit.*, p.469, For a definition of violence against women (as opposed to gender) see the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women: "For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life." (<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm>; accessed 2008.1.22)
- 11 Gender identity is imposed on people by society. It is not an individual choice, although some individuals may have some choice as to how they behave. While this paper focuses on women, the social transformation sought here requires an affirmation of different ideas of gender, including transgender.
- 12 Thomas, Pamela. "The Pacific: Gender Issues in Conflict and Peacemaking" in Rawwida Baksh, Linda Etchart, Elsie Onubogu & Tina Johnson, eds. *Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace*. Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005, p.157
- 13 Thomas, Pamela. "Introduction: Conflict and Peacemaking: Gender Perceptions" in Development Studies Network. *Women, Gender and Development in the Pacific: Key Issues*, pp.3-4 (<http://devnet.anu.edu.au/GenderPacific/index.html>; accessed 2008.6.7)
- 14 Established in 1982, PWB is part of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC; former South Pacific Commission), belonging to the Social Resources Division. Japan is not a member. Membership includes 22 Pacific Island countries and territories: American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna. In addition, the 26 members of the Pacific Community include the four remaining founding countries: Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United States of America. The United Kingdom withdrew at the beginning of 1996 from SPC (at the time the South Pacific Commission), rejoined in 1998 and withdrew again in January 2005. (http://www.spc.int/corp/index.php?option=com_content&task

=view&id=17&Itemid=46; accessed 2008.01.10)

- 15 The Pacific Platform of Action on the Advancement of Women and Gender Equality 2005-2015 (revised 2004) was the result of wide regional and sub-regional consultations and was approved at the 6th Regional Conference of Pacific Women and the Ministerial Conference on Women and Sustainable Development, both held in Noumea in 1994. This plan formed the basis for the Pacific region's contribution to the 1995 World Conference for Women in Beijing. The current PPA incorporates the Beijing +5 outcomes and commitments under CEDAW.
- 16 All Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) have established institutions for women at the national level and 13 countries have ratified CEDAW. Violence against women, domestic violence, teenage pregnancies, school dropouts and broken families are problems and have been linked to alcohol and substance abuse, which remains common. Secretariat of the Pacific Community. "Pacific Women's Bureau Strategic Plan 2006-2009," pp.2-3
- 17 These committees are affiliated with the UN WPS Coordinating Committee, established in 2005 to further implement UNSC Resolution 1325.
- 18 The Biketawa Declaration was signed in Biketawa, Kiribati in 2000. It is a security framework building on a number of other frameworks dating back to the Honiara Declaration of 1994. It has several key features that make it unique to the region. "These include its commitment to upholding democratic processes and good governance, its recognition of indigenous rights and cultural values and the process for addressing crises in the region. The Biketawa Declaration has been invoked twice since its promulgation in 2000, in Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and in Nauru (PRAN). Three successful election observer missions in the region-Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Fiji-have also been undertaken under this framework." http://www.forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/Biketawa%20Declaration.pdf (accessed 2008.01.11)
- 19 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. "Regional Workshop on Gender, Conflict Peace and Security June 15-17 2006, Draft Outcomes Document," p.1
- 20 Thomas, Pamela. "The Pacific: Gender Issues in Conflict and Peacemaking" in *op. cit.* Baksh et al, p.155
- 21 *Ibid.*, p.43
- 22 *Ibid.*, p.39
- 23 Sirivi & Havini, *op. cit.*, p.64
- 24 Macintyre, Martha. "Violence and peacemaking in Papua New Guinea: A realistic assessment of the social and cultural issues at grassroots level." Development Studies Network: Women, Gender and Development in the Pacific: Key Issues, *op. cit.*, p.42
- 25 Garasu, Sister Lorraine. "The Role of Women in Promoting Peace and Reconciliation." Accord: Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea-Bougainville Peace Process, 2002. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/women-peace-reconciliation.php> (2007.12.18)
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- 28 O'Callaghan, *op. cit.*
- 29 Hakena, Helen. "Papua New Guinea: Women in Armed Conflict." Baksh et al, *op. cit.*, p.162
- 30 Helen Hakena quoted in McCutchan, Arthur. "The Bougainville Experience." Pacific Women's Network Against Violence, September 1997, p.1
- 31 Garasu, Sister Lorraine., *op. cit.* Accord
- 32 Havini, Marilyn Taleo. "Women in Community During the Blockade." Sivirini and Havini, *op. cit.*,

p.70

33 Garasu, *op. cit.* Accord

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35 Havini, *op. cit.*, p.71

36 *Ibid.*, p.123

37 Garasu, *op. cit.* Accord

38 See the following site for details: Pacific Islands Government Portal. <http://www.governance.usp.ac.fj/top-menu/countries-and-territories/bougainville/governance-information/> (2007.12.23)

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40 *Ibid.*, p.43

41 *Ibid.*, p.43

42 Hakena, *op. cit.*, p.165

43 *Ibid.*, pp.168-169

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47 Guahan is the indigenous name for the island of Guam. The Chamoru (Chamorro) people are the indigenous residents. http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=17311/overrideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl (accessed 2007.12.17)

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50 *Ibid.*, p.181

51 *Ibid.*, p.181

52 *Ibid.*, p.194

53 <http://blindelephant.blogspot.com/2006/11/un-testimonies-4-this-great-exodus> 2006.11.16

54 'Peace and Justice for Guam and the Pacific: The Question of Guam 2007.' Department of Public

- Information, News and Media Division, NY, 62nd General Assembly Fourth Committee 3rd Meeting (PM) "The Question of Guam 2007" (2007.12.27) <http://decolonizeguam.blogspot.com/2007/11/question-of-guam-2007.html>
- 55 In 1980, Chamorus made up 45% of the population but it had fallen to 37% in 2000 and continues to fall. *Ibid.* (2007.12.27) <http://decolonizeguam.blogspot.com/2007/11/question-of-guam-2007.html>
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- 57 Chinen, Ushi. "*Nihon no Yujinyo. Kichi mottekaette kara matann mensore. — Kichi, Senso, Shokuminchi no Okinawa yori.*" ("Friends of Japan, Let's meet again after you take your bases away. From Okinawa, site of bases, war and colonization.") in Takao, *Anataha Senso de Shinemasuka*. NHK Publishers, (知念ウシ「日本の友人よ 基地持って帰ってからまたんメンソーレ〜基地、戦争、植民地の沖縄より」 斉藤貴男他、『あなたは戦争で死ねますか』NHK 出版生活新書230)
- 58 Military prostitution is a form of sexual violence, although it may include cases of the exchange of money for sexual acts between freely consenting and well-informed adults.
- 59 On 18 August 2008, one of the perpetrators of the rape, Kendrick Ledet, committed suicide after strangling a 22-year old co-worker to death. (*Japan Times* 2008.2.25) The number of protestors was exceeded on 29 September 2007 when a rally protesting Japanese government plans to take out of textbooks all mention of the role played by Japanese soldiers in the mass suicides in Okinawa attracted 110,000 people. In February 2008, Japan was shocked by two more accusations of rape, both incidents perpetrated by US military men in Okinawa. The victim in one is a 14-year-old girl.
- 60 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, 2 December 1996
- 61 A 2005 citizens' referendum on Henoko showed strong opposition to the construction of the new base. For information in Japanese on results of local referenda held in 2005 on US bases see the following site (accessed 07.12.17): <http://www.geocities.co.jp/WallStreet/1412/rd/news71.html#no3>
- 62 In Japanese, refer to <http://www.space-yui.com/koudou.htm>. Also see: 'Outposts of Empire: The case against foreign military bases.' Transnational Institute, March 2007. http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?&act_id=16374&menu=11e
- 63 Takasato, Suzuyo. *Okinawa no Onnatachi — Josei no Jinken to Kichi, Guntai*. ("Okinawa's Women: Women's Rights and Bases and the Military"). Akashi Shoten, 1996. (高里鈴代『オキナワの女たち〜女性の人権と基地・軍隊』明石書店 1996)
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- 66 See Connell, R.W. "The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal." *Theory and Society*, Vol.19, No.5 Oct. 1990, pp.507-544